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Learning to Meet the ‘Demands of the Day’ 
Towards a Weberian Philosophy of Education  
 
John P. Fantuzzo  
The purpose of this dissertation is to propose a Weberian philosophy of education. I 
understand philosophy of education to be a field dedicated to reflection upon the 
educator’s practice. My project arises from the contention that too many contemporary 
philosophers of education have, in the name of realism, exchanged reflection on 
educational practice for reflection on the political dimensions of educational institutions, 
thereby engaging in some variety of applied political philosophy. Treating philosophy of 
education as applied political philosophy demotes the significance of educational practice 
and thus the significance of the field itself. The central question this dissertation takes up 
is how philosophers of education might lend significance and priority to educational 
practice in a manner that does not ignore the realities of educational institutions. My 
argument is that a Weberian philosophy of education – a philosophy based on social 
theorist Max Weber’s conception of education – can provoke reflection upon the ideal 
qualities of educational practice amidst a non-ideal and pluralistic society. A Weberian 
philosophy of education revives a vision of students as particular persons, prioritizes 
calling as an educational aim, galvanizes the dignity of the educator’s cause, and points 
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This dissertation arises from my study of Max Weber’s conception of education, which 
has been a paradoxical experience. Just as Weber argues in Economy and Society that “rational 
asceticism” in the West paradoxically “led to the accumulation of [the] wealth” it rejected 
(Weber 1978, p. 586), my initial critique of Weber’s conception of education – particularly his 
rigid distinction between the scholar and the educator in Science as a Vocation – has led to an 
extended argument for a Weberian philosophy of education. My present reading of Weber 
commends the philosophical and educational aspects of his work. My assurance that this 
emphasis is not marginal arises from a climactic moment in Weber’s lecture “Science as a 
Vocation” (1917). Weber states,  
Philosophy, as a specialist discipline, and the discussions, which are essentially 
philosophical, conducted by the individual disciplines, attempt to achieve [clarity]. We 
can, in this way, if we understand the matter (which must be presupposed), compel or at 
least help the individual to give an account of the ultimate meaning of his own actions to 
himself. It seems to me that this should not be underestimated, even for the purely 
personal life. At this point I am also tempted to say, if a teacher succeeds in this, that he 
is acting in the service of “moral” forces, performing his duty to create clarity and a sense 
of responsibility. (Weber 2008, p. 48)   
We learn from this quote that all specialist disciplines involve philosophical concepts and 
questions, and the moral purpose of all specialist disciplines is accomplished when philosophical 
concepts are taught in a manner that compels students to take an active responsibility for giving 
“an account of the ultimate meaning of his own actions to himself” (Weber 2008, p. 48). If this 
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line is taken seriously, it is possible to read the entirety of Weber’s work as pedagogical matter 
(cf. Fantuzzo 2015).  
 Of course it doesn’t take long to discover that reading the entirety of Weber’s work as 
pedagogically relevant yields no stream of insight. Attempting to find and articulate the 
educational significance of Weber’s work, for me, has been a process of discovery punctuated by 
barrenness. The appropriate metaphor for reading Weber, perhaps on any subject, is mining. As 
Sven Eliaeson writes, “Weber’s work is like a gigantic quarry with many shiny stones to pick 
up—many concepts and hypotheses to extend, elaborate, and transcend” (2002, p. 3).1 It might 
be said that my reading of Weber seeks to locate (extend, elaborate, and transcend) the 
philosophical and educational aspects of his work. I approach Weber as a thinker who can 
illuminate the human condition from an educational perspective, who is attentive to insights into 
human nature, and who compels his students to reconsider the basic ethical question: “How 
ought I live?” (cf. Scaff 2011, p. 250) The possibility that this question finds support in Weber’s 
work bears heavily upon my conception of a Weberian philosophy of education.   
 In what follows, I develop a Weberian philosophy of education in order to offer a 
response to the following question: How might philosophers of education lend significance to the 
priority of educational practice in a manner that does not ignore the realities of educational 
institutions and the collision of interests and values currently shaping them? I argue that 
reflecting upon the Weberian educator provides a promising response. The Weberian educator 
provokes students to take an active responsibility for ideas. She echoes the demands of particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Mining the secondary literature on Weber yields the same image in Käsler’s work (1988): “The 
lack of system, the existing contradictions and the differing levels of precision made and still 
make Weber’s entire oeuvre into a huge ‘quarry’ which could be, and indeed was, exploited, 
protected, wondered at and inspected” (p. 214).    
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ideas arising from the content she teaches, while anticipating the formative potential of these 
ideas upon a person’s life.  
 Admittedly, the scope of education is vast, ranging from algebra to car repair and 
economics to theatre. Rather than limiting the scope or presuming competence over its range, I 
shall focus on unpacking the meaning of what the Weberian educator anticipates: namely, an 
educated calling. Although Weber taught specific disciplines,2 and these disciplines will 
undoubtedly color what follows, a Weberian philosophy of education need not hinge upon a 
particular discipline’s content.3 Instead, it hinges upon the Weberian educator’s relationship to 
students working particular ideas in a given subject and her hope that these students will take an 
active responsibility for the meaning of their obligations in the world as mature persons. 
 Educated will mean taking an active responsibility for ideas: heeding the demand of an 
idea to become a reality, along with heeding the voice of an educator who echoes this demand. 
Calling will mean a conception of the ultimate meaning of a person’s obligations in the world. 
When analyzed, calling is an idea about a person’s self as well as an idea about the world. To 
provide the skeletal version of what follows: an educated calling will be understood as an active 
responsibility bearing upon a person’s self-examination or ideas about his self (chapter 2) in 
relation to an idea about the world – which I will call his habituation – and his task therein, 
which I will call his cause (chapter 3). The unity of these demands can be found as a person acts 
upon his obligations in a non-ideal and pluralistic society – which I will refer to as having an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Weber names them in “Science as Vocation” as “sociology, history, political economy and 
political science and those varieties of cultural philosophy whose function is to interpret them” 
(2008, p. 41).   
	  
3	  Throughout this dissertation I will frequently return to the example of an 8th grade algebra 
teacher. I do so because this is a subject, unlike history or English, which does not obviously 
provide moral and existential lessons.  
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educated calling in modern society (chapter 4). After the meaning of an educated calling has 
been fleshed out, I argue that the Weberian educator’s cause harbors a positive social vision 
(chapter 5). Specifically, through her work echoing the demands of her particular students’ ideas, 
the Weberian educator envisions a fuller conception of humanity. This conception is not 
borrowed from an ideal external to the educational domain (e.g., a political ideal premised upon 
the common good), but springs from the educator’s practice. I refer to the educator’s cause and 
this positive social vision as “responsible re-enchantment.” Thus, I claim, “responsible re-
enchantment” springs from the Weberian educator’s everyday practice. Ultimately I hope to 
show that reflection upon educational practice is still quite valuable without preset political aims; 
a significant source of hope and noble aspiration springs from the Weberian educator’s practice 
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Chapter 1  
“Learning to Meet the Demands of the Day”  
 
1.1 A Fundamental Obligation   
 
 Imagine two parents engaging in an argument about the best way to parent. The argument 
becomes heated, interests collide, the norms of family life appear to be on the line. Imagine 
further that this argument occurs in the presence of their children. So imagined, an irony of this 
argument is that it is simultaneously an act of parenting. As the children listen to their parents 
argue, they are being “parented” as it were by the collision of parental interests. If both parents 
were to watch a video recording of their argument and reflect upon their children’s reactions, the 
contradiction would likely become quite clear. Both parents would see that despite the 
importance of their values or strengths of their interests at the time, they could have been arguing 
more responsibly, because their argument about parenting neglected the practice of parenting – 
and thus their children suffered. Such arguments between parents happen every day, of course, 
and perhaps they are an unavoidable part of a modern upbringing. But, upon reflection, they 
should not happen; children should not be raised by the collision of parental interests. Put 
positively, the practice of parenting ought to take priority over the politics of parenting. We 
might call this a fundamental obligation of parenting. It is fundamental because affirming it is 
essential to a more substantial conception of parenting. It is not merely an externally given 
obligation, like a traffic law, because it bears the qualities of an ideal, that is, an image of 
excellence that motivates parents to attend to the practice of parenting (in a variety of situations) 
and set their more specific goals and orient their daily decisions accordingly.4 The task of this 
dissertation is not to reflect upon a fundamental obligation of parenting, but to explore its 
educational counterpart. Does an analogous obligation arise in the educational practice—when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Here I am borrowing language from De Ruyter (2003).  
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this term is taken as basic, as it will be throughout this dissertation, and constituted by the tasks 
we commonly think of educators engaged in when they are working for students?  
 Intuitively, the answer is yes. Those who will read this dissertation would likely agree 
that students should not be subject to the collision of interests and values that impinge upon 
educational institutions unless they are first prepared to understand the issues at stake or unless 
stakeholders dispute with instructive intentions. To think otherwise would not be to think about 
educating students, but rather about subjecting them to a careless form of socialization, where, 
for instance, the person in the room with the loudest voice or the philanthropist in the room with 
the most money would arbitrarily determine the course of their education. This seems wrong, at 
least from our current social and historical vantage point. Perhaps this is the case because 
educational practice in modern society should not be reducible to mere socialization (e.g., 
adjusting students to the most dominant social interests or the most persuasive social values), 
because contemporary educational practice recognizes an obligation to cultivate independent 
thinking in students, that is, a disposition to understand and take responsibility for the course of 
their lives in a modern, pluralistic society. For, in such a society, a person’s obligations and 
values are not inherited at birth; a burden is placed upon persons to decide the course of their 
lives in light of its demands, possibilities, and limitations. An educator can play an important role 
in helping students to understand and take up this burden. And, given the challenge of thinking 
independently about one’s life in modern society— whether this involves a career choice, 
political participation, or religious affiliation, many would agree that an educator (one way or 
another) is fundamentally obligated to do so.5 This is to say, many would agree that the practice 
of education ought to be something more than mere socialization and that educational practice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For sophisticated articulations of the value of autonomy from liberal political philosophers see 
Callan 1997 and Levinson 2002.  
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ought to take priority over the colliding interests that impinge upon educational policy and the 
everyday politics of school life.   
Despite the intuitive appeal of this educational obligation, at least from our social and 
historical vantage point, it is difficult to take responsibility for it in practice. The ideal quality of 
this fundamental educational obligation seems necessarily compromised amidst the realities of 
modern educational institutions. Teachers in all educational institutions have very likely 
experienced the frustration of having their educational practice obstructed by a parent’s 
complaint, institutional policy, or administrator’s whim. Such occurrences are common; so 
common, in fact that they may be chalked up as a necessary evil of schooling.  
Of course, the frequency and variety of these occurrences varies from place to place. 
Teachers working at small, affluent private schools may less often feel the brunt of institutional 
regulations, though they may feel unduly subject to the demands of educational competitions and 
the necessity of victory that justifies their school’s status and price tag (cf. Khan 2012). Public 
school teachers, on the other hand, may duck the demands of frenzied educational competitions 
and paying parents but more often feel obstructed by institutional regulations. This occurs, at its 
worst, in the form of clumsy accountability schemes and punitive oversight that leads to what 
one scholar has aptly called “demoralization” (cf. Santoro 2011).  
Whether facing the particular demands of paying parents or the agenda of mass 
educational reform, the need for teachers to push back on educational interests in the name of 
educational practice is easier said than done. Teachers who shirk the external demands of their 
institutions risk putting their livelihood on the line or (less obviously) risk engaging in a political 
dispute that can also distract attention from the priority of educational practice. So, it is difficult 
to take responsibility for the priority of educational practice when educators suffer from a lack of 
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professional autonomy (cf. Metha 2013). The present state of affairs feels grim, for the realities 
of educational institutions, from Pre-K to college, seem geared to provoke fear and the interests 
of self-preservation rather than an image of excellence that motivates educators to attend first 
and foremost to educational practice and set their more specific goals and orient their daily 
decisions accordingly. Amidst the realities of educational institutions, and the host of conflicting 
imperatives to educate, can reflection on the fundamental obligation that the educator has to the 
students make a difference?    
1.2 Motivation  
 This dissertation arises from the conviction that contemporary philosophers of education 
need to reflect upon educational practice realistically. If philosophers of education have the time 
and profess a capacity to reflect upon education and seek to inform educational practice, then 
they ought to strive to better understand and elevate its priority, because this fundamental 
obligation seems to lack substance and force in today’s educational climate.    
 Of course, in an educational climate where the field of philosophy of education is 
experiencing a global decline in university teaching positions (Alexander 2015, p. 1), it may be a 
stretch to claim that philosophers of education bear any special responsibility for the fate of 
anything. A likely reason for the decline in positions is that schools of education are moving 
towards methodically equipping future teachers for the realities of educational practice and thus 
further away from speculative inquiry. Thus, in a state of decline, a fair question to ask is: How 
can a small group of scholars be blamed for anything they attend to or neglect when so few care 
to listen? I am not in a position to comment on this problem at a general level, but I am hesitant 
to join exculpatory efforts, because a surprising amount of work being done in the field of 
contemporary philosophy of education does not prioritize educational practice.  
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1.3 The Norm of Institutional Realism  
 The field of philosophy of education represents a diversity of perspectives, but at present 
it is governed by what I shall call a “norm of institutional realism.” The basic tenet of 
institutional realism is that tough-minded and significant philosophy of education involves taking 
a stand on the state and direction of educational institutions; philosophers of education should 
not be too idealistic, utopian, or “airy fairy;”6 they should engage the real crises and politics of 
educational institutions. To echo contemporary political philosopher Raymond Geuss, they 
should not avoid hard questions like: “Who does what to whom for whose benefit?” (cf. Geuss 
2008, p. 25). Philosophers of education will be significant (put crudely: worth listening to) if 
they can identify new crises, much like the news, or contribute to the transformation of 
educational institutions, much like political decision makers or activists. Now, thinking 
realistically about the priority of educational practice does involve acknowledging institutional 
realities. How could it not? Yet the norm of institutional realism bids philosophers of education 
to prioritize reflection on educational politics and thus subtly undermines the priority of 
educational practice. The agents who make political decisions to reform or revolutionize 
educational institutions have become of paramount concern.  
Adherence to the norm of institutional realism is prominent in two dominant yet wholly 
opposed camps in the field of philosophy of education.  Despite their different approaches, both 
camps move away from prioritizing educational practice by collapsing the distinction between 
educational practice and educational politics. As the point of difference between these camps is 
most conspicuous in their stance on educational institutions, I type these camps as “institutional 
adjusters” and “institutional resisters.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Thanks to Ben Raikes for suggesting this term during a class session (Fall 2015).  
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Institutional Adjusters 1.3.1   
 Institutional adjusters engage in normative reflection and argument about educational 
institutions. For institutional adjusters, educational institutions are the common denominator of 
educational practice; they unavoidably govern its practice and determine its meaning. As these 
institutions originate from and can only be legally changed through political decisions, the task 
of “good” philosophy pertaining to education, according to institutional adjusters, is to engage in 
applied political philosophy and to offer normative guidance to educational policymakers 
(Brighouse 2002, p. 181). The work of good philosophy of education thus involves taking a 
realistic perspective, where a realistic perspective is understood as the perspective of present day 
educational decision makers. Sensitive to the perspective of elites whose decisions carry the most 
weight in the real-world alteration of educational institutions, institutional adjusters modestly opt 
to serve as the “under-laborers” of social scientists and educational decision makers (Schouten 
and Brighouse 2015, p. 5).7  
 Although the nature of the philosophical guidance offered by institutional adjusters has 
changed, their variety of institutional realism and relationship to prevailing powers has a 
conspicuous history in the ‘Mirror of Princes’ (speculum principum) tradition and other politico-
educational treatises. Amélie Rorty goes so far as to observe: “Since educational policy is 
formulated by those who counsel the rulers who apply and implement it, the philosophy of 
education is typically addressed to rulers and their counselors” (1998, p. 2). The “rulers” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The use of the term “under-laborer,” as an intellectual laborer, was coined by John Locke. Peter 
Winch provides a helpful history and rebuttal of this conception in ch. 1.2 of The Idea of Social 
Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (2008). Although Schouten and Brighouse’s article 
aspires to be introductory, they neglect describing the origin of the term. That is, while they say 
that philosophers of education should be “under-laborers” to social scientists and policy makers, 
it is unclear whether this is an ode to Locke, a cryptic jab at Winch, or perhaps a reference to the 
British philosopher of education R.S. Peters. The aspirational image of an under-laborer is not 
self evident to the uninitiated. Admittedly, this is a minor concern. Yet I find it telling.  
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decisions, in other words, are the efficient cause of educational institutions and their practices. 
Institutional adjusters thus would deem it unrealistic or idle to entertain thoughts about the 
practice of education prior to the realities of educational institutions and their present 
governance. Education is organized through institutions. If these institutions are to be improved, 
political decisions must be made. Philosophers of education can help decision-makers organize 
institutions better, and thus play a significant role in contributing to their decisions. This 
happens, by necessity, prior to educational practice. Thus philosophers of education who are 
concerned with educational practice are most effectively employed as under-laborers for those 
with the power to make educational decisions.  
1.3.2 Institutional Resisters   
 Institutional resisters balk at this conclusion. Their work reflects on how the practice of 
education can resist the (present) governance of educational institutions. The modes of resistance 
take on a variety of forms. The clearest and most pronounced form today is that taken by critical 
pedagogues. If institutional adjusters aspire to serve the present educational decision-makers, 
critical pedagogues aspire to serve (or, less modestly, simply be) political activists. Critical 
pedagogue Shirley Steinberg goes far in capturing the spirit of institutional resisters: “Critical 
pedagogy isn’t talk—liberals talk. Critical pedagogy takes language from the radicals—radicals 
must do” (xi). Here realism is akin to “not selling out” and confronting the present powers 
governing schools.  
 Contra Amélie Rorty’s observation, I think that the most vital and interesting work done 
in philosophy of education does not reside with the rather bland and unsurprising moral audits 
made by institutional adjusters, but rather with the bold visions of institutional resisters and their 
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ancestors.8  While institutional resisters do not serve the present powers, they also do not engage 
in unrealistic, apolitical thinking. Far from it, they advance political education by devising an 
education for those who will become better rulers and counselors—students who will, one way 
or another, transform the present society because of their visionary educators (cf. Counts 1978). 
Institutional resisters, in short, explain why educators and the truly educated will be the efficient 
cause of the present ruler’s replacement. The justification for this conception of educational 
practice is that politics should be carried out by the better educated. This can, but need not, imply 
elitism,9 but it always implies a sharp challenge to prevailing powers through the educator, cast 
here as subversive political agent number one.  
 Both camps offer valuable perspectives, particularly when read in light of their forebears. 
But my grievance at present is that neither camp reflects upon the priority of educational practice 
as an ideal that can (and does) arise amidst educational institutions. Institutional adjusters treat 
the practice of education as just that: a process of institutional adjustment. The priority of 
educational practice is neglected to accommodate managerial reasonableness. What the practice 
of education can accomplish is confined to what decision-makers, at present, can really 
accomplish. Consequently, the good philosopher of education fulfills his responsibility to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Consider Plato’s Republic and Rousseau’s Emile. Although these works were written prior to 
mass schooling, they shed light on the intentions of institutional resisters. However, they might 
be better classed, at least in these works, as institutional escapists. Both authors imaginatively 
prioritize the practice of education over the educational politics of the time. For instance, Plato 
imagines a state which begins the task of education by first dismissing all of the parents, so that 
the practice of education will not be affected by misguided interests. Rousseau imagines the 
childhood education of his (bourgeois) pupil, Emile, proceeding in a rural context far removed 
from the corrupting mores of Parisian society. 	  
	  
9	  Consider Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, which is certainly not addressed to the 
rulers and councilors of his day; it seeks to realize a form of politics beyond existing “banking 
models of education”; although, as David Backer pointed out to me, Freire’s language can be 
quite elite too.  
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educators when he helps them take the perspective of decision-makers, and helps them to think 
about questions of educational policy or justice as if they were those with the power and wisdom 
to adjust educational institutions. On the other hand, institutional resisters conceive of the 
practice of education as a process of revolution. The practice of education is motivated by cries 
of revolt, and becomes synonymous with political action. Philosophers of education fulfill their 
duty when they persuade teachers that true education is a form of protest or militancy against the 
oppressive powers governing educational institutions.  
1.4 The Problem with the Norm of Institutional Realism  
 My general grievance against the norm of institutional realism, as exemplified by these 
specific manifestations, is that it leads philosophers of education away from reflecting on the 
fundamental obligation to prioritize the practice of education. This obligation is not imaginary, 
but is felt by decent educators on a daily basis. Despite and given the power of educational 
decision-makers, despite and given the need for revolution, educators feel and fulfill the 
obligation to prioritize the practice of education amidst educational institutions. Fully aware that 
educational institutions are shaped by a host of colliding interests and values, teachers who 
prioritize educational practice affirm that none of these interests or values should shape students, 
that is, if they are not filtered through educational practice and presented in a manner that allows 
students to think independently about them. While the implicit message of the norm of 
institutional realism is that it is better not to be an educator today—for educational practice is not 
where elite decisions or momentous political action is to be found—this dissertation is motivated 
by the sense that philosophical reflection on the fundamental obligation of education is not a lost 
cause but a relevant task for philosopher of education. More specifically, there is a need to reflect 
upon the obligation to prioritize educational practice, and there is a need to recall its ideal 
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qualities: an image of excellence that can motivate educators to attend to the practice of 
education and set their more specific goals and orient their daily decisions accordingly.10 But, 
affirming the principle that stimulates the norm of institutional realism, the challenge is to do so 
realistically. How might philosophers of education lend significance to the priority of 
educational practice in a manner that does not ignore the realities of educational institutions and 
the collision of interests and values currently shaping them?    
1.5 Thesis  
 The general claim of this dissertation is that philosophers of education can most usefully 
reflect upon the priority of educational practice when they do so realistically, that is, despite and 
given contemporary educational institutions and their situation in a non-ideal and pluralistic 
society. Although educational institutions are shaped by a host of colliding social interests and 
values, the intuition informing the priority of educational practice expresses the demand that 
none of these interests or values should shape students if they are not taught in a manner that 
allows students to think independently about them. The specific argument of this dissertation is 
that Max Weber’s conception of education provides support for this general claim. Although, at 
first glance, Weber’s conception of education amounts to scattered and passing remarks made by 
a “classical” sociologist,11 I show that Weber’s conception of education has the resources for a 
comprehensive educational vision and deserves to be taken seriously today. I reconstruct 
Weber’s conception of education as a philosophy of education in order to demonstrate a realistic 
reflection on the ideal qualities of the obligation to prioritize educational practice. By philosophy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Again, here I am borrowing language from De Ruyter (2003).  
	  
11	  I find the designation “classical sociologist” to be ridiculous and symptomatic of a field’s 
insecurity. Sociologists should acknowledge (and teach) Plato and Thucydides as classical social 
theorists. Start there and Weber is no longer a “classical” figure, but a late figure in a long line of 
inquiry.   
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of education, in what follows, I will mean a general account of the understanding sought and 
conveyed by the educator through her practice. By a realistic philosophy of education I mean 
said account situated and worked out within a non-ideal and pluralistic society.12 Thus, my 
argument is that a Weberian philosophy of education can provide a means for reflecting upon the 
ideal qualities of the fundamental obligation to prioritize educational practice—what shall be 
shortly introduced as an educated calling—and do so in a realistic manner. To be clear, the aim 
of this dissertation is not to wholly exclude concerns about reforming educational institutions, 
but rather to subject these concerns to the priority of educational practice and see them through 
the educator’s eyes.  
1.5.1 Max Weber?   
 The use of Max Weber, in spite of a preemptive sketch, should raise questions. To start, 
for those who are wholly unfamiliar with the name, who is Max Weber? Next why does Max 
Weber—the tough-minded, value-free sociologist or the passionate, and at times fanatical, 
German nationalist—have anything to do with educational ideals and the philosophy of 
education?   
 To respond to the first question, Max Weber (1864-1920) was an astounding German 
intellectual who, during his lifetime, produced groundbreaking work in a number of disciplines: 
social science, history, organizational studies, political science, music theory, and Russian 
studies.13 Weber is perhaps best known from his sociological study The Protestant Ethic and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  This definition derives from Peter Winch’s important work The Idea of Social Science and Its 
Relation to Philosophy, specifically, from the following line: …the philosophy of science will be 
concerned with the kind of understanding sought and conveyed by the scientist; the philosophy 
of religion will be concerned with the way in which religion attempts to present an intelligible 
picture of the world, and so on.” (1969, p. 18).   
	  
	  
	   12 
Spirit of Capitalism. Yet the more his work is studied, the more apparent becomes Weber’s 
influence on the social sciences, the humanities, and popular culture. Weber was also politically 
involved, and sometime questionably so.14 His commitment to impartial scholarship and highly 
partial political purposes means that Weber can appear in scholarship to be a bipolar figure. On 
the one hand, as a cool-tempered, rationalistic intellectual who lived to disenchant existence; on 
the other hand, as a hot-tempered fanatic who had no confidence in reason and engaged in 
political conflict through the arbitrary force of conviction alone. Although the primary purpose 
of this dissertation is not to engage in the history of ideas, I hope to advance a charitable portrait 
of Weber as not simply a cool scholar or heated political advocate, but, combining the distance 
and urgency of these extremes, as a peculiar moral educator who provoked his students and 
continues to provoke his readers to raise the question “How ought I live?”15 A snapshot of my 
reading of Weber as an educator is captured by French Sociologist Raymond Aaron’s 
observation: “Weber’s originality and greatness consist first of all in the fact that he was, and 
aimed at being, a politician and a thinker at the same time, or more precisely that he both 
separated and united politics and science” (1957, p. 67). My charitable portrait of Weber – only a 
snapshot at this point – depicts an educator who combined extremes without reconciliation and 
offered paradoxes without consolation in order to provoke independent thinking.    
 Yet Weber’s significance as a moral educator is far from obvious. First, Weber explicitly 
insists that an educator (employed in modern institutions) should not be a “sage” or 
“philosopher,” offering students and readers advice on the meaning of the world (cf. Weber 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  An excellent way to become acquainted with Weber’s work and the voluminous secondary 
literature on it is to read through Alan Sica’s exceedingly helpful bibliography (2012). 
	  
14	  See Mommsen (1984), Goldman (1992), and Radkau (2011).  
	  
15	  Cf. Scaff 2011; Derman 2012a, 2012b.  
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2008, p. 48). Secondly, Weber’s conception of education has had a negligible impact on 
educational scholarship and remains largely unknown to philosophers of education.16 This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
16	   Indeed, Weber is not a focal thinker in books and journals devoted to philosophy of 
education; to my knowledge, over the past 20 years, there have been no books or special journal 
editions devoted to Weber’s work. Although Weber’s name is dropped often enough to establish 
the assumption that Weber’s work should be familiar to readers, the field at large does little to 
contribute to this assumption. The many particular authors who mention Weber in passing are 
not at fault, but the field as a whole is weakened for presuming, but never demonstrating, 
knowledge of Weber’s work. Suffice it to say, when gathered together, the bits and pieces 
referencing Weber invite a comprehensive inquiry—if only to fill a historical gap.   
 Beginning at the most superficial level, we find Weber referenced within quotations. For 
instance, Marianna Papastephanou (2001, 2004) quotes Foucault, who cites Weber (among 
others) as a philosophical author who considers the “ontology of the present”; and Kathleen 
Knight Abowitz quotes Cornell West, who recounts his use of Weber when engaging in “abstract 
reflection.” (from West 1993, p. 98,  quoted in Abowitz 2002, p. 291). Neither Papastephanou 
nor Abowitz opt to explain why Weber is influential. This is their prerogative. However, if these 
social philosophers are influencing educational theory heavily, then there are good historical 
reasons to wonder what Weber said about education and the extent to which Weber is a fount of 
contemporary educational theory, as Robbie Mclintock once helpfully suggested to me.  
 Still superficially, though a bit less so, we learn that Weber provided things like an 
influential definition of power (Baez 2000, p. 337), a significant critique of capitalism (Norris 
2006, p. 461), and bleak images of an instrumental age (Higgins 2011, p. 451-454). None of 
these contributions are developed at length; and nowhere in the field (including encyclopedias of 
philosophy and education that include Marx and Durkheim but not Weber) are they even briefly 
mentioned on the same page.   
 More substantially, there are two recent book chapters that examine Weber’s relationship 
to educational theory, Philip Wexler’s Social Theory in Education: A Primer (2009) and Philipp 
Gonon’s Georg Kerschensteiner between Dewey Simmel and Weber (2011). Wexler’s chapter on 
Weber is intended to be “a primer,” and finds reason to be colloquial at times. However, 
Wexler’s chapter does succeed in highlighting relevant passages in Weber’s work relating to 
education, noting that “...there is no tradition of thinking [about] education socially with Weber’s 
ideas intentionally in mind...” (p. 97) and lamenting this fact since Weber’s work does have 
something to offer.  Since the publication of Social Theory in Education, Wexler has written 
more about Weber’s conception of pedagogy—most notably in “Democracy and Education in 
Post-secular Society” (Fischer, Hotham, and Wexler, 2012). This article concludes with the 
suggestive claim that in Weber’s pedagogy we find “the social, cultural, and religious 
interweaving of [social] spheres” (p. 263).   
 Gonon’s chapter on Weber provides a careful and accurate exposition of “Science as a 
Vocation.” Gonon turns to Weber partly for historical reasons, because the subject of his book, 
pedagogue Georg Kerschensteiner, was commissioned by the University of Munich (c.a. 1918) 
to give a lecture on vocations between Weber’s lectures “Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as 
a Vocation.” (Incidentally, Kerschensteiner’s lecture was called “Education as a Vocation.”) But 
	  
	   14 
likely the case because, thirdly, Weber was introduced to Anglo-American readers as a dyed-in-
the-wool sociologist.17 So while Weber discusses education in several of his writings, and a few 
of the most distinguished Weberian scholars have recognized the broader educational 
significance of his work,18 because Weber’s remarks on education were never developed into a 
“full-fledged” sociology of education (Swedenberg 2005, p. 18) they have been generally 
ignored or caricatured. Weber’s work (qua value-free sociologist) is commonly introduced as a 
convenient foil in efforts to develop arguments about moral theory, educational ideals, or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gonon does not focus directly on Weber. Moreover, Gonnon does not take any interpretative 
risks in his reading of Weber’s “Science as a Vocation.” Gonon summarizes passages from 
Weber’s lecture “Science as a Vocation” (1917), which pertain to education and are critical for 
my argument. By sticking so closely to the letter of Weber’s subtle lecture, I think Gonon 
neglects its depth and potential.   
 To my knowledge, the most substantial recent work in educational theory that explicitly 
uses Weber’s social theory comes from Martyn Hammersely’s article “Philosophy’s 
Contribution to Social Science Research on Education” (2006).  Hammersley argues that the 
Weberian distinction between value-relevance and value-neutrality (which I use interchangeably 
with “value freedom”) can help us to determine philosophy’s role in social sciences. Instead of 
endorsing a methodology-as-technique (or a supposedly value-free positivism) or methodology-
as-philosophy (a theory-laden constructivism, which wrongly equates the failures of positivism 
with the failure of science), Weber’s concept of value-relevance, says Hammersley, invites 
philosophers to clarify the values underlying predominant educational concepts. I appreciate the 
move Hammersley makes, but think it finds finds greater sophistication in a book called 
Philosophy in Social Science Research (Keat and Urry 1971); this text, written by a philosopher 
and a sociologist, is an enduring exposition of the philosophy of science called “critical realism.” 
Unfortunately, Hammersley does not reference it or its school of thought; this is unfortunate 
because Keat and Urry do a better job of making the same general point.  
It is worth noting that Weber is used in educational research that locates itself close to the 
border of educational theory: for instance, Eugenie Samier’s work on Weber and the theory of 
educational administration (2002a, 2002b) and Jal Mehta’s (2013) book, which uses Weber’s 
concept of “rationalization” to explain why teachers lack professional autonomy. I will return to 
Mehta’s work in chapter 5 of this dissertation. To conclude this extended footnote, if the goal is 
to learn about Weber’s pedagogical ideal, the point of this section is that educational theory, at 
present, is the wrong place to look. 
17 Scaff 1991   
 
18 The major contributors here are Marianne Weber (1975), Karl Jaspers (1989) Lawrence Scaff 
(1977), Harvey Goldman (1992), Wilhelm Hennis (2000), and Fritz Ringer (2010), and perhaps 
Perry Myers (2004).  
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academic vocation.19 Thus the assertion that Weber’s conception of education can prompt 
needed reflection on the ideal qualities of educational practice should be surprising, and the 
claim that Weber’s conception of education supplies the resources for sustaining a philosophy of 
education may be more surprising still. Yet this is what I set out to accomplish. Although I will 
frequently put Weber’s concerns into conversation with other thinkers to evoke, clarify, and 
critique Weber’s positions, the subtitle of this dissertation is “Towards a Weberian Philosophy of 
Education” because Weber (as an educator) is its intellectual center of gravity.    
1.6 Backtracking to Move Forward with Weber  
 Prior to discussing the fundamental tenet of a Weberian philosophy of education, I will 
demonstrate how Weber’s social theory bears upon the employees of educational institutions, 
and the two camps in the field of philosophy of education. The purpose of this indirect path is 
threefold. First, I aim to provide readers who are unfamiliar with Weber’s work with a sense of 
the relevance and acuity of his sociological descriptions. Secondly, I aim to demonstrate for 
readers more familiar with Weber’s work that his descriptive sociology does not oppose, but 
rather begs, philosophical reflection about educational practice. Thirdly, this indirect path will 
lead to two puzzles about Weber’s conception of education: (a) the source of the educator’s 
charisma and (b) how the Weberian educator who teaches a particular subject and does not play 
the role of a “life coach” compels students to think independently about something so grandiose 
as the ultimate meaning of their lives. My response to these puzzles will launch the argument.  
1.6.1 Particular Persons Amidst Educational Institutions  
 Above I claimed that teachers experience difficulty prioritizing educational practice 
because their work occurs in educational institutions where educational practice is buffeted by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
19 cf. Wolff (1970), Schwehn (1993), Karp (2012), Gorski (2013).  	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arbitrary social pressures and obstructed by clumsy institutional policies. An example of this 
might be a week of compulsory testing that serves state interests and the justification of a 
particular political policy, but has little educational value in its own right. The obstruction of 
educational practice, in this case and others, may be chalked up as a necessary evil of working at 
schools, particularly public schools. But what is the nature and cause of the educator’s 
frustration? Perhaps it arises from the average teacher’s mediocrity and dismay at being revealed 
as incompetent. This is possible, especially from the perspective of educational decision-makers 
who seek to shake up school culture and execute rapid reforms. However, Weber’s study of the 
bureaucracy provides an alternative explanation, an explanation that accounts for the educator’s 
frustration as a problem internal to the relationship between educational practice and educational 
institutions.  
 Weber understood bureaucracy to be a type of social organization that inculcates a duty 
to “impersonal and functional purposes” and does so through, as he describes it, “…a system of 
rational rules, oriented toward the satisfaction of calculable needs with ordinary, everyday 
means” (Weber 1978, p. 959, p. 1111). When employees of a bureaucracy fulfill their impersonal 
and functional purposes, they reap the rewards that the system bestows. Employees are provided 
with goods like a safe (or efficiently policed) environment, a stable income, opportunities for 
advancement, and professional status. Given the stability and rewards of bureaucratic 
governance, not to perform a given function at work, not to follow the rules, and not to be paid 
becomes a highly unreasonable course of action; reasonableness becomes the governing norm. 
Adjusting to bureaucratic institutions, as Weber observed, inculcates a matter-of-fact or by-the-
book disposition.  
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 It is not difficult to illustrate the bureaucratic nature of contemporary educational 
institutions in the United States. For instance, an 8th grade math teacher in an American public 
school has an occupational duty to impart skills that will allow students to demonstrate 
proficiency in Algebra I. At the end of the year, tests are given to measure whether, and to what 
extent, the teacher has fulfilled this duty. If fulfilled, the teacher can expect a stable salary, health 
care benefits, promotional opportunities, and the generally benign social status of being a 
competent teacher. If unfulfilled, the teacher ought to be sanctioned and, if worse comes to 
worst, fired. The decision to fire the teacher, here, is never a personal matter. It proceeds from 
the application of a general rule: schools should only employ functioning employees, where 
“functioning” is defined by experts who design institutional policies and prescribe best practices 
that teachers are required to regard as given and implement daily.  
 Weber acknowledged the effectiveness and precision of bureaucracy as an instrument of 
social organization—in fact, he deemed it a necessary instrument for sustaining the material 
standards of everyday life in modern society—but he also emphasized the inhumane and 
restrictive aspects of bureaucracy. Bureaucracies are designed to externally coerce any action 
that runs counter to the rules. Bureaucracies demand, as Weber observed, “…a discharge of 
business according to calculable rules and ‘without regard to persons.’” So, the employee who 
confronts an exceptional problem demanding individual initiative is liable to feel stuck if her 
way forward is obstructed by existing policies. The employee who acts against these policies and 
calls attention to exceptional problems can be made to feel, even if her actions were entirely 
justified, as if she were violating the bureaucratic norm of matter-of-factness and being 
excessively emotive. In these unfortunate cases, an employee is liable to find herself unable to 
“squirm out of the apparatus into which [s]he has been harnessed...[like] a small cog in a 
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ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes to h[er] an essentially fixed route of march” 
(emphasis added, Weber 1978, p. 988).  In sum, a person’s well-intentioned initiative to engage 
in actions deemed non-functional is liable to be shut down or oppressively handled by 
educational institutions organized bureaucratically.  
 From an educational decision-maker’s standpoint, critique of the oppressive nature of 
school policy sounds unreasonable, and for good reason. Is an 8th grade algebra teacher actually 
“harnessed” to teaching the curriculum? Is not teaching algebra, as assigned, simply the job? 
Should this teacher be given the latitude, say, to teach interpretive dance instead of math? 
Moreover, so long as a math teacher fulfills her occupational duties, does she not have quite a bit 
of wiggle room to personalize her classroom and spice up the material with something cultural or 
student-centered? What then is the problem, exactly?  
 The problem experienced by many teachers is that the practice of education only 
becomes intelligible insofar as it proceeds with regards to persons – namely, their particular 
students. Many teachers do not take themselves to be fulfilling a mere occupational duty or 
functional purpose; they are not merely transmitting skills to test takers in order to justify their 
salary and meet institutional benchmarks. Instead, many teachers teach for moral and existential 
reasons. The practice of education becomes intelligible for these teachers according to an 
educational ideal. These teachers strive to work for their students—particular persons—who are, 
at times, utterly exceptional and wholly inimitable, and, at other times, tedious, lazy, and 
distracted. How particular students take up a lesson—whether and how it motivates, transforms, 
and awakens them—is the challenge, mystery, and grace of educational practice.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Andrew Delbanco provides a helpful illustration of “grace” in educational practice in his book 
College: What it was, Is, and Should be (2012). Because most of his students do not come from a 
religious background, they do not understand the term. To convey its meaning, Delbanco asks 
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 To be sure, these extraordinary moments of educational practice can be carefully studied 
by experts and subjected to quantification; “best practices” and “teaching methods” can be 
coined; new studies can be written and sold to initiate future teachers; and, eventually, better 
educational policies can be decided upon and these practices can then be enforced as 
commonsense. Yet inevitably, hints Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy, something highly personal 
and particular is always lost when the study of educational practice results in another 
(impersonal) rule for educational institutions. If the practice of education conveys something 
highly personal and extraordinary, then it is perhaps little wonder that educators, who work for 
their students and thus strive to prioritize educational practice above admission to an elite school 
or standardized tests results, can be demoralized by the ever “reasonable” rules governing 
educational institutions and the administrators paid to enforce their implementation (cf. Higgins 
2011). 
 To express the matter using another Weberian term, the bureaucratic nature of 
educational institutions collides with what Weber called the charismatic aspect of educational 
practice, that is, its “highly individual quality” (Weber 1978, p. 1113). Bureaucratic institutions 
expect employees to conform to an institution through a system of external rules, whereas 
charisma, as Weber defines the term, “rests on the belief in revelation and heroes, upon the 
conviction that certain manifestations—whether they be religious, ethical, artistic, scientific, 
political or other kinds—are important and valuable…Charismatic belief revolutionizes men 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
them to imagine two students who attend a production of King Lear. The first student is 
unmoved, while the second student has a transformational experience. Despite witnessing the 
same play and even having the same SAT scores, there is a profound difference between their 
experiences. As Delbanco writes, “The difference between them is immeasurable by any testing 
instrument, and has nothing to do with which one has studied harder for tomorrow’s exam on 
Elizabethan drama. While most of us who work in education today have no language to account 
for this mystery, that does not mean the mystery does not exist” (p. 48).  
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‘from within’”(emphasis added, Weber 1978, p. 1116). The teacher who prioritizes educational 
practice over the institutional order seems to be engaged in a charismatic endeavor. She does not 
teach students just to score points, but with the hopes of revolutionizing them from within. If this 
prospect were off the table, if education did not involve a relationship with particular students 
and a concern for their formation, one might conclude that education would be a profession 
lacking motivation and dignity. Educators would simply be inefficient computers.    
 Of course the mere suggestion of a “charismatic” educator raises red flags. It is unclear  
why charismatic educators and their personal projects have a place in modern, educational 
institutions. Educators, in particular, should not be above the rule of law. It is unclear why the 
public should have to pay teachers who manipulate students’ internal commitments and impose 
private values upon them. And, it is unclear if it is even worthwhile to reflect upon charismatic 
education— given its unreasonableness and how unrealistic its authority must seem in a 
institution organized bureaucratically.  
These worries become clearer by examining the way the term charisma is used today. 
Although Weber’s work went far in popularizing the term, charisma has been coopted by 
organizational and leadership studies to denote techniques used to lure others to unwittingly 
follow one’s own designs; charisma has been boiled down to learned behavior strategies for 
producing a powerful presence or “personal magnetism” (cf. Cabrane 2013). Understood this 
way, charismatic educators do not prioritize educational practice. They do not teach their 
“personal magnetism,” but enact it. So, along with shirking an impersonal rule of law, 
charismatic educators teach in a manner that violates the intuitive idea that education should 
equip students to think independently about their lives, since what persons will become in 
modern society is not inherited at birth. Charismatic educators do not teach independent 
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thinking; essentially they control others along a course constituted by their designs. Furthermore, 
there is nothing to say these designs are not simply their arbitrary preferences. Indeed, as 
charisma coach Olivia Cabrane beckons readers: “Charismatic people seem to lived charmed 
lives: they have more romantic options, they make more money, and they experience less stress” 
(2013, p. 2).21 Charismatic educators, in short, maximize their preferences in predictable ways.   
  For those aware of Weber’s work, it is a well-known and controversial fact that he 
outlined the nature of a charismatic political leader in his lecture “Politics as a Vocation” (1919). 
The charismatic political leader’s purpose, as Weber understood it, is not bureaucratic 
impartiality and the norm of reasonableness, but neither is it governed by preferences and vanity; 
it is set by passion and personal responsibility for a cause. Responsibility for a cause, as Weber 
wrote, is the “guiding star” of the charismatic politician’s actions (Weber 2008, p. 193). He is not 
simply seeking to satisfy his interests, but his ideals. As German political theorist Marcus 
Llanaque perceptively observes:  
Interests motivate the wish to be powerful, ideals motivate the wish to be responsible. 
Weber wants to unite responsible for ideal and accountability for deeds. Responsibility 
refers to a “cause” or political aim, something a professional politicians feels obligated to 
do. (2007, p. 492).   
The charismatic politician is motivated to be responsible and ascribes to what Weber called an 
‘ethic of responsibility,’ which holds, as Bradley Starr describes, that distinct values spheres are 
“loosed from any mooring in an overarching hierarchy,” and yet does so without diminishing 
ethical demands; the cost of value conflicts in action—for instance, the costs of being a politician 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 I encountered Cabrane’s book while at Kinkos waiting for an earlier draft of this dissertation to 
print. For those who are curious, some quick strategies for boosting charisma are: (1) lowering 
the intonation of one’s voice at the end of a sentence; (2) reducing how quickly and how often 
one nods; (3) pausing for two full seconds before speaking (p. 10).  
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instead of, say, a saint—must still be shouldered by the actor (1999, p. 426).22 Weber’s 
charismatic politician proceeds with the great ethical seriousness and would not solicit a 
charisma coach.23  
  From this we can infer that if Weber’s political conception of the charismatic leader were 
applied to educational practice, the purpose would not be for the educator to achieve “personal 
magnetism,” but rather for the ardency of a teacher’s personal cause to inspire a group of 
otherwise uncaring and disenchanted students. The Weberian educator would be an inspired 
teacher: a spring of inspiration in a dismal institution, much like the characters captured in films 
like Dead Poet’s Society and Dangerous Minds. Yet Weber did not take the educator to be either 
a charismatic politician or a bureaucratic employee administering the requisite dosage of 
information. Weber understood the educator in different and rather puzzling ways. Prior to 
turning to these puzzles, I will complete my indirect path by explaining how the concepts just 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
22 In Politics As A Vocation Weber distinguishes an ‘ethic of responsibly’ from an ‘ethic of 
conviction.’ An ethic of conviction, as Starr argues, is premised upon the belief in an “ethically 
rational cosmos” where “moral guidance is to be sought and found in an overarching rationality 
in which values are given their proper location in the unity of things” (Starr 1999, p. 425). 
Applying to Starr’s definition, we find that Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace” provides an apt 
example of an argument made from an ethic of conviction. The politician, says Kant, just like 
everyone else, must “Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness” 
(1991, p. 23).  I find Starr’s distinction particularly clear, but this is contestable terrain in Weber 
scholarship: cf. Schuluchter (1996), Bruun (2007), Turner (1992).  
	  
23	  Unfortunately, given the vile political leader who came to power shortly after Weber’s death, 
Weber’s suggestion that the German people needed a charismatic politician to jumpstart political 
life and beat back bureaucratic governance proved to be infelicitous. 
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1.6.2 The Philosophy of Bureaucratic or Charismatic Education 
Above I identified institutional realism as the norm that tough-minded and significant 
philosophy of education uses to take a stand on the state of educational institutions. I then 
identified two adherents of this norm as opposed camps: institutional adjusters and institutional 
resisters. According to both these camps, if some sort of message emerges for the educator, it 
would be to seek a better position: perhaps to climb the ranks and become an educational 
decision-maker, or perhaps to be an activist who hits the streets, or perhaps even a philosopher of 
education whose reflection foresees a political destiny that lies beyond the educator’s everyday 
practice.  
In Weberian terms, institutional adjusters may be classed as those engaged in the 
philosophy of bureaucratic education (i.e., they reflect on the “impersonal and functional 
purposes” of educational institutions and the adjustment of persons to externally imposed 
norms), while institutional resisters might be characterized as those engaged in the philosophy of 
charismatic education (i.e., they reflect on the moments of educational practice that resist or 
escape from the present “logic” governing educational institutions). So conceived, Weber’s 
understanding of bureaucracy and charisma clarifies problems with both camps.  
Although reflection on adjusting educational institution is not idle, it neglects to consider 
that many teachers who prioritize the practice of education are primarily working for their 
students as persons. If the practice of education is “highly personal” and the educator strives to 
revolutionize students “from within”, then philosophers who work to make intelligible, say, a 
conceptual expression of educational opportunity or the just distribution of educational goods are 
not really in the business of understanding the practice of education or its priority. Their applied 
political philosophy is not harmful, but its success may obscure the motivation to reflect 
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carefully on the practice of education beyond institutional regulations and provisions. Anything 
that cannot be captured by a decision-maker’s perspective and impartial norm of reasonableness 
starts to sound flighty. There is real work to do, real educational goods to define and distribute. 
But, if the rules and norms governing a bureaucratic institution are too clumsy to capture the 
subjects of education or the motivation of educators, perhaps we should be unnerved that 
philosophy of bureaucratic education passes as good philosophy of education. For it is 
questionable that its arguments are even specific to education as such. With some quick editing 
(e.g., replacing “students” with “patients”), the same arguments might easily pass for a 
philosophy of hospital administration.  
 On the other hand, institutional resisters who revel in the fact that the practice of 
education will never be sufficiently captured by calculable rules or instrumental policies fail to 
appreciate the necessity of that so-called instrumentalism or “What Works” mentality governing 
educational institutions (cf. Biesta 2007). Few contemporary institutional resisters are arguing 
that teachers should forgo their salaries and health benefits and become bona fide guerilla 
educators, nevertheless the conception of educational practice that they espouse conveniently 
elides the fact that teachers depend upon educational institutions to meet their everyday needs. 
The practice of education, as it occurs today in our current social and historical context, would 
scarcely be intelligible if the average teacher were free from the tension of working for students 
while also living off educational institutions. Ignoring this tension, and thinking about education 
as if teachers should only work for a given political cause, renders the rhetoric of resistance 
unrealistic, particularly when voiced with great enthusiasm at massive educational conferences 
housed in large corporate hotels, which are almost never attended by practicing teachers.  
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 The fact that the majority of teachers live off of educational institutions means that decent 
teachers will experience tension between their obligations. The tension exists because decent 
teachers are morally and existentially committed to working for their particular students. 
Teachers make countless judgments to prioritize the practice of education amidst competing 
obligations.24 But why should this be the case?    
 A response to this question resides in something already mentioned, namely the intuitive 
idea that education should equip students to think independently about their lives because in 
modern society what persons will become and value is not inherited at birth. Or, stated 
negatively, education should not amount to a careless form of socialization, where, for instance, 
the person in the room with the loudest voice or the philanthropist in the room with the most 
money arbitrarily determines the course of a person’s life. Readers of this dissertation will likely 
agree that the practice of education ought to be something more than mere socialization or 
careless formation—that an education should help students understand and take up a burden of 
responsibility. For this reason, educational practice carried out by decent teachers should take 
priority over the collision of values and interests that currently define educational institutions.  
My argument is that a Weberian philosophy of education provides a means for reflecting 
upon the obligation to prioritize educational practice. But my argument has yet to commence 
because I have not described a Weberian educator. So far I have only mentioned what a 
Weberian educator is not. She is not a bureaucratic administrator who sees her students as more 
or less compatible skill, fact, and (perhaps) virtue receptacles; she is not a charismatic life coach 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Discussing the practical experience of the educator in his difficult essay “Roscher and Knies 
and the Logical Problems of Historical Economics,” Weber writes: “The endless stream of 
individual ‘immediate experience’ that flow through our lives ‘schools’ the ‘imagination’ of the 
pedagogue—and of the pupil—and makes it possible that that ‘interpretive understanding’ of the 
life of the mind which the pedagogue needs” (2014, p. 52). 
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(in the corporate, or “spray on”25 sense); and she is not a charismatic politician, in the Weberian 
sense, who inspires a sleepy class by imposing her personal cause and her sense of responsibility 
upon them. So how did Weber conceive of educators? An answer is not readily apparent, 
because two puzzles stand in the way.  
1.7 Two Puzzles: Charisma and Specialization   
The first puzzle involves the peculiar charisma that Weber ascribes to educators. In a 
passage of his lecture “Science as a Vocation”—a passage that is, to my knowledge, entirely 
ignored in the secondary literature—Weber states that the most difficult task of educational 
practice is to introduce students to ideas so that an “untrained but receptive mind can 
understand—and crucially—go on to think about them independently.” But then, rather 
mysteriously, he claims that  “mastery of this art is a personal gift” (2008, p. 30)—a clear 
allusion to charisma’s etymology: χάρισµα, meaning a favor given or a gift of grace (OED). So 
what is the source of the Weberian educator’s charisma? What does it mean that educational 
practice bestows independent thinking through a gift? And why does Weber, typically cast as a 
tough-minded, disenchanted sociologist, opt to mystify the intuitive value of independent 
thinking with a concept like charisma?  
The second puzzle involves the peculiar ambition of the Weberian educator. To recall the 
line quoted in the preface of this dissertation, in his lecture “Science as a Vocation,” Weber 
observes that,    
Philosophy, as a specialist discipline, and the discussions, which are essentially 
philosophical, conducted by the individual disciplines, attempt to achieve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This line is originally from a cartoon that is commented upon in Phillip Reiff’s posthumously 
published book Charisma: The Gift of Grace, and How It Has Been Taken Away from Us (p. 3 
ff.) 
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[clarity/coherence of meaning]. We can, in this way, if we understand the matter (which 
must be presupposed), compel or at least help the individual to give an account of the 
ultimate meaning of his own actions to himself. It seems to me that this should not be 
underestimated, even for the purely personal life. At this point I am also tempted to say, 
if a teacher succeeds in this, that he is acting in the service of “moral” forces, performing 
his duty to create clarity and a sense of responsibility (Weber 2008, p. 48).  
The image of an educator compelling students to “give an account of the ultimate meaning of his 
own actions to himself” seems exceptionally intense: the sort of quest awaiting an adventurer 
who arrives at the top of the mountain. Yet Weber bids us not to conceive of the academic 
lecturer (which includes, for our purposes, a person teaching a specialized subject like algebra) 
as a sage (2008 p. 48) or a life coach (p. 46). So the puzzle is, how does the Weberian educator 
who teaches a specialized subject compel students to do something so grandiose as “give an 
account of the ultimate meaning of his own actions to himself”? How does learning algebra or 
chemistry or art history from an educator who specializes, respectively, in these subjects have 
anything to do with being compelled to give an account of the ultimate meaning of one’s own 
life?  
There are ways to escape these puzzles. Faced with the first, a tempting route is to claim 
there is no real magic or mystery to independent thinking. Weber was probably just being 
rhetorical. A less rhetorical conception of what Weber was after, it might be said, can be found in 
Harry Brighouse’s On Education, where he suggests that school should prepare students for 
autonomy by presenting them with a variety of possible lives and allow them to determine which 
lifestyle matches their preferences based on their constitution. Once the student matches his 
preference with an available lifestyle, the educator can move in to support him in fulfilling it. 
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Following Brighouse’s vision, the greater a school’s buffet of lifestyle options, the better. On this 
less mysterious reading, the educator who helps students think independently about life simply 
helps them to realize their preferences. According to his critics, Weber supports this conception 
of autonomy. As sociologist Phillip Gorski (2013) describes, the Weberian educator simply helps 
students satisfy their preferences and choose “the best means to [their] own personal or political 
ends” (p. 546).  
 Faced with the second puzzle, a tempting route of escape is to ditch the grandiose claim 
that teaching algebra has something to do with the existential or moral value of a student’s 
conduct of life, and to replace it with the broad social value which responds to an existing 
problem in the world. Responding to this problem can then imbue teaching with significance. 
The way to create significance in educational practice lies in educational scholarship, where, put 
cynically, the name of the game is to identify existing social and political problems and plug 
them back into everyday educational practice. If it were not for the specialized educator’s daily 
work, some existing problem in the world would become worse – or at least not get any better.  
This is why educational practice matters, because of the sweeping issues, not because of the 
moral or existential course of particular student lives.  
 On my reading of Weber does not grant an escape from either puzzle.  Somehow, 
independent thinking participates in a mystery. Somehow the everyday work of the educator can 
compel students to give an account of the ultimate meaning of their actions and need not appeal 
to larger social and political problems as a source of significance. The solution to both puzzles, 
which launches the argument of this dissertation, can be found in Weber’s conception of ideas. 
Ideas are the source of the educator’s charisma, and thinking independently about ideas bears a 
larger moral and existential significance that goes beyond the confines of a specialized subject.   
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1.8 Response: Weber’s Conception of Ideas  
   Weber’s understanding of ideas offers solutions to the above puzzles in three respects. 
First, Weber understood ideas to be a creative and mysterious phenomenon. As he describes 
them in “Science as a Vocation,”  
…work cannot replace the idea or force it to appear anymore than passion can. Both—
especially, both together—can entice it to come out. But it comes when it chooses not 
when we choose…all [intellectual] work is accompanied by an element of chance—will 
inspiration come or will it not (Weber 2008 p. 32).  
Weber’s point is that there can be activity and dispositions conducive to the emergence of ideas, 
but the emergence of ideas is still mysterious and incalculable, or, we might say, never wholly 
shorn of grace.  
Second, Weber understood ideas to be psychologically non-specialized. Ideas, whether 
arising in intellectual, practical or aesthetic domains, have the same “psychological roots” and 
initiate the same “psychological process” (Weber 1978, p. 1116, Weber 2008, p. 32). For 
instance, the businessman who has an idea for a profitable venture has an idea like the artist’s 
idea for a painting, or the intellectual’s idea for an argument, or the preacher’s idea for a sermon, 
or the lover’s idea for a seduction, and so on.    
Finally, and most intriguingly for my purposes, Weber thought ideas were accompanied 
by demands. As he writes in what was originally a footnote of ‘Economy and Society,’ “…all 
these kinds of ideas—including artistic intuition—have in common that to objectivate 
themselves, to prove their reality, they must signify a grasp on demands [Forderungen] of the 
work, or if you prefer, a being seized by them; they are not merely a subjective feeling or 
experience” (Weber 1978, p. 1116). Weber’s claim is that ideas have the power to obligate and 
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motivate action. The demand of an idea is to be enacted, objectified, or made real. So if an idea 
seizes a person—say, an idea for a brilliant poem—yet does not emerge when the poet sits down 
to write, then the poet might chalk the “idea” up to a mere subjective experience or might 
continue with redoubled efforts to meet the idea’s demand and bring it into reality.          
Weber’s conception of ideas addresses the above puzzles as follows. First, the source of 
the Weberian educator’s charisma is not her personal cause, but her student’s ideas. This 
involves but means something more than their feelings or experiences. And in response to the 
second puzzle, the student who has an idea in a particular subject – who does not just get the 
answer right but has a genuine idea about a problem or solution – engages a “psychological 
process” which is not confined to, for instance, an algebra problem, but engages a capacity that 
can be recognized and activated in different domains. So, working the demands of an algebra 
problem is not unlike and can support working the demands of a poem. Assuming with Weber 
that this is the case, there is reason to believe that working the demands of an algebra problem 
engages a capacity like working the demands of “the ultimate meaning” of one’s actions. Finally, 
to respond to both puzzles, the fact that ideas bear demands means that the Weberian educator, 
who participates in the charisma of her students’ ideas, does not remain neutral but imposes 
value upon the students’ lives by echoing the demands of ideas. The Weberian educator bids 
students to think clearly and responsibly about ideas, to make them a reality, not allowing a 
particular idea to stop short of reality, not resting content with the expression of a regurgitated 
answer or passing feeling or experience that is neither here nor there.  
It is important to consider if Weber’s conception of ideas is true, and to challenge it with 
competing accounts. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, I will assume it as plausible 
because, as I see it, this is the surest way to develop a Weberian philosophy of education.  If the 
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reader finds Weber’s conception of ideas entirely implausible, then, hopefully after considering 
my argument for a Weberian philosophy of education, this would be a relevant place for him or 
her to critique the project. I now return to the project of defining a Weberian philosophy of 
education.  
1.9 The Basic Tenet of a Weberian Philosophy of Education  
 The high aim of the educator, according to a Weberian philosophy of education, is to 
provoke within students an active responsibility for understanding the ultimate meaning of their 
obligations in the world. The practice of education, accordingly, does not involve persuading 
students to accept or adjust to given obligations, nor does it involve imposing obligations or 
visions upon them through the unregulated force of the educator’s personality. Instead, the 
practice of education involves compelling students to think independently about the meaning of 
their obligations as these obligations arise in their everyday lives. The ultimate object of a 
student’s active responsibility, for the Weberian educator, is the student’s calling: an idea about 
the ultimate meaning of the student’s obligations in the world. The Weberian educator—to be 
very clear—does not provoke the student’s specific and substantial calling, but contributes to 
their capacity to have one. The bulk of this dissertation will be given to analyzing and 
elucidating what the Weberian educator’s particular work in relationship to the student’s calling 
is; put otherwise, I seek to provide a general account of the understanding sought and conveyed 
by an educator who engages in daily work, echoing the demands of particular ideas in the 
confines of a specialized academic discipline, while being attentive to her work’s relationship to 
and influence upon a student’s calling. The basic tenet of a Weberian philosophy of education is 
“an educated calling,” defined as a student’s active responsibility bearing upon the ultimate 
meaning of his obligations in the world.  
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While what is meant by “active responsibility” and “calling” will be developed 
throughout this dissertation, the quickest way to introduce these concepts and summarize a 
Weberian philosophy of education is through a maxim of Goethe’s which Weber was wont to 
repeat: “Try to do your duty and you’ll soon discover what you are like. But what is your duty? 
The demands of the day [die Forderungen des Tages]” (Goethe 1999, p. 57). According to a 
Weberian philosophy of education, the practice of education attends to the formation that occurs 
as students learn to meet the demands of the day. The responsibility is active because each day 
brings new demands. Recognizing the novelty and particularity of each day’s demands cannot be 
achieved by minding impersonal and functional duty or being bulldozed by another personality. 
The Weberian educator echoes the demands of particular ideas and thereby promotes a student’s 
independent thinking and helps him to understand and take up a burden of responsibility in a 
non-ideal and pluralistic society. An educated calling, as an image of excellence, is what 
motivates the Weberian educator to attend to the practice of education (in a variety of situations) 
and set her more specific goals and orient her daily decisions accordingly. Why should the 
fundamental obligation to prioritize the practice of education be heeded by educators within 
educational institutions? According to a Weberian philosophy of education, this is the case 
because fostering students’ capacities to think independently about ideas, conceived of as their 
demands of the day, is the source of motivation to educate particular persons and the grounds of 
the educator’s dignity.  
1.10 On the Uncertain Relationship Between Education and a Person’s Calling  
 Before proceeding, it is important to raise an objection about the relationship between 
students discovering and working the demands of particular problems (e.g., an algebraic 
equation) and students discovering and working the demands of their calling. The objection is: 
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can we be certain this sort of continuity exists?26 Suppose a Weberian educator presents material 
to her students in a manner that gives rise to ideas and then proceeds to echo the demands of 
these ideas as they arise for her particular students. Suppose further that one of her students, who 
enthusiastically heeds the demands of algebra, grows up to be a woman with no strong 
convictions about the “ultimate meaning” of her life. Despite being taught by a Weberian 
educator, the very idea of a calling is unpersuasive to this woman. Does this outcome make the 
Weberian educator somehow remiss for educating a life not dedicated to an educated calling?   
I raise this objection to highlight the uncertainty between learning a particular lesson and 
the eventual course of a student’s life. Rather than refuting this uncertainty, my dissertation 
accepts if not embraces it. I am not arguing that the Weberian educator’s lessons must yield a 
certain moral and existential outcome, a called product, as it were. On the contrary, I hope to 
provide an unqualified critique of the impulse to project the existential and moral trajectory of a 
particular person’s education. The Weberian educator is content with provoking an active 
responsibility for insights arising in her subject matter and attends to their formative potential, 
but she is not so rash as to expect a certain result in the form of a human subject. What an idea 
demands of a particular person—how working it and demonstrating its reality subtly transforms 
him based on the way he has already been formed and launches him into an unseen future as a 
changed being — is not a process amenable to given outcomes and predetermined expectations. 
Certain aspects of a person’s development can be calculated, indeed, but the whole is not subject 
to calculation. Or, as Weber puts the matter in his essay “Roscher and Knies” with explicit 
reference to the classroom: “From the point of view of the ‘laws of science,’ each individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The term continuity is developed at length in chapter 3 of John Dewey’s Experience and 
Education (1997). The gist of the term is that past experiences enter into and modify future 
experiences.   
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[student] represents and individual constellation of an infinite number of individual causal 
chains.” (Weber 2014, p. 52).27 Yet educators, who attend to particular persons, and their lives as 
a whole, catch sight of what calculation cannot. A student’s moral and existential trajectory may 
be foreseen by the educator, but only through a glass dimly, as she sees the student meeting the 
“demands of the day.” The educator’s foresight exists, but particular persons, educational 
experience, and hopeful anticipation constitute her vision—not given outcomes. In the end, the 
most reliable judgment about the course of a person’s formation it is not found through 
educational scholarship, but through reflection and personal testimony.28 For those who can risk 
thinking about education without the expectation of scientific foresight, and the ready-made 
product in view, Augustine’s Confessions provides a surer guide than current best sellers like 
How Children Succeed.29  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The full passage reads as follows: “For the purposes of practical education, the concrete pupil, 
or the multitude of concrete pupils, are considered as individuals; and those of their qualities that 
are relevant for the take of exerting pedagogical influence have, in important respects, been 
conditioned by an immense number of quite concrete influences emanating from their 
“disposition” and their individual milieu” (in the widest sense of the term). In their turn, these 
influences can from every possible point of view be made the object of scientific investigation, 
including ‘objectifying” investigation; but they certainly cannot be produced experimentally in 
the laboratory of a psychologist. From the point of view of the “laws of science,” each individual 
represents and individual constellation of an infinite number of individual causal chains (2014, p. 
51-52). 
 
28	  To provide personal examples, discussing an unassigned passage of a Richard Wright novel 
with my 10th grade English teacher at lunch or being encouraged by my wrestling coach to 
“sprint the hills” are moments in my education that moved beyond their particular lessons and 
contexts and came to shape my ultimate commitments. I feel obligated to discuss ideas off the 
institutional schedule, and to run when the conditions are more suitable for walking. These were 
not personal attributes. They are obligations that echo in my life like the voices of my two 
favorite educators. And these obligations spoil, or become cliché, if they are generalized—e.g., 
applied to any novel or hill and used to set a mass curriculum.  
 
29 This is not to say self-deception doesn’t exist. Indeed, one can acknowledge the phenomenon 
of self-deception, perhaps through ulterior sources, and use it to interpret an autobiography, 
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The particularity and incalculable nature of a person’s moral and existential trajectory 
provides good reason for educational institutions to ignore it presently, as it is too fine a matter, 
and perhaps too gross, for the institution’s net of rules and accountability schemes. Furthermore, 
such a trajectory should cause educational scholars to question their efforts to stoke anticipation 
for massive social or political outcomes following one particular educational reform or another. 
Indeed, so much shrill noise about the direction of education would be hushed, and so much 
respect for particular human subjects would be gained, if educational scholars realized that the 
moral and existential trajectory that a person takes as he discovers and works particular ideas 
necessitates room for mystery and grace.  
Although institutions and educational scholars can, educators cannot ignore the 
possibility that working for particular students, holistic beings, involves contributing to or 
compromising students’ capacity to heed the demands of more consequential ideas about the 
meaning of their lives. Rather than putting another undue burden on educators, however, I 
contend that conveying an understanding of what it means for the Weberian educator to teach 
students particular lessons while attentive to and in anticipation of his or her calling best captures 
and motivates the ideal qualities of the fundamental obligation to prioritize the practice of 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
while still privileging a first-person testimony and holding that the autobiography is a reliable 
account of a person’s education.	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Chapter 2  
Self-Examination and The Condition of Confusion   
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
 The claim of this dissertation is that a Weberian philosophy of education provides a 
valuable means for reflecting upon and motivating the priority of educational practice amidst 
educational institutions. The basic tenet of a Weberian philosophy of education is an educator 
who provokes students, from within, to take an active responsibility for understanding the 
meaning of their obligations in the world. Responding to the important objection that this 
grandiose claim makes little sense for the educator who teaches a specific subject, like algebra, I 
explained that the algebra teacher who provokes an active responsibility for particular algebraic 
ideas contributes to the student’s capacity to respond to his calling: an idea about the ultimate 
meaning of his obligations in the world. This explanation was then supported by Weber’s 
conception of ideas:  
• The notion that ideas emerge mysteriously.  
•  The notion that ideas—whether arising in mathematics, business, or art—have a 
common psychological basis, and thus the formation that occurs from heeding the 
demands of a particular idea cannot be confined to specialized domains. 
•  The notion that ideas are accompanied by obligations that “seize” a person and 
compel him to have “a grasp on ‘demands’ of the ‘work’” (Weber 1978, p. 1116).   
I claimed that working the “demands of the day” that arise from ideas in an algebra class 
bear a relationship, albeit a dimly foreseeable and inappropriately calculable relationship, to 
working the more ultimate “demands of the day” that arise through a person’s calling.   
 The problem of this chapter arises from the distinction Weber draws between working the 
demands of ideas and merely having what we might call an “insightful” subjective experience. 
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Weber draws this distinction in a section of Economy and Society entitled “Charisma and Its 
Transformation.”30 Therein Weber writes,  
all these kinds of ideas—including artistic intuition—have in common that to objectivate 
themselves, to prove their reality, they must signify a grasp on the demands of the 
“work,” or, if you prefer, a being seized by them; they are not merely a subjective feeling 
or experience. (emphasis added, Weber 1978, p. 1116).          
It is not an interpretive stretch to claim that Weber is referring here to his own conception of 
education. A few lines later Weber references the process of learning law or the multiplications 
tables by rote as examples of the opposite educational process, one that renders a student’s 
encounter with a subject’s insights irrelevant.31 Rote memory or mere “proficiency”—
symptomatic of the external demands of a bureaucratic education and standardized testing—does 
not describe the goal of the Weberian educator. The Weberian educator’s aim is to bestow the 
gift of independent thinking. She proceeds by presenting material in a manner that gives rise to 
ideas; the demands of ideas, and ideas alone, enable the Weberian educator to provoke an active 
responsibility within students by echoing their demands.   
 Although it may be difficult to imagine such an exceptional algebra teacher, it is not so 
difficult to see the difference between an algebraic idea and a “subjective experience” about 
algebra, that is, an obligation for validity arising from an algebraic problem versus a feeling had 
while doing “algebra.” To illustrate this, imagine a student who exhibits tremendous enthusiasm 
in regards to his work on a given problem and yet remains wrong about it. The student, in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  In Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft this line is a footnote. Translator Gunther Roth includes it as a 
parenthetical remark in Economy and Society (Weber 1978).   
	  
31	  I say opposite in light of this line from Economy and Society: “…the two polar opposites in 
the field of educational ends are to awaken charisma, that is, heroic qualities and magical gifts; 
and to impart specialized expert training… (Weber 1978, p. 426) 
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case, has an incorrect insight. The source of the student’s enthusiasm can be found in “subjective 
experience” as opposed to the standards governing the validity of algebraic problems. The 
standard governing their validity is impersonal. An impersonal standard is a necessary condition 
of a student having a genuine idea about algebra, but it is not sufficient. After all, a student can 
have no genuine ideas about algebra and merely learn clever strategies for “hacking” 
standardized tests and fare the same, on paper, as a student who has had true algebraic ideas and 
worked their demands.32 Despite the apparent equivalence between the two students on paper, 
where all that matters is whether the test taker chose the “right” or “wrong” answer on a specific 
question within a highly controlled testing environment, the Weberian educator, who works for 
particular students, treats the demands of algebraic ideas as something more than a “right” or 
“wrong” answer. A shallow correct answer is insufficient, because heeding the demands of ideas 
is formative for her students; working the demands of ideas prepares students to think 
independently about the obligation’s governing their lives. Thus, being shallowly correct will not 
suffice. However, if there is only a dimly foreseen and inappropriately calculable relationship 
between students working particular academic demands and persons working demands springing 
from an account of “the ultimate meaning of [their] actions” (Weber 2008, p. 48), the question 
correctly arises: What does it mean to get the latter wrong? That is, is there an impersonal 
standard governing the validity of a person’s self-examination?   
 I will assume it is non-controversial to say that thinking independently about the ultimate 
meaning of one’s actions in a non-ideal and pluralistic society yields results with a looser 
standard of validity than algebraic equations. Actions are partially determined by prior 
experience and partially beset by a host of situational factors that belie the agent’s conscious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  This is perhaps another way of stating Delbanco’s illustration of grace.   
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intentions. However, assuming with Weber that persons have a degree of agency, it remains 
unclear if Weber has an impersonal standard that can be used to distinguish between a person 
working ideas about his or her self and entertaining subjective feelings and preferences about his 
or her self. That is, it is unclear if Weber has an impersonal standard for determining whether a 
person who takes an active responsibility for his life has actually gotten it right or merely feels 
right about it. The lack of clarity on this point poses a problem for the argument of this 
dissertation.  
 Thus far, I have claimed that the Weberian educator imposes active responsibility upon 
students by presenting and echoing the demands of particular ideas. The Weberian educator does 
not presume to foresee a student’s future obligations, nor does she determine them with a given 
end, but she is not neutral on the question of the student’s fate and hopes her educational practice 
will inform it. Specifically, she hopes her students will hear her voice in the future. She hopes 
her once strictly algebraic guidance will be transformed and echo something like the following 
admonition: “This is not an algebraic problem, assuredly, but I know you from watching you 
work; and you should keep working this problem and not rest content until you get it right.”  
 If working ideas about algebra is formative, and not confined to an 8th grade classroom, 
then the echo of the Weberian educator’s voice is more than a fanciful or sentimental projection. 
For recalling the Weberian educator’s voice, or the admonition of a great teacher, would recall 
the enlivening memory of working particular ideas. It would recall a memory of agency, a 
memory of being aroused by an idea and heeding its demands. Now, if there were no impersonal 
standard governing algebra, the educator’s efforts to echo algebraic “demands” would be 
spurious persuasion; there would be no memory of working ideas but only memories of being 
pushed and pulled by the shifting tones of subjective experience.  
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 My argument in this dissertation rests upon the plausibility of the claim that there is 
continuity between working particular ideas in the classroom and working ideas about the 
ultimate meaning of one’s life. This assumes that the latter can be made manifest as an idea and, 
so defined, be subject to correctness or incorrectness according to an impersonal standard. 
Although a person’s life is more complex than an algebraic equation, if there were no impersonal 
standard governing thoughts about the ultimate meaning of one’s actions in the world, then 
working particular insights in an academic context would be discontinuous with meeting the 
“demands of the day.” Put another way, thinking independently about algebra would be an affair 
of ideas; while thinking independently about one’s life would be an affair of subjective 
experience. So, if it is wholly unclear whether there can be an impersonal standard that 
determines the correctness or incorrectness of an idea about the meaning of one’s life, then the 
assumption that there is a relationship between particular academic ideas and self-examination 
will be sorely compromised.   
 The claim I will defend in this chapter is that a Weberian philosophy of education uses a 
social condition marked by confusion—rather than a given impersonal standard—to help 
students distinguish between working ideas about the ultimate meaning of their obligations in the 
world and subjective experiences or mere preferences about their life. I shall refer to social 
condition as the condition of confusion, which can be understood as the dormant or everyday 
state of the intellectual position Weber described as “value collision.” “Value collision” holds 
that social values are ultimately irreconcilable and antagonistic, for instance, that political, 
religious, economic, aesthetic, intellectual, and erotic values cannot be unified into one over 
arching framework. The condition of confusion is constituted by the multiple impersonal 
standards governing different value spheres and defined by Weber’s postulate that these 
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standards are always mixed up and compromised in everyday life. Consequently, it is possible on 
Weber’s account to determine the correctness of one’s life according to an impersonal standard. 
But, in order to not do so shallowly, or based on a mere preference or external compulsion, a 
person must first discover the need to clarify and take responsibility for the impersonal standards 
at play by confronting the condition of confusion. What does it mean for a person to examine his 
life, and heed the demands of an idea about it, when the correctness or incorrectness of his 
examination first involves confronting a condition of confusion?33   
 To make this argument, I will begin by examining an objection springing from two 
related philosophical critiques of Weber. Both critiques emanate from the objection that Weber 
lacks an impersonal standard for distinguishing between excellent and base lives, and thus 
espouses relativism. The first critique, offered by political philosopher Leo Strauss, states that 
Weber’s thinking amounts to nihilism: “…the view that every preference, however, evil, base, 
for instance, has to be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any other 
preference” (1965 p. 42). The second critique, proposed by moral philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre, is that Weber’s thinking is an example of emotivism: “…the doctrine that all 
evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of 
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in 
character” (2007, p. 12). I will first cast suspicion on these critiques by demonstrating that they 
are lodged, respectively, from uncharitable and hasty readings of Weber. Taking greater care to 
understand what Weber means does not reveal the work of a superficial or disreputable thinker, 
but a careful educator who was attuned to the risks of impetuous thinking.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 To be clear, Weber’s theory of value collisions will pervade this entire dissertation and will be 
given the most explicit focus in chapter 5. 
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 I will then turn to a letter Weber wrote to his wife describing his pedagogical relationship 
with a particular young man called Herr Voigt. Contra Strauss and MacIntyre’s claims, it is plain 
from this example that Weber is not espousing nihilism or emotivism, but rather guarding Herr 
Voigt against the impulse to rush irresponsibly into a partially understood position. To better 
understand how Weber conceives of his student, Herr Voigt, I will draw an analogy to Plato’s 
understanding of the daemon, particularly as it is developed in the “Myth of Er”—the 
bewildering account Plato uses to conclude his Republic. Although the connection I make here is 
novel in the realm of Weber scholarship, as far as I have read, it is by no means arbitrary. The 
prominent Weber scholar Wilhelm Hennis has deemed Weber’s relationship to Plato “…the most 
urgent desiderata of Weber scholarship” (2001, p. 91).34 Moreover, the “Myth of Er” clearly 
depicts relevant themes of this chapter: the distinction between ideas about the self and mere 
preferences, the complexities of agency in a partially determined world, and the educator’s 
concern for the student’s self-examination. Finally, and most importantly, Weber refers to this 
same myth at a seminal point of his lecture, “The Meaning of ‘Value’ Freedom” (first presented 
in 1914). I will conclude this chapter by comparing Plato’s call for active responsibility for one’s 
daemon, governed by a cosmic standard of justice, with Weber’s call for active responsibility in 
regard to ideas about one’s identity held against a condition of confusion. The argument of this 
chapter begins with an objection.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  The connection between Plato and Weber has also been duly noted in Goldman 1992 and Villa 
2001. These are sources Hennis does not cite. However, I do not think Goldman or Villa do the 
connection justice as their purpose is to draw this connection to serve their argument rather than 
carefully examine its scope and nuances. I hope what follows provides another modest 
contribution.   
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2.2 The Objection of Relativism  
  The fundamental objection is that the Weberian educator, who hopes that students will 
take an active responsibility for the ultimate meaning of their obligations in the world, is actually 
(and unwittingly) encouraging relativism. Relativism, in this case, is a position that dignifies any 
action regardless of whether it is excellent or base. If the Weberian educator espouses relativism, 
this is a cause for concern because there is nothing stopping the Weberian educator’s voice from 
supporting any “demand of the day”: whether, for instance, it is an obligation to promote racial 
justice or to abuse people who appear to be different. If provoking an active responsibility for 
any obligation (and thus no obligation) goes, then there is relativism, or, worse yet, relativism 
cloaked in the language of responsibility. This general critique of relativism finds specific 
expression in the writing of Leo Strauss and Alasdair MacIntyre.  
2.2.1 Strauss and Weber as Nihilist  
 Strauss’s critique of Weber in Natural Right and History (1965) is intended to be 
devastating. His appreciative remark at the beginning of his critique “Whatever may have been 
his errors, [Weber] is the greatest social scientist of our century” (p. 36) quickly becomes ironic 
in light of the conclusion he guides his reader towards: namely, that Weber’s “doctrine of 
values” leads to a nihilism which Weber aimed to “conceal from himself.” (p. 42). If the greatest 
social scientist of the century is a self-deceived nihilist, it is not hard to imagine how Strauss 
regards the average social scientist. Strauss uses Weber’s doctrine of values as a means for 
reducing the ethical foundations of contemporary social sciences to absurdity. I am sympathetic 
to Strauss’s critique of contemporary social science, but not his use of Weber as a means of 
critique. I hope to discredit Strauss’ argument against Weber in what follows.   
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 Strauss’ argument against Weber proceeds through a series of moral imperatives and 
takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum. He begins with the imperatives “Thou shalt have 
ideals” and “Become what thou art,” noting that, for Weber, the dignity of a person is achieved 
through autonomy, where one freely decides upon and thinks independently about one’s own 
values (p. 44). So far, so good—judges Strauss. This imperative allows us to distinguish between 
excellence and baseness. Yet it does not rest secure because Weber advocated pluralism, not a 
stable hierarchy of values. So, “Thou shalt have ideals” abruptly regresses to “Follow thy god or 
demon,” which Strauss interprets to mean “Strive resolutely for excellence or baseness” (p. 45). 
This move causes confusion, but retains a shred of nobility. The shred is soon lost, however, 
because Weber recognized the possibility of “‘vitalistic’” values railing against impersonal and 
supra-personal standards. Consequently, the new imperative becomes “Thou shalt live 
passionately” (p. 46-47). This imperative poses a problem. When applied in light of “Thou shalt 
have ideals,” appeals to personal preferences seem to coexist equally with a host of impersonal 
standards and there is no way to rationally privilege one way of life over the next. Because of 
this confusion, says Strauss, Weber’s higher claims “Thou shalt have ideals” and “Become what 
thou art,” can be reduced to a nihilistic command that does not distinguish between excellent and 
base actions—specifically, an absurd imperative: “Thou shalt have preferences” (p. 47).   
 Strauss’ argument is rather slick at this point. But after triumphantly announcing his 
conclusion, Strauss makes two qualifications that compromise his argument. The first is that 
Weber’s appeal to responsibility comes too late in the day: “We cannot take seriously this 
belated insistence on responsibility and sanity” (p. 47). However, Weber’s insistence on the 
importance of responsibility is only belated in Strauss’ own argument. Weber need not be read 
along these lines. My dissertation contends that an appeal to active responsibility comes first and 
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foremost in Weber’s ethical and educational views. It is not a belated appeal, but one issued at 
dawn and dusk. When responsibility is included at the outset, Strauss’ entire argument becomes 
suspect, starting from the conclusion “Thou shalt have [responsible] preferences” and working 
backwards.  
The second qualification Strauss acknowledges is that Weber may have claimed 
impersonal and supra-personal standards could be rejected in the name of human freedom, 
according to the imperative “Become what thou art” or “Choose thy fate,” yet to develop this 
argument, admits Strauss, would require a “break” with Weber’s doctrine of values (p 48-49). 
This demands further qualification, however, because Strauss acknowledges a few pages back 
that “Weber never explained what he meant by ‘values’” (p. 39), so Weber may not have 
advanced a clear and systematic doctrine of values to begin with. If this is the case, then a 
“break” with Weber’s doctrine of values is not very difficult to achieve, and a more charitable 
consideration as to why Weber might sanction the rejection of impersonal standards in the name 
of human freedom is in order.  
 Rather than poking small holes in an argument devised by an admittedly superior mind, 
the argument of this chapter is better served by pausing for a moment to appreciate Strauss’ 
worry about the contemporary social sciences. There is an important worry here, I think, which 
can be captured through an educational analogy. Picture Strauss as a clever young student who 
hears his social studies teacher pronounce, with great solemnity and pomp, that she is going to 
teach a unit on politics but will not disclose her own political views because “personal views and 
opinions” are irrelevant to the study of politics.35 The clever Strauss hears the teacher’s vow but 
then registers countless instances, day after day, of the teacher plainly displaying her political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  For an instructive treatment of these concerns see The Political Classroom: Evidence and 
Ethics in Democratic Education (Hess and McAvoy 2015).  
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views. Strauss starts to lose patience with his teacher. Yet, to his amazement, he suffers 
impatience alone. All of his classmates overlook the teacher’s daily disclosures because they 
revere their teacher and believe that having political views truly has nothing to do with the study 
of politics. The teacher’s moments of disclosure are like sneezes to the other students, which 
happen from time to time but are not worth further analysis or remark. I wholeheartedly agree 
that lessons taught by social scientists should provoke concern if they dispose students to treat 
values like sneezes.   
 A contemporary articulation of Strauss’ worry, which incorporates language from 
MacIntyre as well, can be found in the work of sociologist Philip Gorski (2012):   
…sociology finds itself quite bereft of a moral vocabulary, and graduate training in the 
field often serves as a kind of moral un-education, in which students are taught to 
transform their convictions into researchable programs (a good thing) before sloughing 
them off entirely (a bad thing)” (Gorski 2012 p. 99) 
Like Strauss, Gorski views Weber as a prime culprit in the moral un-education of contemporary 
sociologists. In another article, Gorski also deems Weber a nihilist for holding that “our decision 
to devote ourselves to one ‘ultimate value’ rather than another is fundamentally arbitrary” and 
“values are subjective and relative” (2013, p. 545-546); and finally, like Strauss, Gorski ends his 
article with a suspicious qualification that should cause readers to revisit his prior critique. 
According to Gorski, Weber’s views can be partially vindicated because Weber’s distinctions 
between value spheres guards against the totalization of intellectual values—what might be 
called technocratic or scientistic governance— and facilitates open-mindedness. Yet if Weber’s 
pluralism can be used to facilitate open-mindedness and guard against the totalization of 
intellectual values, then perhaps we have reason to believe that Weber’s “nihilistic” views are 
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less entrenched and perhaps more complicated than Strauss and Gorski care to acknowledge. 
Granting that social scientists who treat moral values like sneezes and participate in the moral 
un-education of their students are a cause for real concern, it remains to be seen if Weber—a 
thinker whose sharp vision saw so much—was truly blind to the problem of nihilism in his own 
work.  
2.2.2 MacIntyre and Weber as Emotivist  
 Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of Weber resembles Strauss’, yet it harbors an additional 
cause for concern. For MacIntyre, Weber is not only a relativist who holds that “the choice of 
any one particular evaluative stance or commitment can be no more rational than that of any 
other,” but Weber also endorses an ethical perspective that allows for the unmitigated 
manipulation of others; this is the case because Weber’s view of authority cannot “appeal to 
rational criteria to vindicate itself except that type of bureaucratic authority which appeals 
precisely to its own effectiveness…[to] successful power” (2007, p. 26). These two charges find a 
common ground in MacIntyre’s definition of emotivism. For the emotivist, the only purpose of 
evaluative utterances is to express one’s own feelings or to transform (read: manipulate) the 
feelings and attitudes of others.  So, if the Weberian educator were an emotivist, then there 
would be no impersonal standard governing whether a student’s reflections on the meaning of his 
actions are correct or not; there would only be (a) the student’s feelings about the world and (b) 
the question of how to most powerfully and efficiently move others into accord with these 
feelings. The teacher would be like the charisma coach mentioned in my first chapter. 
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MacIntyre’s worry is that the emotivist educator not only imparts the maxim “Thou shalt have 
preferences,” but also “Might [of preferences] makes right [of preferences].”36  
But is it really so easy to read Weber as an emotivist? A hasty move MacIntyre makes in 
After Virtue is to conflate Weber’s ethical views with his description of bureaucratic authority. 
MacIntyre writes, “Weber is then, in the broader sense in which I have understood the term, an 
emotivist and his portrait of a bureaucratic authority is an emotivist portrait”  
(MacIntyre 2007, p. 26). It is easy to see how Weber’s description of bureaucratic authority 
might be aligned with emotivism, and why MacIntyre chose to use the stark images of a 
Weberian bureaucracy37 governed by external rewards and sanctions alone. Yet it is difficult, for 
me at any rate, to see how Weber’s description of bureaucracy can be collapsed into a conception 
of authority that Weber was endorsing; it is far more plausible that Weber chose to dramatically 
emphasize the restrictive and inhumane aspects of bureaucratic authority in order to resist its 
total authority, and that the normative implications of these dramatic descriptions, besides 
offering material for future moral philosophers and critical theorists to use, amount to an 
“exercise in defending humanity” (Mommsen 1992, p. 115).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36Anticipating our later discussion of Plato, this point can be expressed in another way. For the 
emotivist educator, we might say, there would only be the need for an education in rhetoric, for 
bringing the crowd around to one’s own feelings and private preferences, however base. There 
would never be the need for philosophy, which would motivate, as Plato writes in Gorgias, the 
“the true political craft” that does not “aim at gratification but at what’s best” (Plato 1987, 521d). 
What is “best” implies an impersonal standard that can govern conduct and issue demands 
regardless of a person’s preferences. The emotivist educator (or charisma coach) lacks such a 
standard and thus cannot impart any conception of what is best. 	  	  
	  
37	  In his short essay “The Claims of After Virtue” (1998), MacIntyre writes, “Social reality has a 
kind of unpredictability which the Weberian managerial ethos cannot acknowledge without 
revealing how much of the claims of modern private and public bureaucracy rests upon 
deception and self-deception (p. 71).   
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Yet MacIntyre’s conflation of a Weberian description with a Weberian norm is quite 
common amongst Weber’s critics, particularly those descending from Strauss’ critique. 
Responding to Strauss’ critique in particular, an important Weber scholar and translator, Hans 
Henrik Bruun, captures what is perhaps the most common conflation of all – namely, the move 
to conflate Weber’s appeal to the limits of specialized, academic knowledge with an appeal to 
the limits of reason itself (Bruun 2007, p. 19 ff.). Although Weber resisted the academic expert’s 
determination of human action and decision, this does not mean that Weber promoted irrational 
decisions and arbitrary choices simpliciter. Weber was not so arrogant to think that every action 
and decision could be fully determined by intellectuals serving the modern academic machine; 
on the other hand, Weber was also not so pessimistic as to think that academic scholarship 
amounted to a mixture of confused drives, conformity, and ossification as Nietzsche, for 
instance, portrays in his essay “Schopenhauer as Educator.” The point for now is that Weber’s 
conception of “science” (Wissenschaft) should not be conflated with “reason,” and his 
conception of politics should not be conflated with “irrationality.” As Weber observes in his 
lecture, “The ‘objectivity’ of Knowledge” (originally written in 1904), intellectual critique 
should support a person’s responsibility to make a decision, but the decision “must be taken by 
the striving person who, in accordance with his own conscience and worldview weighs the 
values in question and chooses between them.” (Weber 2014, p. 102). Put otherwise, the striving 
person is not irrational nor utterly beholden to the academies’ epistemic authority, because no 
one value sphere—including the intellectual sphere, and the employees of the institutions 
sustaining it—can determine the meaning a person ascribes to his actions as he deliberates about 
his own life. If it could, then there would be no need for independent thinking per se, and not 
much value ascribable to a particular person’s striving. Furthermore, there would be no need for 
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an education focused on particular persons; there would only be a need for the right sort of 
governance to enforce the correct choice between adjustment to the social order or the 
groundless decision to embrace willful ignorance, irrationality, and insubordination.    
This worry about a “totalitarian straightjacket for the human condition,” a worry used by 
philosophers like Isaiah Berlin to motivate an endorsement of value pluralism, is one that 
MacIntyre anticipates and rejects (2007, p. 143). MacIntryre’s rejection of value pluralism is 
worthy of consideration. For, if value pluralism stands, so does an endorsement of 
thoughtlessness. After all, we can easily imagine two sincere and deliberate strivers who pursue 
irreconcilable or conflicting values. According to value pluralism, the lives of both strivers must 
be equally good and thinking must halt there because thought is incapable of evaluating the 
desirability of these contradictory lives. Hence a space of thoughtlessness is preserved. Appeals 
to value pluralism seem designed to protect a space of thoughtlessness, which, as thinkers like 
Strauss and MacIntryre worry, cannot help but accommodate a harmful form of relativism. Ideas 
about the correct meaning of one’s actions must lack an overarching impersonal standard; they 
must be nothing more than a matter of subjective experience and preference. This creates a 
society where there is plenty of wiggle room. But it also creates a society where the presence of 
impersonal standards governing a person’s understanding of their conduct of life lacks 
educational authority; within a reasonable political system, as John Rawls observes, the 
expectation reigns that “the comprehensive doctrines of most people are not fully 
comprehensive” (Rawls 2001, p. 197). Put otherwise, most strivers do not really understand the 
values they are striving after, and need not strive consistently, lest the space for thoughtlessness 
be compromised.  
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Nevertheless, is accepting pluralism, and the subsequent space given to thoughtlessness, 
really the best antidote to a “totalitarian straightjacket for the human condition” (MacIntyre 
2007, p. 143)? Why not call it a philosophical tribute to the soft despotism governing a 
consumerist society, which demands loudly, consistently and sleeplessly: “Thou shalt have 
preferences and strive to satisfy them…and nothing much more.”   
2.3 Weber’s Concern for His Student’s Self-Examination  
Against these objections, I argue that Weber did not endorse value pluralism in order to 
champion irrational preferences or to preserve a space for thoughtlessness, but rather to motivate 
independent thinking. This becomes clear when Weber is read as an educator, intent on 
provoking an active responsibility within students for heeding the ideas that shape their 
identities. A helpful illustration of Weber’s care for his students’ self-examination can be seen by 
turning to a letter he wrote to his wife Marianne.  
The letter describes the indirect pedagogical strategy Weber employed while conversing 
with a young theologian named Herr Voigt. Weber observes,    
 I avoided asking him point-blank what he thought about this or that important 
 point—and I think I was right in this. Here is my reason for this: I know from 
 experience—that if at Herr V.’s stage of development a man is goaded into  
taking a stand on a point he has not yet worked out in his own mind and expresses  
an opinion, he is apt not to continue his dispassionate quest for truth—naturally, a  man 
feels bound, as it were, to something that he has once said—but, without knowing it, to 
look only for reasons to justify what he once said. Thus he is nailed down to his own 
statement, which is often made only under a momentary impression.  
(Weber 1975, p. 154)     
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This passage goes far in exemplifying a Weberian philosophy of education. The particular 
questions and concerns—Herr V’s stance on “this or that important point”—are not 
compartmentalized. They bear significance beyond themselves. Herr V’s position on “this or that 
important point” contributes to the formation of his identity. Given the connection between 
particular problems and the student’s identity, it matters tremendously whether a particular 
problem is “worked out” independently or forced upon a person by the educator (or some other 
situational pressure). Here Weber recognized an important point regarding the psychology of a 
student’s identity: a student who affirms a position will have an interest in defending it, insofar 
as espousing the position becomes associated with protecting his identity. An implication of this 
psychological observation is that if a position is only partially understood—because it is, in fact, 
another’s—then the student will work to justify the external “demands” established by another 
person or system, perhaps according to the strength or persuasive quality of the “momentary 
impression” made upon him.38 However, if a position and its obligations are understood, the 
student who holds it will be working his own demands of the day, and thereby define himself 
according to an idea he has mastered and is able to resolutely defend.   
If there were no ideas involved here, if Strauss (et al.) are correct and the Weberian 
educator is fundamentally just endorsing the imperatives “Thou shalt have preferences” and 
“Thou shalt make groundless and arbitrary decisions,” then it is perplexing that Weber would 
even care about Herr Voigt’s “dispassionate quest for truth” (Weber 1975, p. 154) and not 
simply proceed with eliciting his charge’s “opinions” or “preferences,” whatever they happened 
to be.  But matters become less perplexing when Weber’s conception of ideas and educational 
commitment to his student’s independent thinking are taken seriously. It is difficult to deny that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  This is another way of stating that the Weberian educator is not a charisma coach. 
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Weber cared about his students and felt bound to his practical work as an educator. Indeed, as 
Wilhelm Hennis suggested, the dominant concern of Weber’s work is whether there is an 
“…intellectually responsible manner in which [persons] can be inwardly aroused, or do the 
prospects of education exhaust themselves in training for practical administrative employment.” 
(Hennis 2000, p. 91). Expressed differently, using language introduced in chapter one, the 
concern is: Can there be an educational charisma that arises internally, from the demands of 
ideas, or is all education simply a matter of bureaucratic education (heeding given institutional 
demands and meeting given standards) or charismatic persuasion (being attracted by another’s 
personal magnetism)? Entertaining the idea that Weber did care about his students’ self-
examination and “dispassionate quest for truth,” and recalling the earlier point that Weber 
distinguishes between ideas and subjective experience, it remains to be determined how Weber 
understood a person’s idea about the meaning of his or her life.  
2.4 An Idea about the Self: An Analogy to the Platonic Daemon  
 One approach to this question would be to explore studies on Weber’s conception of the 
personality (cf. Farris 2013) and then plug these back into his educational views with the support 
of scholarship that has already paved the way (Goldman 1992). I think a more promising 
approach, particularly for the rather elusive subject at hand, is to approach the question through 
an analogy to Plato’s daemon,39 particularly as Plato describes it in the Myth of Er. My analogy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 “Daemon” is also translated “daimon.” As the German scholar Angus Nicholls notes, “The two 
different ways of translating δαíµων (daemon and daimon) reflect different transliteration 
conventions used in separate historical periods. The Latinate “daemon” was favored during the 
Romantic period, while “daimon” reflects the more direct transliteration used in recent 
scholarship. Only one form of spelling (Dämon) is used in German.”(2006, p. 10-11) For the 
purposes of this dissertation I will use daemon, following the rendering of Dämon as daemon in 
Gordon C. Wells translation of “Science as a Vocation”(Weber 2008).   
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runs as follows: Weber conceives of ideas arising about the self from a student’s self-
examination like Plato conceived of a person’s daemon.   
An initial concern might be that this connection appears arbitrary, but there is actually a 
vital connection between Plato and Weber. Wilhelm Hennis, for instance, has suggested an 
“examination of Weber’s relationship to Plato belongs among the most urgent desiderata of 
Weber scholarship. At the most important points of Weber’s writings he justifies himself by 
reference to Plato” (Hennis 2001, p. 91). Passing connections between Weber and Plato have 
also been made by sociologist Harvey Goldman (1992) and, more recently, by political theorist 
Dana Villa (2001), but there is far more to be said. Again, my analogy will be that Weber 
conceives of ideas about the self arising from a student’s self-examination like Plato conceived 
of a person’s daemon.   
2.4.1 Historical Connections  
Another relevant concern is that there are innumerable historical connections needed to 
sufficiently ground the analogy. This is particularly true if we include the genealogy of Plato’s 
conception of the daemon, which would require turning back to Homer (where the term daemon 
originally meant “allotter” or “fated” and the adjective meant “incomprehensible” or “uncanny”) 
as well as noting diachronic variation in the term’s meaning through pre-Socratic philosophers 
like Heraclitus and Empedocles (cf. Darcus 1974).40 Wolfgang Zucker’s article “The Demonic: 
From Aeschylus to Tillich” (1969) provides an impressive snapshot of the historical terrain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
40 For Empedocles, the daemon was the entity underlying successive incarnations, and as 
classicist Shirley Darcus explains, “a man’s daimon is an active force working within him to 
shape his life” (Darcus 1974 p. 398); Heraclitus described a person’s ethos (or disposition) as 
shaped by his daimon (p. 399). But as it is through the daimon that a person achieves first-hand 
knowledge (gnome) of the divine, “[h]uman capabilities are extended and enlarged” by the 
daimon, “the power within” (p. 406).    
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Zucker notes that the daemon in Plato can mean both “a benevolent helper towards self-
realization, consenting to man’s autonomy as long as he does not lose himself in his passions,” 
but also a person’s “connection to the divine” (p. 38-39). Angus Nicholls’ recent work Goethe’s 
Concept of the Daemonic: After the Ancients (2006) is the most thorough study I have come 
across that links the ancient conception of the daemon to modern German conceptions. Nicholls 
sets out to read Goethe’s understanding of the daemon in light of Plato’s, and the move from 
Goethe to Weber, as the very title of this dissertation suggests, is not so great.41 As Nicholls 
describes it, Goethe’s conception of the daemonic was like Socrates’s in that it reminds us of “an 
outside, an uncontrollable excess or remainder, which exceeds the cognitive capacities of human 
reason, the ignorance of which may cause tragic consequences” (p. 262); and it is like Plato’s 
because it affirms that the “progression from mythos to logos”—or an original account to a 
logical or scientific account—“is never complete, nor susceptible to completion (p. 269). 
Goethe’s conception of the daemonic, most comprehensively described in his autobiography Aus 
meinem Leben: Ditchtung und Warheit, stresses the highly personal, non-rational, and 
exceptional quality of the daemon. The Platonic notion of the daemon includes this, but also, 
through the voice of Socrates, an appeal to sobriety and responsibility.  
Another promising hinge between Plato and Weber is the nineteenth century Danish 
philosopher and proto-existentialist Søren Kierkegaard, particularly in his work The Concept of 
Irony: With Continual Reference to Socrates. Herein Kierkegaard claims that Socrates’ daemon 
“was concerned only with particular situations and merely spoke warningly…The daimonian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
41 Goethe died in 1832. Weber was born in 1864. Goethe’s influence pervades Weber’s work, 
including his notion of “ideal types” and his famous phrase “elective affinity,” used in The 
Protestant Ethic to describe the relationship between the spirit of capitalism and the disposition 
formed by Protestant theology (cf. Rakau 2009).   
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was sufficient for Socrates, and with it he could manage…” (1989, p. 166). Kierkegaard goes on 
to suggest that “science and scholarship are right in ignoring such things; nevertheless, one who 
wants to understand an individual life cannot do so” (ibid). Here Kierkegaard is using different 
language and referencing a distinct person, yet his observation about Socrates’s daemon 
resembles a point made in chapter 1: that it is understandable, at the moment, why educational 
decision-makers and educational scholars ignore students as particular persons. Yet it is not 
absurd, but wholly appropriate, that educators, each day, attend to students as particular persons, 
or (strange as it sounds) to attend to their daemons.  
What is a daemon? Clearly for Plato it is not a demon, or evil spirit, and it need not 
signify baseness – the meaning Strauss was quick to ascribe to Weber. Is it a person’s ideal? Is it 
a non-rational excess? A vitalistic excess? A rational admonition? A person’s fate? Or, is it just a 
classical term revered by classicists? As Kierkegaard jokes,  
From time immemorial there has been a strong tendency to talk about [the Socratic 
daemon]…but the matter usually ends there. The curiosity that is titillated by mystery is 
satisfied by getting a name for it; profundity is gratified by having someone say with 
solemn countenance: ‘What is there to say?’”  
Kierkegaard then references one contemporary classicist bold enough to disenchant the entire 
mystery and chalk Socrates’s daemonium up to “…a presentiment or a kind of fanaticism that to 
some extent had its roots in [Socrates’] vivid imagination and his delicate nervous system” 
(1989, p. 157-158). I mention these deflationary remarks because they capture relevant concerns 
about drawing this analogy. On the one hand, the comparison might not be clear because not 
much can be said about a mysterious classical entity/force like the daemon. On the other hand, 
there may be nothing to stop the term from being reduced to nonsense. Even still, the connection 
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between Plato and Weber on the daemon is not tenuous; Weber’s own references to the daemon 
suggest an explicit connection.   
2.4.2 Explicit Connections  
 The concluding lines of Weber’s momentous lecture “Science as a Vocation” (first 
delivered in 1917) read as follows: “We must set to work and meet the “demands of the day”—
humanely and vocationally. These are plain and simple, however, if everyone finds and obeys 
the daemon who holds the threads of his life” (2008, p. 52). As this conclusion quotes Goethe’s 
aphorism, it likely references Goethe’s conception of the daemonic too. There is nothing 
explicitly linking Weber to Plato in these last lines. Nevertheless, Plato’s conception of inquiry is 
mentioned in the lecture, and sociologist Harvey Goldman (1992) interpreted “Science as a 
Vocation” as Weber making an appeal for Platonic education aimed at self-mastery, and to 
charismatically revealing to students “the battlefield on which they must do combat” (p. 79). 
Goldman’s interpretation combines, I think, the right mixture of revelation and realism. Yet it is 
a generally uncharitable interpretation. Goldman’s underlying purpose, we might say, is to depict 
Weber as a fanatic with a delicate nervous system.42 However, it is uncharitable to conclude that 
Weber’s intention as an educator was to charismatically compel students to step onto a 
battlefield. Recalling the Herr V. passage, Weber’s intention was clearly not to incite a 
battlefield mentality through the force of rhetoric. His concern was for Herr Voigt’s independent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Radkau’s biography (2009) takes this suggestion to its furthest logical conclusion. He provides 
a psychoanalytic interpretation of Weber’s use of the term demon, and chalks it up to a 
metaphorical way to describe sexual dysfunction: “Were they for the Webers an interchangeable 
metaphor, a mere code word for ‘nocturnal disasters’?”  Radkau also interprets Marianne 
Weber’s biography and her reference to the “demons” that tormented her husband’s health. The 
latter likely refers to a Dostoevskian (or Christian) conception of demon, meaning malicious 
spirits. This use of the term is distinct from the Platonic conception daemon, which Radkau 
quickly defines as: “..the God-given inner voice pointing out the right path to man.” (2009, ch. 
7).  
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thinking and “dispassionate quest for truth,” insofar as these played a formative role in shaping 
his identity. Or, put more generally, the Weberian educator hopes to provoke her students’ active 
responsibility for the meaning of their actions in the world by echoing the demands of particular 
ideas. If heeding the demands of particular ideas is formative, then the educator’s particular work 
plays a role in shaping her students’ identities. But what is the object of a student’s self-
examination? The claim I am developing in this section is that the Weberian educator’s 
conception of the student’s self is best understood through an analogy to the Platonic daemon. 
This becomes clear by turning to Weber’s most explicit reference to it.  
The reference occurs in Weber’s article “The Meaning of ‘Value Freedom’” (1917), and 
will be quoted at length; this passage is crucial for the argument of this chapter and will be 
referenced throughout this dissertation. Weber writes,    
People’s humdrum “everyday lives,” in the truest sense of that expression, make  them 
shallow precisely in that they do not become aware [of the fact] that irreconcilably 
antagonistic values are thus [in practice] mixed up with each other, partly for 
psychological reasons, partly for pragmatic ones. Above all, they do not want to become 
aware of [that fact]: on the contrary, they evade the choice  between “God” and the 
“Devil,” and the fundamental personal decision as to which of the conflicting values 
belongs to the realm of one, and which to the other. The fruit of the tree of knowledge, 
disturbing to human complacency yet inescapable, is precisely this [insight]: that we 
cannot avoid knowing about these conflicts, and must therefore realize that every single 
important act—and to an even much greater extent: life as a whole, if it is to be lived in 
full awareness and is not just to unfold like a natural event—involves a series of 
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fundamental decisions through which the soul, as Plato [describes it], chooses its own 
fate—the meaning that is of its activity and being. (Weber 2014, p. 314)        
The crux of this passage is the ineluctable necessity of what Weber called “value collision” in the 
social world, which he explicitly says should not be interpreted as relativism (ibid). Rather, it 
means that if we desire to know about the social world, and the meaning of our actions therein, 
“we cannot avoid knowing about these conflicts” (ibid). There is more than one impersonal 
standard to measure the correctness of action in society, and because these standards are mixed 
up, they become diffused throughout everyday life. In the “shallow” and “humdrum” activities of 
life, acknowledging value collision involves acknowledging what I have called the condition of 
confusion. Self-examination involves realizing one’s complicity in the mix-up, and thinking 
about the ultimate meaning of one’s obligations in the world against a condition of confusion. 
Here the connection between Plato and Weber on the daemon becomes unavoidable.   
2.4.3    The Myth of Er  
The passage above directly references Plato’s Myth of Er, which occurs in book 10 of 
Republic. Here I make a strong claim. These lines must be understood in light of this myth, or 
they will be misunderstood (as I posit that Strauss misunderstands Weber above). Nevertheless, 
Weber’s words are not equivalent with the myth. Although Plato and Weber are both concerned 
with guarding their readers from rushing into life confusedly, based upon an impression or 
preference that has not been sufficiently thought through, for Plato the impersonal standard is 
one of cosmic justice, whereas for Weber there are impersonal standards (plural), and to 
deliberate about them first requires confronting a condition of confusion: the mix-up of values 
spheres and the standards governing these spheres in everyday life. To support this claim, a brief 
description of Plato’s myth is in order.  
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 In Book 10 of the Republic, Socrates concludes his extended defense of the just life by 
telling a complex myth about a man named Er who died and visited the afterlife, and then 
returned to speak of his experience. In a climactic moment, Socrates relates how Er saw a 
collection of disembodied souls being given instructions by a prophet of Lachesis (the maiden 
daughter of Necessity). The prophet takes models of possible lives (daemons) from the lap of 
Lachesis and tells the souls that lots will be cast for the selection of lives. Chance thus enters the 
cosmic picture, for, presumably, receiving the first pick allows one lucky soul to choose the best 
possible life (daemon). Yet the prophet makes it clear: “Your daimon will not be assigned to you 
by lot, you will choose him ... Virtue has not master: as he honors or dishonors it, so shall each 
of you have more or less of it. Responsibility lies with the chooser” (emphasis added, Plato 2004, 
617d-e). With the disorienting image of countless daemons in mind, and souls facing the 
necessity of making a choice, Socrates steps back from simply describing the tale to warn his 
interlocutor (Glaucon) about the momentous importance of this decision. This passage, for the 
sake of comparison, must also be quoted at length.  
Here, it seems my dear Glaucon, a human being faces the greatest danger of all, and 
because of that each must, to the neglect of all other subjects, take care above all else to 
be a seeker and student of that subject which will enable him to learn and discover who 
will give him the ability and the knowledge to distinguish a good life from a bad, so that 
he will always and in any circumstances choose the better one from among those that are 
possible. He must calculate the effect of all the things we have mentioned just now, both 
jointly and severally, on the virtue of a life, so as to know what the good and bad things 
are that beauty does when it is mixed with wealth or poverty and this or that state of the 
soul; what high and low birth, private lives and ruling offices, physical strength and 
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weakness, ease and difficulties in learning, and all the things that are naturally part of the 
soul or can be acquired by it do, when they are mixed with one another. On the basis of 
all that he will be able, by considering the nature of the soul, to reason out which life is 
better and which worse and choose accordingly, calling worse the one that will lead the 
soul to become more unjust, and better the one that leads it to become more just. 
Everything else he will ignore. For we have seen, this is the best way to choose, whether 
in life or death (emphasis added, 618 b-e).  
Plato’s use of this strange account to conclude the Republic has given rise to much 
commentary.43 Recently, philosopher Francisco Gonzalez (2012) claimed that the myth of Er 
illustrates human life in terms of its “fundamental opacity” (p. 272) and does not offer the 
philosopher a form of escapism or consolation, but rather “…the myth of Er is his nightmare” (p. 
277). Weber’s remark about “shallowness” and the “humdrum” nature of everyday life also calls 
attention to its opacity and confusion; Weber’s view is that most prefer not to know about the 
meaning of their actions in the world because it is discomfiting. Such knowledge not only 
involves a threat to one’s personal identity and confrontation with a difficult personal decision 
about whether to live ignorantly or pursue knowledge, but it also involves the alienating reality 
of living amidst people who feel at home, as it were, in ignorance. Yet it does not seem as though 
Weber is aiming to depict a nightmare. Read as an educator, if this dissertation is correct, Weber 
aims to provoke the need for active responsibility and the desire to live one’s life insightfully—
as opposed to preferentially or experientially.   
Stephen Halliwell’s recent “this-worldly” interpretation of the myth goes far in 
illuminating the comparison between Weber and Plato.  Halliwell describes the myth as,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  J.S. Morrison’s article “Parmenidies and Er” (1955) is the most frequently cited Anglo-
American study that I’ve come across.  
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…a stark emblem of the inescapably self-forming consequences of ethical agency, a 
magnified image of how at every moment (“always and everywhere”) the individual 
soul/person is intrinsically responsible for what matters most about its existence. Every 
action, we might thus say, brings with it its own “afterlife.” Every choice makes us who 
we are; when we choose we activate (and become) something, and therefore cannot 
simply pull back from ourselves… (2007, p. 469).  
Put another way, according to Halliwell, the myth is meant to be an imminent appeal for Glaucon 
to take active responsibility for his life – his daemon – as it is being formed, heeded, or neglected 
by his everyday actions. Halliwell’s reading is strikingly similar to Weber’s use of the myth in 
the above passage; both Plato and Weber saw everyday life as mixed up, and both Plato and 
Weber used this opacity to motivate readers to take an active responsibility for self-examination.    
Yet, as mentioned above, there is an important difference between Plato and Weber. For 
Plato, insights about the best life do not accommodate plural standards of deliberation but one 
standard, and the encompassing value of justice. Socrates bids Glaucon to question his impulses 
and remain vigilant so he can sort through the Er-like confusion of everyday life and choose the 
best life. But the only means for sorting through the confusion, as Socrates presents the myth, is 
by minding the standard of justice that governs all persons—regardless of their ability to fool the 
majority, take an undue share of goods or privileges, and appear “just.” Only the impersonal 
standard of justice can be used to measure the correctness of one’s decision and evaluate the 
decisions of others. The divine agent’s decree, “Responsibility lies with the chooser” (Plato 
2004, 617d-e), is modulated through Socrates’s warning to become an unequivocal demand for 
judging the merit of one’s life according to this standard. “Everything else he will ignore. For we 
have seen, this is the best way to choose, whether in life or death”  
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(emphasis added, 2004, 618 b-e).   
 The worries about Weber’s relativism—respectively described above as “nihilism” and 
“emotivism”—charge Weber with having no cognizance of impersonal standards. According to 
these charges, unlike Plato, Weber cannot warn his students to mind an impersonal standard 
because he is a relativist who does not recognize the existence of one impersonal standard that 
can encompass the whole of life. Consequently, Weber’s appeal for living a self-examined life 
over and above a shallow and confused life is accused of lacking any criteria by which such a 
distinction can even be made. The most Weber can say, so the accusation runs, is: “Choose as 
best what you feel or experience as best—whether that means the base daemon of a tyrant or the 
profound daemon of Socrates. Responsibility lies solely with the chooser, and which life the 
chooser prefers or experiences as best or worst, will be best or worst for him or her. There is 
nothing more to say about the matter. We must preserve a thoughtless space for the individual’s 
private preferences and experiences lest our thinking abet a totalitarian regime.” Yet, as 
suggested above, this caricature seems to advocate the opposite of Weber’s views.  
2.5 Self-Examination Against the Condition of Confusion  
Much like Plato, Weber wants to impress upon his readers the demand to take an active 
responsibility for the meaning of their lives, or, in Halliwell’s words, the “…inescapably self-
forming consequences of ethical agency…” (2007, p. 469). Forcing a dichotomy between one 
impersonal standard and base relativism might be an expedient way to critique Weber, but it is 
not a useful device when the intention is to understand what Weber is actually saying. Weber’s 
meaning in the above passage is that shallowness prevails in everyday life when people do not 
care to see that different value spheres (and the impersonal standards governing their conduct of 
life) are thoroughly mixed up. To imagine what Weber is after, consider how the values of a 
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political party might be thoroughly mixed up with economic and religious values, such that the 
party’s message becomes political (when convenient), economic (when convenient), and 
religious (when convenient). Weber’s pronouncement would be that such a party is shallow. To 
continue with this example, without forcing this or that political party upon his pupil, Weber is 
concerned that a person will rush to identify with said party based upon a “momentary 
impression” (Weber 1975, p. 154), and that this person’s interest in maintaining the integrity and 
coherence of his chosen “political identity” will lead him to stick with shallowness rather than 
uncovering the confusion of purposes inherent in his political party. In this case, the impersonal 
standards governing the correctness of action are plural and mixed up. The apparent coherence of 
the political party betrays a condition of confusion. If there were one impersonal standard clearly 
governing a society, there would be no need for a Weberian education: indeed, social life would 
“unfold like a natural event” (Weber 2014, p. 314). But, looking around with open eyes, this 
does not seem to be the case. It is more nearly the case that the confusion, the mix-up of values, 
prevails. The person who is attentive to this social fact, and examines the meaning of his life by 
first confronting it, is thus prepared to understand whether the meaning and obligation of his life 
has been examined correctly or incorrectly; this person is prepared, in other words, for profound 
self-examination. Recognizing the condition of confusion, according to a Weberian philosophy 
of education, is thus a prerequisite of self-examination. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Focusing largely on Weber himself, I argued in this chapter that the Weberian educator 
uses the confusion of impersonal standards in society—what I have called a condition of 
confusion—to help students distinguish between working ideas about the ultimate meaning of 
their obligations in the world and merely having subjective experiences or preferences about 
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them. Refuting the idea that Weber espoused a relativism incapable of distinguishing correct 
ideas about a person’s life from mere preferences, I then turned to Weber’s description of his 
indirect pedagogical approach with Herr V and claimed that Weber’s conception of the object of 
a student’s self-examination is best understood through an analogy to Plato’s daemon as 
conveyed in the Myth of Er. Noting the parallels between Plato and Weber, I observed that Plato 
set justice as an impersonal standard for judging the correctness of one’s life, while Weber 
assumes that mix-up always prevails in social life and does not adopt a perspective sub specie 
aeternitatis, a view from the perspective of eternity, but first bids students to encounter an 
everyday condition of confusion; acknowledging it prepares a person for profound self-
examination.  
 In conclusion, I suggest that the stark contrast between Plato’s promotion of an 
impersonal standard of justice and Weber’s initiation to self-examination via a condition of 
confusion must be qualified. Consider perhaps a striking moment in the myth of Er. The first lot 
is drawn. The first soul, with the option of the best life, rushes forward and impulsively chooses 
a tyrannical life that involves “being fated to eat his own children, among other evils” (Plato 
2004, 619b). Interestingly enough, this soul had previously lived his life “in an orderly 
constitution”—imbued with excellence and virtue—perfectly governed, we can imagine, by an 
impersonal standard of justice. Yet this soul, says Socrates, had only known “virtue through 
habit but without philosophy” (619b). Thus the soul, despite receiving the first lot and despite 
being habituated to a just lifestyle, chooses the worst life amidst the great confusion of the 
afterlife, and ‘he’ does so precisely because ‘he’ did not “adequately examine everything” (ibid). 
In this scene, at least, Weber and Plato are in complete agreement. Acknowledging a condition of 
confusion prepares a person for self-examination and a “dispassionate quest for truth;” for both 
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Weber and Plato, it seems, motivation does not lie with the presence of a single, impersonal 
social standard governing society, but with the condition of confusion and the worry about living 
amidst it irresponsibly.  
For the Weberian educator, one impersonal standard determining the validity of a 
student’s insight about the “meaning of his life” is not given in advance. What is given in 
advance, as Weber and Plato seem to agree, is a condition of confusion, which can be readily 
seen in social life. Interestingly enough, it can also be foreseen as students work particular 
problems. Along with simply getting an algebra problem wrong, as mentioned above, a student 
can get it right but do so shallowly and thus subtly abet social confusion. Although the student 
may earn a high score, which may entitle him to a share of scarce resources, the student works by 
rote in a specialized domain. Ideas to not arise; formation is a matter of external adjustment. At 
the end of the day the student is not formed by heeding the demands of ideas, but by the shifting 
tones of subjective experience.44  
Strangely enough, while working particular problems in a specialized domain, a social  
condition of confusion prevails here too. Consider, for instance, the conflicting values and 
purposes mixed up in the objectives of standardized tests. The strategies and shortcuts designed 
to enable students to “get the answers” superficially “right” mirror the strategies and shortcuts 
for success in social life: the political parties, universities, artists, philanthropists, and religious 
figures who get it “right,” but do so superficially, without a clear idea of what they are doing, as 
if based upon a series of momentary impressions. Thus, strangely enough, deliberations about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Such an impoverished conception of education is powerfully illustrated by a passage from 
Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” in Book VII of the Republic, where he describes the prisoners 
distributing honors and prizes to those who are “sharpest at identifying the shadows as they 
passed by…and best able to remember which usually came earlier, which later, and which 
simultaneously; and who was thus best able to prophesize the future…” (Plato 2004, p. 516c).  
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meaning of one’s obligation in the world as well as ideas about algebra can arise against the 
condition of confusion. Contemporary educational institutions seem to rest content with 
inhabiting a space of thoughtlessness: just as “the comprehensive doctrines of most people are 
not fully comprehensive” (Rawls 2001, p. 197), so most students’ academic proficiency is 
applauded for being merely proficient. Aiming to provoke an active responsibility for particular 
ideas, the Weberian educator strives to prioritize the practice of education. She seeks to echo the 
demands of ideas and teaches with the hope that her voice will echo into the student’s future: 
“This is not an algebraic problem, assuredly, but I know you from watching you work, and I urge 
you to keep working this problem until you get it right.” The Weberian educator thus resists the 
shallowness of social life, even by teaching a specialized subject, by waking students up to 
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Chapter 3:   
Questioning the Cause of Wide-Awakeness  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 When habituation is cast as mechanical or mindless, it makes good sense to celebrate 
what Weber called the charismatic aspect of education: an education that awakens students to the 
world around them and distinguishes them from an otherwise somnolent condition. Alfred 
Schutz, an important critic and developer of Weber’s work, called this “wide-awakeness” or “an 
attitude of full attention to life and its requirements” (1963, p. 213). The term wide-awakeness 
gained popularity in the field of philosophy of education through the work of Maxine Greene. It 
is no stretch to say that an education for wide-awakeness captures Greene’s aesthetic and 
existentialist approach to philosophy of education.45 At some points, Greene describes individual 
responsibility as a wholly undetermined phenomenon: “The person who chooses himself/herself 
in his/her freedom cannot place the onus on outside forces, on the cause and effect nexus” (1988, 
p. 5).46 For Greene, the free choice of the wide-awake teacher or student is admirably estranged 
and gains distinction by being disassociated from those who inhabit a sleepy, confused social 
condition. 
 Examining Greene’s conception of wide-awakeness in light of Weber’s conception of 
education, I suggest that Greene’s work can be read as an ally in the cause of defining a 
Weberian philosophy of education. Both Weber and Greene hope the educator will awaken 
students from the ways they have been unreflectively habituated by the social world. “In a great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Greene quotes Schutz in Landscapes of Learning (1978, p. 163).  
	  
46	  This may not be Greene’s summative conception of freedom. But whatever it is, it is sorely 
complicated by her attempt to synthesize an existentialist conception of freedom, primarily from 
Sartre, with aspects of Dewey’s philosophy of education. The two views are incompatible. 
Dewey does not think the self can be neatly distinguished from the “cause and effect nexus.”	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majority of cases,” Weber observes, “action goes on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness 
or actual consciousness of its subjective meaning … In most cases … action is governed by 
impulse or habit” (1978, p. 21). Weber’s description of the “great majority of cases” clearly 
differs from his description of an educated person. As described in the previous chapter, an 
educated person “finds and obeys the daemon who holds the threads of his life” (Weber 2008, p. 
52); an educated person’s soul lives in “full awareness” and “chooses its own fate—the meaning, 
that is, of its activity and being” (Weber 2014, p. 315). The educated person, in short, 
understands the meaning of his obligations in the world and is thus exceptionally wide-awake.  
 These ideas may prove inspiring for those who feel oppressed by the impersonal demands 
and general drudgery of modern educational institutions. Yet a fact that both Greene and Weber 
may be liable to ignore is that human beings are not wholly self-authoring subjects who can 
choose their fate and freely create themselves regardless of their prior habituation in the world. 
Put otherwise, all persons are unknowingly and profoundly shaped by the social world during 
their most formative years of life. This basic fact finds ample support in the “cause and effect 
nexus” (Greene 1988, p. 5). However, Weber does not sufficiently reflect upon the role of 
habituation in education and seems to denigrate habituation as mere unreflective behavior. This 
could be based on his upbringing.47 And, to be clear, this is not good reason to fault Weber 
himself, because he did not engage in systematic work on education. But for me to neglect or 
avoid habituation would be a significant shortcoming of this project since habituation is a critical 
concept in any philosophy of education – and this dissertation aspires to develop a Weberian 
philosophy of education. To be more concrete, if an educator read this work and was persuaded 
to prioritize her particular educational practice because of it, yet came away conceiving of ideas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  See the first two sections of Jaochim Radkau’s (2009) recent biography entitled “The 
Violation of Nature” and “Nature’s Revenge.”  
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about algebra problems or ideas about a student’s calling as “demands of the day” arising outside 
of her student’s history and the “cause and effect nexus” (Greene 1988, p. 5), then she would be 
misled. But in what respect would this educator be misled? In what respect is an educated calling 
foreseen irresponsibly if habituation is ignored?  
 Responding to this question is necessary for advancing my argument. An educated 
calling does not simply mean a person taking active responsibility for ideas arising from self-
examination, determining his daemon against a condition of confusion prevailing in the social 
world, and being wide-awake to and for himself. It also involves taking an active responsibility 
for causes, which are practical and demand work. According to Weber, the achievement of 
personality does not occur through self-discovery, but through serving causes: moral tasks 
demanding humility. As Weber states in “The Meaning of ‘Value Freedom’” (1914):   
…one would wish that, in particular, the generation which is now reaching 
 [adulthood] will again, more than anything else, get accustomed to the idea that 
 “being  a personality” is not something that one can set as a deliberate goal, and 
 that there is only one way in which one can (perhaps!) become [a personality]: 
 by committing oneself unreservedly to a “cause” whatever [that cause] and the 
 “claim of the day” entailed by it may look like in the individual case (2014, p. 
 307).        
I hope the previous chapter has convinced readers that Weber was not a nihilist or emotivist, and 
thus his meaning should not be understood as a “cause” to maximize one’s preferences. For 
Weber, as Wolfgang Schluchter observes, “Persons of true moral conviction passionately devote 
themselves to a suprapersonal cause in which they have faith without losing themselves 
completely in the process” (1996, p. 97). Although Schluchter’s line does not suggest Weber’s 
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view of a moral “cause” can be reduced to self-deceived nihilism, nor that a cause should 
consume a person’s identity, it is difficult to read this passage and not worry that Weber’s 
remark about “personality” being formed by heeding the demands of a cause is nothing more 
than advocacy for fanaticism. The concluding lines of the last chapter may have suggested 
something similar. The educator who echoes the demands of ideas about algebra sounds 
fanatical; she sounds like the sort of teacher who denies the reality of her students’ home lives or 
personal problems: the sort of teacher who zealously teaches algebra as if her students’ lives and 
moral characters depended solely upon it.  
The aim of this chapter is to connect Weber’s denigration of habituation and this worry 
about fanatical devotion to a cause. I argue that an education is liable to mis-educate students if it 
espouses an unreserved commitment to a cause that proceeds by forgetting its relationship to 
one’s habituation or the “cause and effect nexus” (Greene 1988, p. 5). My argument, however, 
does suggest that educators today must think about habituation as an ultimate or basic 
educational concept, like Aristotle, who famously claimed “It makes no small difference, then, 
whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great 
difference, or rather all the difference” (Aristotle 1995, p. 11743, 1103b25-26). Instead, it means 
that the Weberian educator who hopes her students will heed the demands of ideas must 
acknowledge that reflection upon her students’ habituation is a necessary part of echoing their 
demands of the day, lest a student’s commitment to an algebra problem or to a moral cause be 
encouraged to proceed irresponsibly.   
Ultimately I will argue that a Weberian philosophy of education provides an ideally 
insufficient but non-ideally sufficient means for reflecting upon habituation’s role in education. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the chapter will be given to developing a critique of a Weberian 
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philosophy of education: or, more specifically, to fleshing out the idea that fanaticism results 
from the neglect of habituation.  
 Because this is a blind spot in Weber’s own work, I will push Weber and the Weberian 
educator to a secondary role for the majority of this chapter in order to develop the problem 
through a variety of other sources. I begin by introducing the modern propensity to neglect 
habituation through British philosopher Michael Oakeshott’s (1962) essay “The Tower of 
Babel.” Herein, Oakeshott argues that a moral education should involve both habituation and 
reflection, but that the West emphasizes philosophical reflection over habituation. According to 
Oakeshott, much like the biblical myth of the “Tower of Babel,” a modern moral education—
involving a wide-awake pursuit of moral ideals—lacks a foundation in common habits and is 
thus liable to collapse into a crisis of moral “languages.” What Oakeshott takes to be a sufficient 
moral education will then be briefly fleshed out by turning to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
and Politics—a series of lectures where preferably habituated students are provided with rational 
instruction on the principles of their habituation. Then, what Oakeshott takes to be the crisis of 
modern moral education will be advanced by turning to Friedrich Hölderlin’s Hyperion—a 
Bildungsroman in which the main character reflects upon his moral formation as a tension 
between reconciliation with the social world (inspired by natural beauty) and fanatical revolt 
against the social world (inspired by the desire for a better world). Together these admittedly 
strange bedfellows (Oakeshott, Aristotle, and Hölderlin) will help to explain the educational 
problem of neglecting habituation and draw out the connection between this neglect and 
fanaticism.   
 I respond to these problems by explaining that a Weberian philosophy of education 
necessarily proceeds from a modern person’s non-ideal habituation. This dismisses an 
	  
	   73 
Aristotelian reverence for habituation (which is based upon grounds that should give rise to 
moral indignation). A Weberian educator, therefore, meets youth as they have been habituated 
(vs. should have been habituated). The “demands of the day” are thus encumbered by a non-ideal 
habituation. But this does not mean that educational practice cannot be prioritized. It simply 
means that a student’s habituation is not eliminable; it must become subject to reflection as 
understanding one’s own habituation provides a solid undergirding for meeting the demands of 
ideas and moral causes. In conclusion, I will argue that a Weberian philosophy of education 
gives educators responsible vision for serving a moral cause in modern society because it 
encourages acknowledgement of limitations, including its own. I begin by turning to Michael 
Oakeshott’s work.  
3.2 Oakeshott’s Challenge  
 Oakeshott’s essay “The Tower of Babel” (1962) does not purport to do more than 
diagnose the malformation of moral life in contemporary Western civilization (p. 60). Oakeshott 
claims that its form is “unavoidable,” but that its diagnosis can help us to, as he states, “know its 
defects and feel its necessity” (p. 79). That Oakeshott associated moral life in modern society 
with the biblical myth of the “Tower of Babel” suggests he found its defects to be particularly 
immense and its necessities tragic. As the reader may recall, in this myth (Genesis 11:1-9), the 
early inhabitants of the earth banded together to build a tower to heaven. The project was 
facilitated by the fact that the builders spoke the same language and were inspired by the promise 
of inhabiting a better world (i.e., heaven). But God disrupted the builders’ project by causing 
them to speak different languages. “Therefore [the tower] was called Babel, because there the 
Lord confused the language of all the earth” (Genesis 11:9). As Oakeshott interprets the myth, 
the responsibility for this chaotic outcome falls upon the builders’ shoulders, for they chose to 
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sacrifice a common life together in order to dwell in heaven, or, as Oakeshott describes it, to seek 
“perfection as the crow flies” (p. 59). The very nature of their project resulted in a “chaos of 
conflicting ideals” (p. 59). Oakeshott uses this provocative image of a fallen condition 
(incidentally, post-Eden) to characterize the modern form of moral life.   
 Prior to explaining how this myth poses a challenge to Weberian philosophy of 
education, it is interesting to note that the aftermath of Babel is similar to what I described as a 
the condition of confusion in the previous chapter and Weber describes as value collision: “the 
various value systems in the world are in unresolvable conflict with each other … if we take pure 
experience as our starting point we arrive at polytheism” (Weber 2008, 44). Additionally, it is 
interesting to note that Oakeshott’s intention to show that the defects and necessities of 
contemporary morality are “a misfortune to be made the best of” resembles Weber’s desire in 
“Science as a Vocation” to help his youthful audience understand uncomfortable realities and the 
spiritual limitations of the age in order to better meet “the demands of the day” (2008 p. 52). 
Later I will exploit these similarities in my response to what I call “Oakeshott’s challenge.” But 
now, I turn to the challenge itself.   
 Unlike Weber’s condition of confusion described above, Oakeshott argues that there is 
life before social confusion (or Babel). However, his argument is not made by recourse to an 
Arcadian society where inhabitants sing hymns in a common tongue, but to an ordinary 
upbringing that inculcates shared habits and affections, and thereby forms the dispositional basis 
for subsequent activity. Weber’s standard of confusion, Oakeshott would claim, neglects the fact 
that habituation inevitably occurs prior to a person’s conscious decision to take an active 
responsibility for understanding the meaning of his obligations in a state of social confusion.  
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As Oakeshott reminds us,  
We acquire habits of conduct, not by constructing a way of living upon rules or precepts 
learned by heart and subsequently practiced, but by living with people who habitually 
behave in a certain manner: we acquire habits of conduct in the same way as we acquire 
our native language (p. 62). 
Just as language acquisition does not involve children memorizing rules and making existential 
choices about, say, the authenticity of grammar, Oakeshott suggests that the child’s initial moral 
education does not involve children making existential choices in a context of value pluralism. 
Instead, the child’s initial education involves adjusting to the world as a dwelling—what 
Oakeshott describes as “making oneself at home in the natural and civilized world” (emphasis 
added, p. 62). The condition of confusion may falsely assume that the human condition is always 
homeless.  
 Now it might be objected that a child’s experience differs from a mature realization that 
relevant distinctions, fragmentations, and conflicts are the true stuff of taking active 
responsibility for the meaning of one’s life. To heed the demands of ideas, and to “meet the 
demands of the day,” for Weber meant a person must recognize the mix-up and conflict of values 
and then maturely deliberate upon which values will be “god … and which the devil” (Weber 
2008, p. 45). Oakeshott partially agrees with Weber. A complete moral education must involve 
intellectual training—including training in the nature of moral ideals, the organization of these 
ideals, and the “art of selecting appropriate means for achieving the ends which our education 
has inculcated” (p. 67). Oakeshott calls this aspect of moral education “reflective,” and affirms 
that a morally educated person is “something of a philosopher and something of a self-analyst” 
(p. 68). Yet the very reason Oakeshott likens contemporary moral life to the Tower of Babel is 
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because reflective morality is foolishly sought as the grounds of moral life and personal identity. 
Like the characters in the myth who strove to dwell in heaven and yet ended up losing the 
linguistic basis of their common life, the form of contemporary moral life bids people to elevate 
reflective morality while belittling habituation: the common experience of being raised to dwell 
in the natural and social world. The result of prizing reflective morality, as Oakeshott sees it, is 
moral life marked by a condition of confusion: “constantly or periodically suffering the ravages 
of the armies of conflicting ideals, or (when these for a time have passed) falling into the hands 
of censures or inspectors” (1962, p. 72). Thus, exhibited either through fanatical convictions or a 
bureaucratic application of general rules to particular contexts, the modern form of moral life 
militates against our given capacity to be at home in the world.  
 To provide an initial gloss of Oakeshott’s challenge: a Weberian philosophy of 
education’s wrongly treats habituation, or the unavoidable grounds of education, as though it can 
be surmounted by ideas. Furthermore, Oakeshott’s essay challenges the argument of this 
dissertation, where I purport to defend the fundamental obligation to prioritize the practice of 
education. Oakeshott would point out that, by only considering the demands of ideas, I end up 
neglecting habituation, which constitutes the earliest concern of educational practice. The 
argument of this dissertation, resting heavily upon the formative power of heeding the demands 
of ideas and thinking independently, promotes just another version of  “seeking virtue as the 
crow flies” (p. 69). Later I will argue that a Weberian educator who strives to provoke her 
student’s active responsibility provides sufficient educational means for coping with the 
habituation that Oakeshott describes as our “fallen condition.”  First, though, I would like to 
strengthen Oakeshott’s challenge by fleshing it out with two additional sources.  
 There is a prominent moral theory in Western tradition that Oakeshott’s essay overlooks. 
	  
	   77 
Oakeshott claims that a sufficient moral education involves “moral habit supplemented, but not 
weakened, by [an] education in moral ideology” (1962 p. 71). He concludes his essay with a 
hurried summary of classical and medieval moral traditions, hoping to show that moral education 
in Western civilization has been (save for a few historical outliers) a nearly continuous pursuit of 
reflective morality. This summary is then used to support his claim that “we are for the most part 
dominated by [reflective] morality” (p. 75). I find Oakeshott’s historical summary to be largely 
unpersuasive, not least because it overlooks Aristotle’s virtue ethics, which actually comprise 
what Oakeshott would deem a sufficient moral education.. And, parenthetically, the promise of 
virtue ethics is abundantly clear in the field of philosophy of education, where neo-Aristotelian 
theories of moral education are gaining clout (cf. Curren 2013, Kristjánsson 2012). For the 
purpose at hand, Aristotle strengthens Oakeshott’s challenge by substantiating Oakeshott’s 
conception of a sufficient moral education.  
3.2.1 Learning to Flourish in Ancient Greece  
 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics were written as lectures delivered to young 
men belonging to the Athenian elite. These lectures provided the young men with a rational 
account of their common habituation. By noting the social distinctions that Aristotle makes 
throughout the lecture, it becomes clear that Aristotle assumed a common habituation. The 
young men Aristotle addressed had been raised to govern households and polities. Their 
habituation thus gave them a social distinction that others lacked. Those who governed 
households and polities were not raised to be women (who lacked requisite power), or slaves 
(who lacked deliberative capacity), or money makers (who engaged in an activity “undertaken 
under compulsion” (Aristotle 1995 1732[1096a6])), or the masses (driven by pleasure and 
“prefer[ing] a life suitable to beasts” (1995 1731 [1095b20]). A shared habituation was an 
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assumed and necessary condition of these young men’s moral education, but it was not 
sufficient.   
 To achieve moral excellence, the young men had to engage in excellent action. Excellent 
action, as per Aristotle, is action that avoids excesses and deficiencies, and proceeds from 
deliberations over the “relative mean” of any given action. Such deliberation requires more than 
habituation. The relative mean of an action is “determined by reason in the way in which the man 
of practical wisdom would determine it” (1995 1748 [1106b36-1107a2]). Direct instruction on 
the rational principles of excellent action facilitates deliberation. The rational instruction 
Aristotle provides in Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, however, is not intended to replace the 
important work of habituation (which occurs in childhood), nor is it intended to serve as a 
surrogate for excellent action. Aristotle was keen to recognize the common deficiency of 
mistaking a philosophical education in rational principles for excellent action. As he observed,  
most people do not [engage in excellent action], but take refuge in theory and think they 
are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like 
patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered 
to do.  As the latter will not be made well in body by such a course of treatment, the 
former will not be made well in soul by such a course in philosophy (1995, 1746 
[1105b12-17]).  
This resonates with Oakeshott’s message in “Tower of Babel.” The form of contemporary moral 
life, Oakeshott essentially says, is like a course in philosophy where students equate reflecting on 
moral ideals, or causes, with moral action. But again, more than moral ideals are necessary for 
excellent action.  
 Aristotle illuminates this point by drawing a psychological distinction between 
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“continent” and “virtuous” action. This psychological distinction helps flesh out what Oakeshott 
takes to be a sufficient moral education, and provides further reason to deem insufficient an 
education in reflective morality.  
 To introduce this distinction, imagine a particular Athenian youth had not been 
appropriately habituated, but still managed to enroll in Aristotle’s Lyceum. Rather than being 
habituated to respond to pleasures and pains nobly, i.e. like a virtuous person, this youth was 
raised to see excessive luxury as a high good. Aristotle would not deny that this unfortunate 
youth could learn the principles of excellent action and commit them to memory like a 
catechism, or like laws designed for people without proper habituation (cf. Aristotle 1995, 
1163b-1172a). Yet without proper habituation, Aristotle observes that this youth’s will to follow 
the rules of virtue will be divorced from taking pleasure in virtue. The youth’s action will evince 
psychological division as a result of his flawed habituation: he will simultaneously feel a surge 
of covetous desire at the sight of a luxurious home and feel the force of a rule bidding him to 
beat back the temptation. To act nobly under these circumstances means engaging with the world 
only according to cognitive obligations—that is, as if virtue were wholly a matter of moral 
reflection. Aristotle calls this continent action, which is inferior to virtuous action. As John 
McDowell (1998) elaborates,   
[a] continent person has a flawed approximation of practical virtue. He has, in a way, a 
correct conception of doing well, and applies that conception to particular  predicaments; 
but he reveals that his possession of full-fledged practical wisdom  is only partial, by the 
fact that he is swayed by the attractions of alternatives to what he knows (in a way) to be 
doing well. (p. 128) 
Unlike the continent person, the virtuous person would not be tempted by excessive luxury. His 
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action would not commence as a conflict between desire, deliberation, and action. The virtuous 
youth would take an appropriate pleasure in disdaining excessive luxury. This disdain, as Julia 
Annas describes it, would effortlessly flow forth as an “unforced expression of the person’s 
reasoning and feelings, in harmony with the rest of [her] character and structured system of 
goals” (2008, p. 29). Excellent action thus engages the virtuous person in the activity of 
flourishing, while continent action (mere rule following) engages a person in psychological 
frustration: a discord between desires issuing from one’s flawed habituation and obligations 
issuing from rational reflection.  
 Incorporating Aristotle’s distinction into what I have called Oakeshott’s challenge, the 
Weberian educator who hopes students will learn to “meet the demands of the day,” and heed 
ideas about the meaning of their obligations in the world, may only be hoping for continence. 
Continent action, to be clear, is not vicious action. It is thus a limited achievement. But continent 
action is not virtuous action and does not contribute to a person’s flourishing. Only a flawed 
philosophy of education would extol the merits of a second-rate psychological state like 
continence.   
 This brief turn to Aristotle’s virtue ethics provides a glimpse of how Oakeshott’s 
understanding of a sufficient moral education might be fleshed out. Far more could be said about 
Aristotle’s conception of moral education. Assuming we can read past the instances of racism, 
sexism, elitism and priggishness in Aristotle’s work,  there is hope for a sufficient moral 
education contained therein. Perhaps the possibilities of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics provide 
reason to acknowledge the general point of Oakeshott’s “Tower of Babel,” but also to dismiss his 
pessimistic view that moral life today is a “misfortune to be made the best of.” For what is 
best—human flourishing—can be realized today.     
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I, however, am skeptical about the promise of virtue ethics in modern society. I do not 
understand how a person could be satisfied with his or her possession of virtue in our society, 
where injustice reigns. I also do not see how a virtuous person could avoid being reduced to 
continence or vice if presented with a confusing or a novel situation (as Plato portrayed in the 
previous chapter with the soul who won the first lot but chose to live a tyrannical life). My 
doubts will soon be made more explicit. For the moment, I want to continue developing 
Oakeshott’s challenge. Having used Aristotle to elaborate upon what Oakeshott took to be a 
sufficient moral education, I now turn to Friedrich Hölderlin’s novel Hyperion to flesh out the 
crisis between habituation and reflective morality described by Oakeshott.  
3.2.2  Learning to Flourish in Modern Greece    
 Friedrich Hölderlin’s novel Hyperion is a Bildungsroman in which the central character, 
a Greek poet named Hyperion (ca. 1773), recalls through a series of letters the formative 
influences in his life. The letters are addressed to a German named Bellarim. I recall one 
interpretation suggesting that “Bellarim” is Latinized name combining beauty and war. This 
interpretation, I think, lends itself to a headline summary of the novel: Hyperion is an epistolary 
novel that reflects on the failure of a “beautiful war.” Read in light of Oakeshott’s challenge, as I 
will do, the novel can also be viewed as a reflection on a failed moral education, or, more 
specifically, on the unresolved conflict between being habituated to be at home in the world and 
being inspired to enact a better world.   
 Hyperion begins his letters to Bellarim by describing his childhood education. His 
teacher, Adamas, cultivated in Hyperion a love for the classical world. As Hyperion describes,   
Adamas led me, now into Plutarch’s world of heroes, into the magical land of the Greek 
gods; now he quieted my youthful impatience with arithmetic and geometry, now he 
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climbed among the mountains with me—by day for fields flowers and woodland flowers 
… by night that we might gaze at the sacred stars above us, and understand them as men 
may (Holderlin 1990, p. 8).       
These lines bear a tension between heroic aspirations and dwelling in the natural world. This 
tension is developed throughout the novel. Roaming the natural world with myths in mind 
provides the young Hyperion with an experience of the ancient world in the present: nature, 
enchanted and unchanged. But the social world, Hyperion comes to see, is no longer animated 
by noble deeds and divine graces. Due to utilitarian exigencies, for many people the loss of 
wholeness and heroism is not felt. This modern persona: “to demonstrate what an advanced 
thinker he was, would snap his fingers at Heaven and cry that he had never worried about the 
birds in the bush, give him the birds in the hand!” (1990, p. 15-16). Yet for Hyperion (and, 
incidentally, for Weber), the “bird in hand” approach is distressingly insufficient. A loss is felt. 
And from the place of loss, a conflict between two pressing obligations emerges: a heroic 
obligation to refuse habituation by a slavish modern society versus an aesthetic obligation to see 
society (however base) as encompassed by the natural world—“the changeless, the quiet, the 
beautiful” (1990 p. 3). Early in the novel, Hyperion recounts these conflicting obligations as 
follows:   
 All things age and are rejuvenated. Why are we excepted from this beautiful  
circling of Nature? Or does it rule us, too? I should believe so, were it not for one  
trait that is in us—the gigantic striving to be all things, which, like Aetna’s Titan,  
rages up from the depths of our being. And yet, who would not rather feel it  
within him, like seething oil, than acknowledge that he was born for the whip and  
the yoke? A raging battlehorse, or a workhorse with hanging ears—which is the  
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nobler (1990 p. 11)?     
The tension between the “beautiful circling of nature” and “the gigantic striving to be all things” 
proceeds as a reflection upon the novel’s two central characters. First there is Alabanda—who 
represents the “raging battlehorse,” and whose desire for freedom is like “seething oil.” Then 
there is Diotima—who represents rejuvenation and the “beautiful circling of Nature.”  Briefly 
examining the natures of Alabanda and Diotima sets the stage for a more profound understanding 
of the discord between learning to be “at home” in the world and striving to revolutionize it.  
 Hyperion sees Alabanda as a “Young Titan” amongst a “race of dwarfs” (1990, p. 17). 
Alabanda is nobly self-determined and exhibits an admirable distance from the slavishness of the 
present. Alabanda, for Hyperion, represents the possibility of heroism in modern Greece. But 
Alabanda is also an extreme character who gives vent to an eerie hatred of his present world. 
Consider a few lines from an impassioned speech Alabanda addresses to humanity in the 
presence of Hyperion:  
We do not ask if you are willing, you slaves and barbarians! You are never willing! Nor 
will we try to make you better, for that is useless! We will but make certain that you get 
out of the way of humanity’s victorious career! Oh! let someone light a torch for me, that 
I may burn the weeds from the field (1990 p. 21).    
Alabanda’s passionate cause to realize a better world does not shy away from destruction. In 
fact, his duty to free himself from a base age demands destruction. We might say Alabanda 
provides an ideal type for fanatical devotion to a cause, but we might equally say that he 
provides an ideal type for wide-awakeness. He refuses to rest comfortably in a world where, as 
he judges, “to be happy means to be sleepy” (1990, p. 21). For this reason, we might say 
Alabanda personifies the initial worry that Weber’s passion for moral causes makes him sound 
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like a fanatical educator: an educator of Alabandas.  The worry about Alabanda is that his moral 
cause to realize a better world—as Hölderlin incisively sees—may be antithetical to flourishing 
in any world. Once “the field” has been cleared, the agents of destruction are left with the 
gloomiest of consolations: “They say that grapes grown on burned-out dead volcanoes yield no 
bad cider” (1990, p. 26). The prospect of celebrating a better world upon scorched earth provides 
a graphic illustration of how the fanatical pursuit of moral causes may involve not just 
overcoming a base social life, but also, more radically, the destruction of the natural world and 
the very context of life.  
 After departing from Alabanda—“with a mind full of wild contradictions”— Hyperion 
encounters the character Diotima. She helps Hyperion to forget his anxious reflections and 
reminds him of the enchanted natural world he first encountered as a child (1990, p. 47). 
Hyperion recalls Diotima: “Her heart was at home among flowers, as if it were one of them. She 
named them all by their names, or out of her love for them gave them new and more beautiful 
ones, she knew exactly which was the happiest season for each of them” (1990, p. 45). Diotima, 
a caring governess of nature, lovingly attends to pupils who bear no prospect of meaningful 
action. And, importantly for our purposes, it is Diotima—not Alabanda—who urges Hyperion to 
engage in the practice of education.  
Go back into Athens once again, and look not only at the ruins but also at the men who 
walk among them ... who console themselves with a merry dance and a pious tale for the 
infamous oppression that weighs upon them—can you say,  ‘I am ashamed to work with 
this material?’ I think it can still be fashioned …You will be the teacher of our people, 
you will be a great man (1990, p. 72).  
Diotima’s lines inspire Hyperion to act. He joins Alabanda to fight in the Greek Revolution of 
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1773. This endeavor can be read as an attempt to reconcile the influences of Diotima and 
Alabanda, and thus to engage in a “beautiful war.” At first, the effort realizes Hyperion’s hopes: 
he introduces his troops to the noble ideas of antiquity while also leading them into battle. But 
ultimately Hyperion’s “beautiful war” is an abysmal failure. Hyperion’s pupils (troops) reveal 
themselves to be thieves and cowards. Diotima dies a flower’s death (simply wilts); Alabanda 
joins a fanatical group called the “Agents of Nemesis;” Hyperion is left to wander, eventually 
settling down to live as a hermit, mulling over dissonant memories and kindling reflective 
desires as he writes letters—letters he perhaps never sends—to Bellarim.  
 Far more could be said about this weighty philosophical novel, particularly when it is 
read as an address to notable German philosophers (e.g. Kant, Schiller, Fichte, and Hegel) who 
watched the French Revolution with both enthusiasm and dismay, then proceeded to labor 
philosophically to explain away their dissonant feelings—thereby losing the event to reflection. 
For the purposes of this chapter, however, my claim is that Alabanda and Diotima deepen our 
understanding of the crisis of moral education described by Oakeshott.  
 Let us first note a common critique of rationalism shared by Hölderlin, Oakeshott, and 
Aristotle. Like Oakeshott and Aristotle, Hölderlin agrees that mere study provides an insufficient 
moral education. Evoking an image frequently used by Herder in Another Philosophy of History 
(2004), and also one that Kant (1963) uses to conclude his essay “What is Enlightenment,”48 
Hölderlin states early in the novel: “The state is the coarse husk around the seed of life, and 
nothing more. It is the wall around the garden of human fruits and flowers” (1990 p. 23). Later in 
the novel, Hölderlin returns to this image and associates the human intellect with a journeyman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  “As nature has uncovered from under this hard shell the seed for which she most tenderly 
cares—the propensity and vocation to free thinking—this gradually works back upon the 
character of the people, who thereby gradually become capable of managing freedom” (Kant 
1989, p. 10).	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“who constructs the fence out of rough timber as it has been sketched out for him and nails the 
sawed and planted posts together for the garden that his master intends to plant.” Hölderlin 
judges, “The entire business of intellect is makeshift. By its ability to sort out, it saves us from 
folly, from injustice; but to be safe from folly and injustice is, after all, not the highest level of 
human excellence” (emphasis added, 1990, p. 68). These remarks provide another way to phrase 
what has already been said by Oakeshott and Aristotle. Philosophical analysis and reflection can 
play a contributing role in a person’s moral education, but does not afford the height of human 
excellence, for achieving human excellence first requires learning to make “oneself at home in 
the natural and civilized world” (Oakeshott 1962, p. 62): habituation, or growing, so to speak, in 
the garden of “human fruits and flowers” (Hölderlin 1990, p. 23) is an aspect of education that 
“makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference” (Aristotle 1995, p. 11743, 1103b26). 
 Nevertheless, Hölderlin adds needed complexity to Oakeshott’s sketch of reflective 
morality and an Aristotelian critique of continence. Recall that Oakeshott describes those who 
fanatically pursue moral ideals and the inspectors who engage in bureaucratic management as 
two instances of the same reflective morality. Hölderlin, however, notes a relevant distinction. 
The rationalist engaging in mere “fence work” for, say, the basic structure of a just state is quite 
different from a character like Alabanda, who passionately strives with all his being to realize his 
moral cause against the baseness of the present world. Alabanda’s pursuit of a moral ideal is far 
more human. It involves felt convictions. Do these convictions arise from reflection? Perhaps 
they do. Yet it seems more apt to say that they arise from awakening to the fact that one’s 
habituation has occurred in a troubled garden, so to speak. This awakening is not simply 
reflective, but is accompanied by a feeling of moral indignation that surges forth like “seething 
oil.” Recall that Aristotle counts continence a second-rate psychological state, which does not 
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flow forth harmoniously but encounters dissonance and resistance. But what if what moral 
indignation against one’s own habituation provokes the state Aristotle calls continence? Acting 
upon this indignation is not impersonal fence work but very personal fieldwork. Oakeshott’s 
treatment of reflective morality as well as the Aristotle’s demotion of continence seem to fly past 
the phenomenon of moral indignation, particularly which can arise from reflection on a troubled 
or deceptive habituation.    
 A further complexity that Hölderlin adds, this time to Oakeshott’s description of a 
sufficient moral education, which I have identified as Aristotelian virtue ethics, is the suggestion 
that an Alabanda-like cause to overhaul society is never reconcilable with a Diotima-like 
flourishing. Actively refusing to accept the social world means realizing that the garden is 
troubled. Unreflectively flourishing in a troubled garden, and finding no cause to question one’s 
own habituation is—it is at least plausible to suggest—what it means to be “sleepy.” So a moral 
education that involves wide-awakeness to a cause may not lead to an Aristotelian flourishing, 
but rather seems to involve agents in realizing a strange virtue: the pleasure felt in willfully and 
rationally severing themselves from their prior habituation.   
 This pleasure accompanying wide-awakeness, which occurs as agents free themselves 
from a troubled habituation, is essentially an enlightenment idea. Alabanda’s voice can be heard 
in the following remark Kant makes in the Metaphysics of Morals:  
What is it in you that can be trusted to enter into combat with all the forces of nature 
within you and around you and to conquer them if they come into conflict with your 
moral principles? Although the solution to this question lies completely beyond the 
capability of speculative reason, the question arises of itself; and if he takes it to heart, the 
very incomprehensibility in this cognition of himself must produce an exaltation in his 
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soul which only inspires it the more to hold its duty sacred, the more it is assailed. 
(emphasis added, 2006, p. 226).49   
Hölderlin appreciates the noble sentiments of Kant’s “sacred duty.” But Hölderlin is also 
cognizant of its danger. Taken to the extreme, the “sacred duty” becomes a destructive exaltation 
against one’s own habituation: “Oh! let someone light a torch for me, that I may burn the weeds 
from the field” (1990 p. 21).  
 If our natural habituation in childhood precedes our reflection upon moral ideals, then 
acting upon what Kant calls a sacred duty to engage in conflict against the internal and external 
forces in nature amounts to waging war upon our childhood. Kant, for one, was terrified of being 
taken for a child. His antithesis of enlightenment is “self-incurred tutelage” (which can also be 
rendered “culpable immaturity”), where “tutelage” or “immaturity” means the “inability to make 
use of [one’s] understanding without direction from another” (Kant 1989 p. 3).50 Weber, it 
seems, inherited this worry. To cite one of many examples, he deemed naïve optimists who saw 
science (Wissenschaft) as a means to happiness to be “overgrown children” (2008, p. 39).  
 Cast in this light, Oakeshott’s challenge can be ultimately expressed as follows: It is 
foolish for any educator to encourage a student’s cause that proceeds from a hatred of one’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  A similar sentiment can also be discerned in Friedrich Schiller’s essay “On the Sublime.” 
Schiller writes, “The feeling of the sublime is a mixed feeling. It is a composition of melancholy, 
which at its utmost is manifested in a shudder, of joyousness which can mount to rapture and, 
even if it is not actually pleasure, is far preferred by refined souls to all pleasures. This 
combination of two contradictory perceptions in a single feeling demonstrates our moral 
independence in an irrefutable manner … two opposed natures must be united in us, each of 
which is interested in diametrically opposed ways in the perception of the object. By means of 
feeling for the sublime, therefore, we discover that the state of our minds is not necessarily 
determined by the state of our sensations, that the laws of nature are not necessarily our own, and 
that we possess a principle proper to ourselves that is independent of all sensuous affects” 
(Schiller 1966, p. 198).    
50 Kant’s fear was first pointed out to me in a seminar at Georgetown University taught by Prof. 
Terry Pinkard (Spring 2009).	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habituation and leads to destroying the natural and social world that made one’s childhood 
possible. Aristotle shows that the psychology of this enlightenment conception of maturity 
amounts to celebrating continence at the expense of virtue. Hölderlin, while complicating the 
view of Oakeshott and Aristotle, can be used to show that moral causes for reforming the present 
world, taken to their fanatical extreme, sanction destruction of the natural and social world. Thus, 
insofar as a Weberian philosophy of education encourages the demands of ideas alone and 
extols, as Schluchter writes, “Persons of true moral conviction” who “passionately devote 
themselves to a suprapersonal cause…” (1996, p. 97), there is good reason to worry that the 
Weberian educator’s neglect of habituation amounts to an endorsement of fanaticism.  
3.3 Response to Oakeshott’s Challenge   
 I readily grant that a Weberian philosophy of education is insufficient, particularly 
because it does not provide norms or precepts for habituating children. Nevertheless, I wonder 
what it means to set the aim of education as habituating persons to flourish in a non-ideal and 
pluralistic world, which would involve adjusting to a society that is, so to speak, a troubled 
garden? Although the contemporary resurgence of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics has helpfully 
drawn attention to the importance of habituation in moral education, and recalled important links 
between philosophy and psychology, my worry is that it has not sufficiently explained whether 
children can be habituated to legitimately flourish in the context of modern society. There seems 
to be a gap, that is, between the facts of flourishing and the norms of flourishing.   
 To convey this suspicion with a straightforward example, imagine that elementary school 
A is heavily funded and well staffed while elementary school B is the opposite. Imagine that the 
disparity between the schools arises for morally arbitrary reasons—the parents at elementary 
school A have more money or paler complexions. Further imagine that children from elementary 
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school A are habituated to flourish while children from elementary school B are (carelessly) 
habituated to flounder. Eventually, let us say, children from elementary school A grow up and 
learn about places like elementary school B, and come to encounter the sorts of people shaped by 
these conditions. The question arises: Could the people raised in elementary school A honestly 
claim they were justly raised to flourish when they realize, upon reflection, that they were raised 
in a society that arbitrarily allowed some to flourish and others to flounder? There is something 
unsettling about affirming flourishing at elementary school A in light of elementary school B. 
Just as we might suspect that Aristotle’s Athenian pupils were not fully flourishing, but were 
being habituated to (at least a bit of) moral sleepiness because they were being habituated to 
deem themselves superior to others on troubled “natural” grounds, we might also affirm that 
students from elementary school A were habituated to flourish on similar (though far less 
explicit) grounds.  
 If we rule out the notion that people can truly flourish in an unjust society, and if we 
acknowledge that we live in an unjust society, then the running assumption of the educator must 
be that everyone’s habituation (of course, to varying degrees) has been problematic (or damaged, 
as Adorno [2005] puts it). And if we choose to understand the meaning of our actions in a world 
we may not prefer but were nonetheless habituated to dwell in, we would all find ourselves 
confronted with the demands of inconvenient ideas, and thus in varied states of continence. 
Accordingly, as I see it, given the high likelihood of any student’s non-ideal habituation, the 
educator’s role must be to help students understand what is problematic—or incomplete—about 
their desires, convictions, and aspirations to act upon the world. Put another way, in order to 
prioritize educational practice, the Weberian educator – even the algebra teacher – would be 
obliged to provoke students to take an active responsibility for understanding the “demands” of 
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their flawed habituation, because ideas, even ideas about algebra, arise in the world. Depending 
upon the social conditions and the person, this may necessitate a critical departure from a 
student’s childhood habituation. Yet the role of the educator is not simply to encourage such a 
departure, but also to provoke an understanding of what it means to depart from it. This is not as 
extreme as fueling the flames of Alabanda’s convictions or as straightforward as awakening 
persons from their childhood or traditional upbringing. Nor is it merely intellectual “fence 
work.”  Rather, it involves an educator enacting a pedagogy that (eventually) helps students to 
understand the defects and feel the necessities of their non-ideal habituation, in order to help 
them better recognize and respond to their obligations in the world.   
 This is, in fact, Oakeshott’s modest aspiration in the “Tower of Babel.” Oakeshott aspires 
to write amidst—not past—a fallen condition. In this respect, Oakeshott’s challenge 
compliments a Weberian education, for it encourages an awareness of the “misfortune” of a 
reflective moral life led in a world mark by a condition of confusion. This is a world that lacks 
common habituation and, I would add, cannot be comfortably dwelt in due to morally troubled 
grounds. Like “Tower of Babel,” but perhaps with greater clarity, Weber as an educator did not 
provide norms or principles of habituation, but he was concerned with students critically 
reflecting on their habituation.  
3.4 Subjective Culture and Weber’s Account of Modern Habituation   
 In his lecture “The Meaning of ‘Value Freedom’” (1914), Weber suggests that professors 
should consider how their own educational practice affects a generation that, as Weber described 
it, “has a pronounced predisposition to take itself [too] seriously” (2014, 307). What Weber 
means is there exists an excessive desire to treat every activity in life as an exhibition of the 
personality. It is not hard to convey Weber’s concern.  Modern advertisers cultivate this desire 
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incessantly.51 They sell nearly every product on the basis of its amenability to the customer’s 
unique personality (my education, my truck, my age-defying make-up). But it is less easy to 
explain why this desire is excessive, or (in other words) vicious. And it is unclear how educators 
ought to teach students habituated in a world that affords, at every turn, opportunities for 
personal style or personalization.  
 Without providing a full explanation, I suggest that part of the desire to personalize 
everything springs from the Romantic conception of the personality, where the world becomes 
significant as a means for disclosing a personal journey. This conception of the personality is 
developed in the genre of the Bildungsroman. The world disclosed to Hyperion, for instance, is 
oriented around his personal engagement in a “beautiful war.” The Romantic personality – the 
youth of Weber’s time, and perhaps now everyone in the modern West – retains a propensity to 
see the world as a grand and personalized reflection.52 Perceiving the world as a grand reflection 
of the personality is not innate, however. It is the work of modern habituation, where “to be” is 
to be reflexively aware. Weber deemed this a vicious aspect of modern habituation because it 
reduces the achievement of personality to an exhibition of the self’s quest. For this reason, 
Weber wrote the lines quoted at the beginning of this chapter:    
…one would wish that, in particular, the generation which is now reaching [adulthood] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See Arcilla 2011.  
	  
52	  Kierkegaard’s observations in The Present Age seem to capture the problem nicely:  
“More and more people renounce the quiet and modest tasks of life, that are so important and 
pleasing to God, in order to achieve something greater; in order to think over the relationships of 
life in a higher relationship till in the end the whole generation has become a representation, who 
represent … it is difficult to say who; and who think about these relationships…for whose sake it 
is not easy to  discover … [For instance] To go to school no longer means to be in fear of the 
master, or merely to learn, but rather implies being interested in the problem of education” 
(Kierkegaard 1962, p. 45).  
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will again, more than anything else, get accustomed to the idea that “being a personality” 
is not something that one can set as a deliberate goal, and that there is only one way in 
which one can (perhaps!) become [a personality]: by committing oneself unreservedly to 
a “cause” whatever [that cause] and the “claim of the day” entailed by it may look like in 
the individual case (2014, p. 307).       
Again, for Weber and for a Weberian philosophy of education, the term “cause” [Sache] means a 
serious, ethical task that a person is devoted to without vanity (Cf. Weber 2014, p. 492). In 
claiming that an education should not facilitate more opportunities to exhibit the personality, but 
should provide students with an understanding of moral causes and their demands, Weber is not 
advancing a simple version of reflective morality. Rather, he is concerned with how education 
can reorient a student’s engagement with the world. This reorientation involves acknowledging 
the nature of one’s non-ideal habituation, as well as the existence of “causes” in the world. 
Heeding the demands of causes, it might be said, re-habituates the desire to embellish or stylize 
the personality.53 So how would the Weberian educator teach those who have been habituated to 
personalize reality? An answer lies within this dissertation. The algebra teacher who echoes the 
demands of ideas about algebra is not echoing something synonymous with her student’s 
identity, but is echoing a task for it. Admittedly, it is difficult to see how the “demands” of 
algebraic ideas are continuous with the “demands” of causes in the world. But the person who 
works the demands of ideas is not primarily focused on displaying his personality, but exhibits 
devotion to the task at hand. To demonstrate this, I conclude by considering how the Weberian 
educator would instruct Hyperion as he engages in his cause: a beautiful war.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  The difference between the former and the latter, we might say, is like the difference between 
a person who serves cancer patients in response to a moral task that defines their life versus a 
person who expresses their concern over cancer by purchasing a plate at a charity dinner.   
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 The Weberian educator, to start, would guide Hyperion to see that, outside of himself, the 
notion of a “beautiful war” in modern Greece contains contradictions and inconvenient truths. 
For instance, fundamental contradictions exist between the means of flourishing and the means 
of social reform. These contradictions call for deliberation: Hyperion must decide which cause 
demands service. The Weberian educator, as illustrated in the Herr Voigt passage in chapter 2, 
would warn Hyperion about rushing into a cause because of a momentary impression. 
Hyperion’s habituation, however, encouraged him to reconcile discordant values in the world by 
grandly projecting his personality upon the world. As a child, for example, his teacher Adamas 
led him up a mountain, and as the sun shone down upon “his devastated country, on his temple, 
his pillars,” Adamas assigned him a cause and dramatically cried “Be you like him!” (1990, p. 
10). The Weberian educator would lead Hyperion to see the limitations of this habituation, and 
how it distorts Hyperion’s understanding of his cause because it does not proceed from a true 
understanding of the modern world. Yet the Weberian educator does not need to be brought in 
from outside the text; the lessons of the Weberian educator are contained in the novel itself.  
3.5 Conclusion: Inconvenient Truths for the Weberian Educator  
 As the message of Hyperion is largely a reflection on the failure of a “beautiful war,” and 
if Diotima and Alabanda are read as ideal types for the possibilities of flourishing and pursuing 
causes in the modern world, it becomes clear that Hölderlin —gutted, stuffed, and labeled as a 
Romantic poet—is a Weberian educator par excellence. Hölderlin does not sacrifice the felt 
demands of conflicting ideas to reflection, but imaginatively depicts the fundamental dissonance 
between a person’s habituation and a person’s desire to heed the demands of a moral cause. 
Consider the novel’s final lines: “‘The arteries separate and return to the heart and all is one 
eternal glowing life.’ So I thought. More soon” (1990, p. 133). Recalling the line mentioned 
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above, beginning with the description of the “beautiful circling of nature,” it is not difficult to 
interpret what comes next: “were it not for one trait that is in us—the gigantic striving to be all 
things, which, like Aetna’s Titan, rages up from the depths of our being. And yet, who would not 
rather feel it within him, like seething oil, than acknowledge that he was born for the whip and 
the yoke?” (1990, p. 11). In Hyperion, Hölderlin radically identifies, challenges, and educates 
about the cause of wide-awakeness through a dissonant reminder of habituation: the importance 
of learning “to make oneself at home in the natural and civilized world” (Oakeshott 1962, p. 62). 
Without formulating laws for the non-ideally habituated, Hölderlin tempers the conviction of 
wide-awakeness with a portrayal of its extremes and its limitations. He challenges readers to 
have a better understanding of it. Indeed, Weber might describe this as providing an education 
for those who uncritically celebrate the merits of wide-awakeness, or (as this chapter has sought 
to demonstrate) as providing an education for those who are quick to reduce themselves and the 
world to cause and nothing more.   
 Hölderlin is a Weberian educator par excellence, as well, because his profound literary 
labors (which Weber would describe as possessing the “power of the artistic ‘I will not let thee 
go’”[Weber 1975, p. 458])54 show us how to apply an important principle of Weberian education 
to Weberian education—that is, he shows us how to subject an education advocating the 
importance of self-critique and inconvenient truths to its own lessons. Being disposed to self-
critique strikes me as an indispensible lesson in a society where ideal habituation cannot be 
assumed and social life seems to proceed according to a sleepy, condition of confusion or as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The quote “I will not let thee go…” is a reference to Genesis 32:22-32, where the patriarch 
Jacob wrestles with God until the break of day. When God says “Let me go for day has broken,” 
Jacob replies, “I will not let you go unless you bless me.” God then renames Jacob “Israel”—“for 
you have striven with God and men, and have prevailed.” The remark occurs in a letter Weber 
wrote to his sister describing his reaction to Stephan George’s poetry.      
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outright “conflict of ideals.” Moreover, learning to find strength in the knowledge of one’s own 
limitations, because they truly exist, works against the prevailing vice of personalizing reality: 
naming (or burning) the flowers of the field as an exhibition of my name. Thus, while the 
purpose of this chapter has been to challenge and acknowledge the limitations of a Weberian 
education for its neglect of habituation and potential advocacy of fanaticism, it concludes by 
vindicating a Weberian philosophy education for the very reason that it encourages educators to 
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Chapter 4:  
An Educated Calling in Modern Society 
 
But we simply cannot promise a land of Cockaigne or a paved road in this world or in the next, 
either in thought or in action. And it is a stigma of our human dignity that the peace of our soul 
cannot be as great as the peace of someone who dreams of such a land of milk and honey.  
                                  -- Max Weber55  
 
The attitude taken is often that of man living in an indifferent and hostile world and issuing 
blasts of defiance. A religious attitude, however, needs the sense of a connection of man, in the 
way of both dependence and support, with the enveloping world that the imagination feels is a 
universe. 
              -- John Dewey56  
 
Introduction   4.1 
 
In the introduction to this dissertation, I defined calling as an idea about the ultimate 
meaning of a person’s obligations. In chapter 2, I explained how the Weberian educator 
conceives of the ideas arising from a student’s self-examination, which I described through an 
analogy to Plato’s daemon. In chapter 3, I explained how the Weberian educator conceived of 
the student’s relationship to the world, both their habitutation and causes (or moral tasks) that 
arise therein. Throughout, the role of the educator remains unchanged. She echoes the demands 
of ideas and provokes students to take an active responsibility for heeding these ideas as the 
“demands of the day,” while anticipating a student’s educated calling. The central terms of a 
Weberian philosophy of education  is an educated calling, which can be understood as taking an 
active responsibility for the ultimate meaning of one’s obligations in the world. However, in the 
fiel of philosophy of education, this is not the most usual way of understanding the term 
“educated calling.”   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Quoted Weber 1975, p. 418. This line comes from a lecture that Weber gave in 1909 in 
Vienna during a convention held by the Verein für Sozialpolitik, which later was published (and 
altered) as the article “The meaning of value freedom” (1917).   
	  
56	  Dewey 1960, p. 53.  
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Typically, an educated calling is understood to be a personally fulfilling and socially 
valuable occupation. Indeed, if there were a hierarchy of aims of education, then an educated 
calling, conceived as an occupation, would rank near the top. An educated calling, so defined, 
provides a clear response to what one philosopher recently described as the “one basic question” 
of philosophy of education: “To what extent can educating children for the common good be 
reconciled with educating them for their own good?” (Curren 2013, p. 233). John Dewey 
responds to this very question in a chapter entitled “Vocational Aspects of Education.” Although 
Dewey sought to democratize Plato’s conception of education, he states, “Plato … laid down the 
fundamental principle of a philosophy of education when he asserted that it was the business of 
education to discover what each person is good for and to train him to mastery of that mode of 
excellence, because such development would also secure the fulfillment of social needs in the 
most harmonious way” (emphasis added 2004, p. 296-297). A person engaged in his calling, as 
an occupation, discovers his own good and the common good simultaneously, and thus 
overcomes the discord between private and public flourishing. Social harmony, according to 
Dewey, is the direction of an educated calling.  
 Unfortunately, despite the great value of an educated calling, modern society does not 
appear attuned to social harmony. Modern society, as I will use the term loosely throughout this 
chapter, is a non-ideal society marked by complexity, profit motive, and injustice. To speak of 
educating all people for a calling today—that is, to speak of educating people as if their work 
will someday contribute to a socially cooperative project, whether they sweep floors or trade 
stocks—can quickly provoke wry smiles from those who recognize the non-ideal realities of 
modern society.   
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 Given the present state of affairs, an educational aim better aligned with the direction of 
modern society might be to provide young people with a fair and equal opportunity to adjust to 
the needs of economic and political systems so that they could legally compete for material 
goods that enable them to maximize their preferences. If this educational aim were achieved, 
then maybe the idea of an educated calling could play a supporting role, as part of a story that 
would make the disparate outcomes of social competitions appear more holistic or purposeful. 
The story’s message: “Together, we are called by the global economy to compete fairly and live 
reasonably.” Given the realities of modern society, however, at some point it becomes remiss to 
continue telling students such a story. At a certain point it would be important to wake students 
up to aspects of modern society that have nothing to do with calling: for instance, complex and 
impersonal institutions, zero-sum competitions, the Hobbesian “State of Nature” underlying 
conventions of cooperation,57 and so on. All these features of modern society belie the 
harmonious direction evoked by a story about calling. So, in the end, perhaps nothing of practical 
significance would be lost if the story were never told; and perhaps something of practical 
significance would be gained if contemporary philosophers of education took seriously the 
overly idealistic nature of their “one basic question” in the context of modern society. But the 
threat modern society poses to an educated calling, today, threatens the argument of this 
dissertation too. The continuity between a student learning to take an active responsibility for 
particular academic idea and taking an active responsibility for his fundamental obligation may 
also be undermined by the competitive realities of modern society.    
 The purpose of this chapter is to defend calling (used synonymously with vocation) as an 
educational aim. The problem inherent in this defense involves discerning the relationship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  I am grateful to Uday Mehta for drawing my attention to the Western assumption that conflict 
undergirds society in his course “Modern Social Theory” (Spring 2012).  
	  
	   100 
between a person’s educated calling and modern society—whether the term is defined as an 
personally fulfilling and socially valuable occupation or the ultimate meaning of a persons 
obligations. In either case, take it that an educated calling means more than an individual’s 
preferred occupation, and thus is not reducible to a person’s preference. First, because a person’s 
calling might be voiced in opposition to his preferences; for instance, a prophet might be called 
to warn an unjust city of its imminent demise against his preference for its demise (cf. Jonah) or 
a teacher might be called to reevaluate her teaching methods against her preference to shift the 
blame elsewhere (cf. Hansen 1995). Second, because everyone cannot be called to do everything 
or one particular thing. Regardless of inflated notions of opportunity or highly desirable 
occupations, callings are neither equally distributed nor scarce like goods. Third, because calling 
bears social significance; whether a person heeds or ignores a calling bears consequences for 
society. But what does it mean to heed an educated calling in modern society? Or, expressed as 
the question this chapter will take up: How can education help persons to passionately discover 
and decide upon their calling while equipping them to discern that the realities of modern society 
seem to reduce calling to a fiction of the past?  
I will argue that Weber’s conception of calling (Beruf) supplies a timely and efficacious 
resource for addressing this question and advancing active responsibility as an educational aim. 
Rather than evoking images of a harmonious society, Weber’s conception of an educated calling 
turns the inhospitable realities of modern society into a sounding board that intensifies the power 
and meaning of the concept. Weber provides educators with an understanding of what echoing 
the demands of particular ideas contributes to their students’ callings in modern society.    
 Yet Weber’s conception of calling is far from obviously desirable. It does not endorse a 
story about calling just to facilitate successful adaptation to modern society. Instead, Weber 
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assumed a condition of confusion and renounces using social harmony as a postulate for social 
inquiry and critique. By implication, his work challenges all abstract or imagined conceptions of 
the “common good.” Contrary to the occupation-view of calling, as Weber understands it, a 
person pursuing a calling in modern society does not simply realize his “own good” in tandem 
with the “common good”; instead, those with an educated calling in modern society learn to 
strengthen and test their lives against antagonistic forces. Weber’s vision of calling is predicated 
upon an individual’s decision to heed calling x in a social condition marked by radical pluralism. 
As Bruun describes Weber’s social vision, “the tense but necessary co-existence of 
fundamentally different value spheres, is not just a point of logic, but a fundamental existential 
fact for Weber” (2007, p. 38). While evoking an image of a harmonious society provokes wry 
smiles, talk of educating students to affirm a Weberian calling prompts genuine concern because 
it assumes that an educated calling must be affirmed in a non-harmonious state of affairs. This 
concern is particularly pronounced when the struggle is cast as existential and involves values—
as opposed to our more familiar educational competitions for positional goods (better scores, 
greater prestige, higher salaries).    
 Weber’s conception of calling enjoins us to entertain three unpopular ideas in educational 
scholarship. First, that dedicating oneself to a calling in the modern world demands heroism or 
courageous action in the face of exorbitantly powerful systems or pressures. Second, that 
dedicating oneself to a calling requires asceticism – particularly the renunciation of total 
flourishing. Third, that dedicating oneself to a calling requires devotion to a particular cause that 
places unconditional demands upon an individual’s conduct of life, and thus, as Wolfgang 
Schluchter describes, “affects practical conduct, as it were, from within” (1996, p. 63). In sum, 
Weber’s conception of calling seems to demand a worrisome combination of heroism, 
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asceticism, and devotion. Should educational practice be prioritized to help form students with a 
calling marked by these traits?    
 Supporting the argument of this dissertation makes it critical for me to defend Weber’s 
conception of an educated calling. To make this defense, I will utilize John Dewey’s 
understanding of calling.58 Dewey, a prominent philosopher of education, advances a view of 
calling as occupation that is far less controversial than Weber’s and continues to be lauded by 
scholars and educators today. I will begin by providing an extended reconstruction of Dewey’s 
conception of calling as occupation, first defined in Democracy and Education (2004) and then 
religiously inflected in A Common Faith (1960). My initial purpose in turning to Dewey is to 
cast doubt upon his more palatable conception of calling by situating it in modern society in 
order to prompt consideration of Weber’s less popular conception of calling, which, I will show, 
acknowledges aspects of modern society that Dewey chooses to underplay. After this 
consideration has been given, I will return to Dewey’s work in order to pose two objections to a 
Weberian conception of an educated calling as a person’s ultimate obligations: (a) the apparent 
gap between theory and practice and (b) its impoverishment of social experience. Ultimately my 
argument is that a Weberian philosophy of education can help us—including Deweyans—
reaffirm the relationship between education and calling despite and given modern society.  
4.2 Dewey: Occupation as God   
 In chapter 23 of Democracy and Education, Dewey defines vocation generally as “a 
direction of life activities as renders them perceptibly significant to a person, because of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  John	  Dewey (1859-1952), whose life overlapped with Weber’s (1864-1920), is generally 
considered to be the most important philosopher of education of the 20th century. It is possible 
that Weber knew of Dewey’s work through his familiarity with William James’ work, but Weber 
does not cite Dewey; Dewey cites Weber, but only in passing. Thanks to Axel Honneth for 
kindly sharing this information in an email exchange.	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consequences they accomplish, and also useful to his associates” (2004, p. 294).59 This definition 
collapses many dualisms that Dewey critiqued in previous chapters (e.g., “labor and leisure,” 
“intellectual and practical studies,” “individual and the world”). When these dualisms are 
collapsed, as Chris Higgins observes, “Dewey may have been able to sum up his entire 
philosophy of education with the single phrase ‘vocational education’” (2005, p. 443). Vocation 
thus provides a key to Dewey’s vision of the good life: socially significant activity that exercises 
a person’s capacities with “the minimum of friction and the maximum of satisfaction” (Dewey 
2004, 296). Vocation is thus one of education’s highest purposes—the discovery of what a 
person is both “good at” and “good for” in a deeply meaningful and progressive sense. 
Ultimately, for Dewey, all callings collapse into the vocation of living. But how can a 
harmonious vocation of living occur amidst the dissonance of modern society—one marked by 
complexity, profit motive, and injustice?  
 For Dewey, schools provide a response to this question. Although modern societies may 
be hotbeds of private wants and public needs, schools need not be. As Dewey sees it, schools can 
“simplify,” “purify,” and better “coordinate” modern society (2004, p. 18-22). Educational 
institutions thus become, for Dewey, the crucial means for social progress and transformation. 
Although situated amidst modern society, schools can constitute in themselves a happier 
society—what Dewey elsewhere calls an “embryonic community” (1990, p. 18)— a society 
where there is harmony, where the vocation of all is “living,” which includes both “intellectual 
and moral growth” (2004, p 298), where “every person shall be occupied in something which 
makes the lives of others better worth living, and which accordingly makes the ties which bind 
persons together more perceptible—which breaks down the barriers of distance between them” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
59	  This awkward sentence has been correctly transcribed.  
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(2004, p. 304).  In short, even though schools are situated amidst modern society, schools can 
provide students with the experience of working in a harmonious society. The hope is that this 
experience will develop a habit for harmonious work in students, which will transform modern 
society when they become adults.   
 Inherent in Dewey’s vision of harmonious society is an effort to antiquate traditional 
conceptions of heroism, asceticism, and religion. The true calling of the hero, for Dewey, is not 
to be extraordinarily strong or successful in personal quests, but rather to promote the common 
good. Similarly, the true calling of the ascetic is not to sacrifice his or her own flourishing to 
achieve a higher spiritual ideal, but rather to delay immediate gratification for the purpose of 
greater collective flourishing. And, finally, the true calling of the religious devotee is not to be 
“merely one who wears the cloth” (2004, p. 296)—that is, one who claims authority based upon 
a soon-to-be-outmoded, exclusive belief system—but rather to be one who promotes social 
growth in all spheres of life.60 Dewey would dub traditional heroes, ascetics, and religious 
devotees as “monstrosities,” because they cultivate themselves individualistically and one-
sidedly. As he says, “No one is just an artist and nothing else, and in so far as one approximates 
that condition, he is so much the less developed a human being; he is a kind of monstrosity” 
(2004, p. 295). The very purpose of education, according to Dewey, is not to cultivate such 
monstrosity, or preserve its historical forms, but to remove whatever hinders the growth of “the 
infinite variety of capacities found in individuals” (2004, p. 297).     
 A curious feature of Dewey’s discussion of vocation in Democracy and Education is that 
he never bothers to mention the religious etymology of the term. For Dewey, “vocation” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Although Dewey acknowledges that religious leaders in modern society may be concerned 
with social reform, he claims that their “exclusive and authoritative position” necessarily 
compromises reform efforts (1960, p. 83). The activism of civil rights leaders like Martin Luther 
King Jr. and Malcolm X call this judgment into question.  
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“calling” are not words with a particular history, but flexible terms that can be readily exchanged 
with occupation.61 Of course, occupation for Dewey is not merely a utilitarian activity that pays 
the bills and yields contentment to those who subscribe to the “bird in hand” approach to life. As 
Dewey defines the term in The School and Society, occupation is an activity whose “end is in 
itself; in the growth that comes from the continual interplay of ideas and their embodiment in 
action” (emphasis added, 1990, p. 133). The rationale behind Dewey’s conflation of calling and 
occupation, along with his neglect of calling’s etymology, can be surmised as follows: If modern 
society were simpler, purer, and more cooperative, there would be no need to distinguish 
between a higher calling and a lower occupation. The barriers would be removed. The plumber’s 
work would advance culture and the philosopher would fructify the cultural value of fixing 
pipes. So, progressive thinkers can be excused when they casually shed “inconvenient aspects” 
and “historical encumbrances” borne by terms springing from particular religious traditions, for 
the progressive thinker’s work is to locate and formulate evidence of the better society to come 
(cf. Dewey 1998, p. 403).62 How does this better society appear?        
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
61	  This negligence calls to mind Hans Joas’ observation about Dewey’s conception of religion: 
“[Dewey] skips over the particularism of each individual experience and lands, with his 
‘common faith of mankind,’ in an empty universalism of the democratic ideal, the motivating 
force of which remains unfathomable” (2000, p. 123).  
 
62	  These quoted phrases are borrowed from a line in Dewey’s	  A	  Common Faith: “The logic 
involved in getting rid of inconvenient aspects of past religions compels us to inquire how much 
in religions now accepted are survivals from outgrown cultures. It compels us to ask what 
conception of unseen powers and our relations to them would be consonant with the best 
achievements and aspirations of the present. It demands that in imagination we wipe the slate 
clean and start afresh by asking what would be the idea of the unseen, of the manner of its 
control over us and the ways in which reverence and obedience would be manifested, if whatever 
basically religious experience had the opportunity to express itself free from all historical 
encumbrances” (emphasis added, Dewey 1960, p. 6).  
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 Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics forbids talk of static ends of actions that exist in a 
realm beyond experience. All ends occur in experience; within experience they become ends of 
deliberation, “ends-in-view,” “redirecting pivots in action” (Dewey 1922, p. 225). The 
suggestion of a final state of rest is anathema to Dewey’s philosophical orientation.  
Nevertheless, in his essay A Common Faith (originally published in 1934), we find descriptions 
that help us articulate how Dewey imagined a healthier society. A healthier society, as Dewey 
foresaw, evinces religious devotion emancipated from traditional (supernatural) religions, and 
bears the following characteristics:   
 First, a healthier society is marked by a unity of purpose. Members worship—with “faith 
and ardor” (1960, p. 81)—natural and common ideals arising from common activities (e.g., art, 
labor, friendship, or really any activity that promotes personal and social growth) (p.51). Next, 
the practice of worshiping these ideals does not occur exclusively in churches, but extends “the 
sway of ideals” into everyday occupations (p. 57), i.e., by working worshipfully. Finally, because 
the most reliable method for identifying and extending the sway of ideals is through intelligent 
inquiry (specifically one modeled on the scientific method), Dewey’s religious vision sanctifies 
the workers of intelligence. Collaborating together, a group of scientists, public officials, artists, 
and educators become the priests and prophets of a healthy society. Their work is to discover and 
sustain the common ideals that are worshiped in everyday activity. As Dewey describes the 
results of this group’s work:   
The outcome would not be a gospel of salvation but it will be in line with that pursued, 
for example, in matter of disease and health. The method if used would not only 
accomplish something towards social health but would accomplish a greater thing; it 
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would forward the development of social intelligence so that it could act with greater 
hardihood and on a larger scale (Dewey 1960, p. 77).   
Following the true priests and true prophets, everyone in Dewey’s healthy society is called to 
experimentally activate intelligence in a manner which “[bears] upon the unification of human 
desire and purpose” (emphasis added, p. 86). A healthy society is thus, for Dewey, a 
progressively reconciled society. But let us recall the question of this chapter: how does a person 
proceed in a Deweyan calling (now religiously conceived) when modern society is so unhealthy?  
 The answer has already been stated. Dewey takes the right education, in the right 
educational environment (or school), to be the primary means of social transformation. Social 
transformation is necessary, because relationships in modern society are obviously troubled. As a 
tireless and passionate social activist, Dewey acknowledged how easy it is to make “a severe 
indictment of existing social relations” (1960, p. 74).63 However, Dewey saw that schools might 
be simpler, purer, and more cooperative. Thus, if a student is occupied in school experience, he 
or she will not seamlessly reproduce the problems of modern society. Transformation will occur. 
Students permeated by educational experience will progressively move modern society towards 
social harmony as they act in the world. And thus someday, so the hope runs, modern society 
will come to bestow school-like experiences. The selfish and bustling “Great Society” will 
become the unified and worshipful “Great Community” (cf. Dewey 1988). But can Dewey’s 
grown-up students, who adapt to modern society, though habituated by the school’s “embryonic 
community life” (Dewey 1990, p. 29), address the problem of this chapter?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  The full quotation reads: “It is not difficult to make a severe indictment of existing social 
relations. It is enough to point to the war, jealousy, and fear that dominate the relations of nation 
states to one another; to the growing demoralization of older ties of domestic life; to the 
staggering evidence of corruption in politics, and to the egoism, brutality, and corruption that 
characterize economic activities” (1960, p. 74).    
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  The trouble is that Dewey uses school experience to obscure the problem of describing in 
detail how grown-up students, habituated by school experience, interact with the hostile 
conditions of modern society. The very problem of occupying the lag time between the “Great 
Society” and the “Great Community” is finessed by a faith in the evidence of progress. However, 
the problem of this chapter—an education for a calling in modern society—ineluctably involves 
understanding how individuals will be educated to act in the lag time. In what Dewey called the 
“Great Society,” which I call a modern society, the pursuit of a calling—including Dewey’s call 
for corporate worship of ideals—is not simply an encounter with progress. It is also an encounter 
with confusion, friction, selfish incentives, impersonal systems, broad and narrow paths, and 
sometimes “pathless” and “inexorable” horrors like war (Bourne 1999, p. 200). The case for 
forces in modern society that work against Dewey’s conception of calling as occupation is 
impressive.   
 The state of modern society leads Sidney Hook, a thoughtful advocate of Dewey’s work, to 
observe the following:  
  …unless concerted political and social efforts are made to strengthen the    
  institutional framework of the democratic community, Dewey’s educational   
  philosophy may turn out to be inoperative … In a racist community it cannot be   
  properly applied; nor in a slum city which starves its schools, where municipal   
  administration is corrupt, where hoodlums and delinquents terrorize whole   
  neighborhoods. Indeed, to attempt to apply Dewey’s educational philosophy   
  under manifestly unripe and hostile conditions may result in consequences worse   
  than those observable in situations where conventional methods of discipline and   
  instruction prevail (emphasis added, 1973 p. 86). 
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Hook’s point is that, prior to enacting Dewey’s educational methods, the conditions of modern 
schools need to be transformed by grown-up, political action. But this point appears to 
undermine the very idea that education (or school experience) is the crucial means of social 
transformation. How can the transformation of modern society be credited to schools if what is 
first required is political action?64  
  In response to this question, Hook offers the following charge: “We must adapt, modify, 
improvise in a creative way, using some features in one context and some in another, taking 
advantage of every opportunity to inch forward, like a New York taxi driver—provided we know 
the direction we are going” (p. 86). Here the “direction” is likely Deweyan. Having discussed the 
direction of Dewey’s socio-religious vision, and acknowledged the ills of modern society, my 
concern is that Dewey’s conception of calling does not sufficiently motivate or guide individuals 
to work their callings and inch forward towards their ideals in “unripe and hostile” conditions.  
  Interestingly enough, Dewey critiques Protestants and militant atheists alike for being 
preoccupied with the isolated individual who plays out a drama of salvation in his lonely soul. 
Dewey observes: “…the attitude taken is often that of man living in an indifferent and hostile 
world and issuing blasts of defiance” (1960, p. 53).  But what if social transformation demands 
this? What if inching towards an ideal, like a New York taxi driver, occurs in isolating 
conditions? What if issuing “blasts of defiance,” so to speak, is the only available means of 
checking those who feverishly rush to get ahead?  
  Dewey is keen to direct attention away from negative motivations for social 
transformation. One reason for this is that Dewey refuses to imaginatively conceive of what is 
wrong with society. Recalling this chapter’s epigraph, Dewey calls a “religious attitude” one that 
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  Schools of education, too, we might say.     
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involves a “sense of connection…with the enveloping world that the imagination feels is a 
universe” (Dewey 1960, p. 53). Unlike other eminent philosophers of education (e.g., Plato or 
Rousseau), Dewey imagines society made whole but never imagines or dramatizes at length the 
features of an unhealthy society.65 Although he encourages readers to imagine “god” as being a 
synonym of “occupation,” where god is defined as an “active relationship between the ideal and 
actual” (Dewey 1960, p. 51) and occupation is defined as “the growth that comes from the 
continual interplay of ideas and their embodiment in action” (Dewey 1990, p. 133)—Dewey 
discourages readers from investing imaginative labors in amplifying, say, the vision of a hellish 
occupation. Dewey does this on principle, asserting that blanket moral generalizations about 
social ills obstruct the detailed work of social reform (Dewey 1960, p. 77). But this is a 
suspicious claim. First, it is selectively applied: imaginatively perusing a general good in society 
(e.g., treating occupation as if it were god) could also involve neglecting details. Second, it is 
plausible to suggest that the actual labor of social reform requires motivation to resist what is 
(generally) wrong with society as well as the motivation to pursue what is (generally) right. 
Dewey leaves individuals pursuing social transformation in modern society with no momentous 
aversions—only an expansive playing field for the progressively educated. For this reason it is 
difficult to imagine how Dewey’s religious vision could ever become what he desired it to be: 
“explicit and militant” (1960, p. 87).  
  Having cast suspicion on assumptions supporting Dewey’s educational vision, I now turn 
to Weber’s historically informed conception of calling, motivated by its behest to explicitly and 
militantly see modern society and resist the forgetfulness of calling that modern society can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  For instance, Dewey writes, “one of the greatest obstacles in conducting this combat [for great 
social health] is to dispose of social evils in terms of general moral causes. The sinfulness of 
man, the corruption of his heart, his self-love and love of power” (1960, p. 77). 	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easily induce. If a person is educated to heed a calling in modern society—any calling, including 
Dewey’s religious conception of it—then active responsibility, a vigilance for the “demands of 
the day,” must bear upon their calling. However, if students take active responsibility for ideas 
that arise in everyday academic work, and then proceed to take responsibility for the ultimate 
meaning of their obligations in a manner that resembles what Dewey calls “monstrosities,” 
whose dogged pursuits stunt the “the infinite variety of capacities found in individuals” (Dewey 
2004, p. 297), then perhaps we conclude that the relationship between calling and education 
should be decisively undone. Indeed, perhaps to be educated today means to speak of calling 
only in a self-consciously, fictive sense. For instance: “Although I experience growth and self-
discovery through a countless variety of pursuits and social interactions—I am working at this 
particular pursuit only as if I had a ‘calling.’” And—as a corollary—perhaps those who heed 
actual callings today, like the character Alabanda, must be eyed suspiciously as potential 
fanatics. Yet, as I will now argue, Weber’s work allows us to reconceive the relationship 
between education and calling. This starts by not glossing over the non-ideal realities in modern 
society.   
4.3 Recalling the Protestant Calling    
  What is the state of calling in modern society? Weber addresses precisely this question in 
his historical work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber’s Protestant Ethic, 
originally published as a series of essays between 1904-1905,  has been extensively analyzed (cf. 
Ghosh 2014). My purpose here is to briefly recapitulate its argument and provide the reader with 
a sense of Weber’s historically informed and imaginative diagnosis of the forgetfulness of 
calling in modern society. 
  In The Protestant Ethic, Weber argues that the origins of modern capitalism are not 
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simply technological advancement or an age-old love of material gain, but can be located in a 
particular ethos that obliges its adherents to consider the neglect of work as a forgetfulness of 
duty (Pflichtvergessenheit). Weber (2003) claims that this attitude towards work was born “of a 
long and arduous education [Erziehungprozesses]” (p. 62)—specifically, a religious education. 
As he notes in the introduction to his study: “The magical and religious forces, and the ethical 
ideas of duty based upon them, have in the past always been among the most important 
formative influences on conduct” (2003, p. 27). Weber traces the intellectual origin of these 
religious forces back to Luther’s use of the word “calling” (Beruf) in his translation of the Bible. 
Weber suggests that Luther’s translation was politically motivated; Luther wanted to affirm that 
the cobbler who serves God by repairing shoes performs as devout a service as the monk praying 
in his cell. Prior to this, as Weber observes in Economy and Society, “The church [outbid] 
secular morality in marriage, state, vocation, and business through the monastic ethic as the 
higher principle and thus reduce[d] everyday life, especially in the economic sphere, to an 
ethically inferior level” (Weber 1978, p. 1191). Negatively, Luther’s translation of calling 
disparaged the monk’s retreat from everyday life; positively, it aimed to promote fraternity 
(Brüderlichkeit) and elevated the ethical status of everyday work. For our purposes, it suffices to 
say that Luther’s translation made it possible for economic activity to be engaged as a devout 
calling.66 
  The culmination of this religious education, according to Weber, occurred not 
specifically in John Calvin’s logically consistent and non-consoling doctrine of predestination, 
but as congregants heard this doctrine preached from the pulpit. The fear of being ranked among 
the damned, coupled with the elimination of magical means of absolution (e.g., sacraments), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 There might be room for an interesting comparison of Luther and Dewey here.  
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placed such a heavy psychological burden on congregants that the duty to succeed in their 
callings became practically synonymous with obtaining evidence of their salvation. Thus, as 
congregants felt the uncertainty of their personal salvation, so Weber’s thesis runs, a sober and 
determined ethos appeared in everyday life.   
  Weber makes clear that following a call to work was not easy for the Protestants. A 
particular obstacle to success in their calling was a traditional work ethic. A traditional work 
ethic did not cast work as a religious duty—as an end in itself—but as a dispensable means to the 
enjoyment of life. As Weber describes this pleasant condition, “A long daily visit to the tavern, 
with often plenty of drink, and a congenial circle of friends, made life comfortable and leisurely” 
(Weber 2003, p. 67). Thus, to proceed, the Protestant had to resist and overcome the disposition 
of a traditional work ethic. A “comfortable and leisurely” life had to be cast as a distraction to 
calling, which was a duty to serve God in the world. In Weber’s eyes, efforts to overcome such 
great obstacles endowed the Protestants’ everyday actions with heroism.67  
  Weber’s argument is that the Protestant ethic—born of a religious education—bears an 
“elective affinity” to the spirit of capitalism, where the summum bonum is “the earning of more 
and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life” 
(2003, p. 53). The spirit of capitalism resembles the Protestant’s calling precisely because it sets 
work (or occupation) as an end in itself. Yet, unlike the Protestant ethic, the spirit of capitalism 
bears no religious or metaphysical significance. According to Weber, Benjamin Franklin’s 
maxims “Remember that time is money … Remember that credit is money” (quoted in Weber 
2003, p. 48-49) exemplify the ethic of capitalism, but not the Protestant ethic—that is, Franklin’s 
maxims cast the earning of more money as a prudential duty, but not as a religious duty. 
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  Weber is well aware that “insane” could also be a predicate.  
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Moreover, the spirit of capitalism does not animate a natural order created by God, but, as Weber 
imaginatively described it, a “cosmos” of capitalism marked by anti-religious ambitions.  
  The cosmos of capitalism is not an environment oriented by higher purposes. Rather, as 
Weber incisively writes, it irreligiously “educates [erzieht] and selects the economic subjects 
which it needs through a process of economic survival of the fittest” (p. 55). Work no longer 
occurs according to God-willed activity, and perhaps not even according to Franklin’s maxims, 
but in a second-nature arena of competition where participation is compulsory. As Weber writes 
in one of his book’s most famous lines,  
In Baxter’s view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the “saint 
like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.” But fate decreed that the 
cloak should become an iron cage (2003, p. 181).   
It is worth pausing here to note that the frequently used term “iron cage” is the product of a poor 
translation. The American sociologist Talcott Parsons freely translated stahlhartes Gehäuse as 
“iron cage.” Parsons (consciously or subconsciously) took Weber to be alluding to a scene in 
John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress (1678), where the main character, Christian, is shown a 
forsaken professor trapped in an iron cage. Yet, as many have noted, stahlhartes Gehäuse is 
better translated as a “shell/casing as hard as steel.” Peter Baehr persuasively contends that 
Weber’s stahlhartes Gehäuse is a condition less final or despairing than Bunyan’s iron cage. 
Steel is a man-made and specifically modern substance, and the shell/casing (put into a 
metaphorical relationship with “cloak”) is something one wears or dwells in. The shell/casing is 
thus both a “shelter and constraint” (Baehr 2001, p. 164). Accordingly, Weber’s metaphor is not 
a wail of despair but more nearly a critique of modern people who are weighed down by the steel 
shell of capitalism and “have their nose so close to the ground that they are incapable of aspiring 
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to heaven or any non-utilitarian value” (Baehr 2001, p. 160). This shell/casing as hard as steel is 
better, perhaps, than an iron cage—but it is not benign. As Weber writes,  
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism 
was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly 
morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order 
(emphasis added, Weber 2003, p. 181).  
Weber describes capitalism as an unstoppable social force.  
  It is worth pausing here to note that if, as this dissertation claims, there is continuity 
between a student heeding the demands of particular intellectual ideas with active responsibility 
and a person heeding the demands of a calling with active responsibility, then the cosmos of 
capitalism must impinge upon the student’s education too. Consider: The students who slack 
have it coming, while the most successful students sacrifice their youth and work as if they were 
heroically, religiously, or aesthetically called to have excellent test scores and be admitted into 
prestigious schools. Yet their compulsion is likely not driven by a conception of the meaning of 
their identity or a moral cause, but, more nearly, by the market’s demand to beat out the 
competition for scarce educational and economic resources. Weber would find this appalling. For 
this reason it is not hard to see why Weber’s contemporaries read him as an opponent of the 
Protestant’s calling.  
4.4 The Historical Context of Weber’s Affirmation of Vocation   
  In an essay entitled “Vocation and Youth” (published in Die Wissen Blätter on May 15, 
1917), a young author writing under the pseudonym Franz Xaver Schwab denounced vocation as 
a bourgeois idol that must be smashed in order to revive a full and flourishing conception of 
humanity: one reminiscent of the Greek ideal taught in the German Gymnasium, and the 
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objective of Hyperion’s “beautiful war.” In advancing this critique, Schwab claimed that “the 
only persons in our time who have something important to say about vocation in a conscious way 
are the brothers Max and Alfred Weber in Heidelberg” (quoted in Schluchter 1996, p. 32-33). 
Schwab was referencing Max Weber as an ally in his charge to smash the oppressive legacy of 
vocation. An initial reading of The Protestant Ethic stirs a desire to escape from the strictures of 
a Puritanical legacy. Furthermore, despite his intentions to put evaluations to the side and keep 
his study purely descriptive, Weber himself confesses in The Protestant Ethic that “the path of 
human destiny cannot but appall him who surveys a section of it” (emphasis added, Weber 2003, 
p. 29). In Deweyan terms, what is so appalling about the Protestant’s calling is its supernatural 
sanction of activity that belittles leisure and casts the pursuit of flourishing as an obstacle to 
obsessive work. Indeed, Schwab may have been sympathetic to Dewey’s “vocation of life,” and 
his attempt to revamp the Greek ideal by collapsing the dualism between labor and leisure in 
modern society.68   
  But Weber did not end up backing Schwab’s position. In an indirect response to 
Schwab’s article (Schuluchter 1996, p. 33), Weber would associate vocation with his own 
engagement in science, politics, and education. The conception of vocation that Weber advanced 
was in many ways akin to the Protestant vocation. But why would Weber affirm an “appalling” 
notion like the Protestant’s calling?  
4.5 The Difficulty of Calling in Modern Society  
  This question betrays a hurried reading. Although Weber claimed he was not “musically” 
attuned to religion,69 he was not appalled by the Protestant ethic as such. What appalled Weber 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Cf. The extended argument made in Dewey’s later work Art as Experience.   
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was the cosmos of capitalism, which reduces social life to a second-nature arena of competition 
where adaptation is compulsory and blindly habitual. Within the cosmos of capitalism, working 
insights about values (or, the “magical and religious forces, and the ethical ideas of duty based 
upon them”) no longer elevate the status of everyday life and a calling cannot be discerned in a 
person’s activity. What appalled Weber, as one scholar aptly puts it, is that “vocational duty was 
replaced by mere striving for success” (Schluchter 1996, p. 69). More specifically, self-
determination becomes weighed down and reduced to an instrumental rationality intent on 
competing for morally irrelevant goods (e.g., money or status). This evokes a Weberian 
distinction that will become important later in my argument: value rationality (wertrational) 
demands that individuals account for their values and consider whether their actions consistently 
accord with them; instrumental rationality (zweckrational) demands that individuals move 
efficiently from point A to point B (cf. Starr 1999, p. 419). Thus, individuals who have 
successfully adjusted to the cosmos of capitalism act in a manner that evinces the “calling” to 
achieve minimal friction and maximum satisfaction (zweckrational) in their occupation in order 
to secure morally irrelevant goods.  
  Yet, as Weber sees it, individuals who constantly adapt to the cosmos of capitalism to 
secure goods become rationalized and unmusical versions of Diderot’s character Rameau’s 
nephew, who postured himself without shame to profit in an unjust society. Although their 
behavior appears purposeful, as it conforms to formal procedures and rational systems, there is 
nothing internal, no ultimate obligation—nothing outside of the vagaries of the external 
environment—to reorient or check their adaptation. For this reason, people who consistently 
navigate life strategically in search of morally irrelevant goods, as Weber judges following Kant, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 As Weber was raised by a devout Protestant mother and maintained a close friendship with the 
theologian Ernst Troeltsch, it is important to consider that he was not exactly tone-deaf either.   
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lack personality—where that term is defined as: “consistency of … intimate relationship to 
certain ‘ultimate values' and 'meanings' of life" (translated by Portis 1978, p.114). Individuals 
without personality lack dignity. Their lives do not affirm an internal commitment to values; they 
lack integrity because their relationship to values is dictated by external circumstances, and they 
lack autonomy because they are not shaped by values they have chosen and thought 
independently about, but only according to the game-like means—the chutes and ladders, so to 
speak—of their environment (cf. Brubaker 1984, p. 96). Ultimately what appalls Weber is the 
demise of individuals, like the Protestants, who were motivated by the demands of their calling 
and elevated the ethical status of everyday life by acting dutifully therein.  
  Does this mean Weber wishes for a healthy society permeated by a sense of vocation? 
Possibly, but readers will find little resembling a reconciled social vision in Weber’s work70—
which does not offer hopeful visions (at least not explicitly), but instead a variety of descriptions, 
images, and explanations for why modern society is not hospitable to callings. Weber invests his 
imaginative labor in diagnosing what is wrong with modern society. His work provides negative 
motivation to pursue a calling: for instance, the motivation to throw off the “shell as hard as 
steel” in fear of losing one’s moral cause and neglecting one’s daemon. The Weberian educator 
who keeps in mind the student’s calling and how he responds to the demands of particular ideas 
in class (e.g., algebra problems) also acknowledges that the student’s attention to these demands 
and calling can be dampened by the much louder demand of the cosmos of capitalism: literally, 
the demand for self-preservation. Thus the Weberian educator in anticipating her students 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  An exception to this, perhaps, is Weber’s work on the concept of brotherliness (cf. Symonds 
and Pudsey 2006). However Weber is generally a pessimistic theorist. I think what Jeffrey Green 
says about Machiavelli also applies to Weber: “political morality … is a morality for minimizing 
a preexisting set of evils; it has little to do with attaining some positive good” (Green 2010, p. 
24).    
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callings must also must anticipate struggle to resist modern society.   
  Commentators have noted that Weber’s struggle against modern society was expressed in 
terms of responsibility. As Löwith describes: “The motive force of Weber’s whole approach … 
was the contradiction, always conquered anew, between the recognition of a rationalized world 
and the counter-tendency towards freedom for self-responsibility” (1993, p. 77). Or, as Brubaker 
puts it: “[Weber] affirms the ethical significance of rational action ‘within institutions of the 
world but in opposition to them’” through an “ethos of engaged opposition” and “responsible 
struggle” (1984, p. 111). Both of these passages suggest that Weber conceived of taking active 
responsibility for one’s life as an affair involving conflict. But the possibility of conflict and the 
need to anticipate resistance does not undermine Weber’s conception of calling, but rather makes 
it more pronounced. Because Weber is not beholden to a vision of a “Great Community” 
permeated by harmonious senses of vocation, his work compels educators to think concretely 
about why students should heed the demands of ideas in a success-oriented cosmos of capitalism, 
where the competitive pursuit of education as positional goods is so pervasive that the “demands 
of the day” seem given in advance. Students who heed the demands of ideas do not profit 
materially in such an environment.  
  Philosopher Robert Paul Wolff provides an excellent example of this in The Ideal of the 
University (1969). Wolff asks readers to imagine a college student named John who has a great 
passion for historical ideas – so great a passion that he does not attend his other classes.  John is 
thus kicked out of school for heeding the demands of historical ideas. As Wolff remarks: 
“Everything in the organization of [the university]…conspires to persuade John that he is a 
failure…” (p. 65). Yet John was engaged in more genuine and formative education than his 
peers, who simply distributed their energy “prudently, if dispassionately, among [their] several 
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courses” (ibid.). If John does not give in to the supposition that he has failed at life because he 
failed at strategically navigating the university, he may lack a credential but be well on his way 
to heeding his calling over and against this experienced antagonism.  
4.6 Fragmented Callings   
  Dewey might appreciate Weber’s critique of capitalism, but he would protest the idea that 
heeding a calling, even in spite of the misfortunes of modern society, is rightly conceived as 
being fraught with conflict and fragmentation. How did Weber envision and justify fragmented 
callings?  
 Weber provides his prescriptive vision of calling in two lectures: “Science as a Vocation” 
(1917) and “Politics as a Vocation” (1919). At a formal level, these lectures embrace the 
historical conception of vocation described in The Protestant Ethic. For instance, in order to 
follow their calling, the Protestants had to heroically resist a traditional economic ethic, 
ascetically renounce worldly comforts, and religiously attend to their everyday work. Weber’s 
discussion of the (modern) academic vocation and (modern) political vocation can be expressed 
according to a similar vocational template. In “Science as a Vocation,” Weber claims that the 
academic must learn to heroically resist the encroachment of capitalistic mentality upon the 
university; the academic must learn to ascetically renounce fulfilling his youthful audiences’ 
strong desires for leadership and quasi-religious “experience”; and the academic must learn to 
serve ideas with special devotion. In “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber claims that the politician 
must learn to heroically resist domination by the aims of bureaucratic efficiency or power-
hungry party bosses; the politician must learn to ascetically renounce common vanity; and the 
politician must learn to be so devoted to a particular cause that he issues blasts of defiance in the 
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face of great opposition: “Here I stand. I can do no other” (Weber 2008, p. 205). 71   
  Though they share a vocational template, Weber does not aspire to fit these callings 
together or concoct a grand calling. Weber’s aim is not social reconciliation or breaking down 
the “barriers of distance” that obstruct social harmony. On the other hand, Weber’s purposes are 
not to instigate a vocational war, reveal battlefields, or stir up “value collision.” Rather, in 
“Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber is speaking as an educator. He 
presents material about vocations and encourages students to think independently about the 
meaning of their obligations and actions in the world. His aim is not to prompt students to affirm 
the callings he describes because of a “momentary impression,” but for students to take an active 
responsibility for the meaning of their lives. Weber recognizes that living out a calling in modern 
society is not given (as it may have been in the past).  A condition of confusion persists; when it 
is examined distinct callings are found at odds.72   
  To be sure, a prejudice for conflict is uncomfortable for those who sympathize with 
Dewey’s social vision of occupation premised upon the “common good.” As an educator, 
however, Weber’s intention was not to realize a comprehensive religious vision or univocal 
social transformation; rather, it was to help students to understand their demands of the day. 
What many today would consider a positive aspect of a Weberian education is its insistence on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 As the editors of this translation note, this line is attributed to Luther at the Diet of Worms 
(April 18, 1521).  
 
72 For instance, as Weber echoes Machiavelli, the person with a calling for politics must look 
down upon the religious obligation to care more about the salvation of their soul than the city; 
the person with a calling for academic inquiry must have contempt for the modern politician’s 
need to exploit his audience using “crowd phenomena”; and the religious “virtuosos,” like Saint 
Francis, must want nothing to do with the puffed-up vanity of intellectuals or the politician’s 
dirty hands. For Weber, the ethical distinctions between different callings—i.e., the pluralism of 
their distinct demands—are clarified as they conflict to such an extent that, as Bruun notes, “one 
is almost led to conclude that [Weber] has a positive prejudice in favor of this kind of ‘tense 
coexistence’” (Bruun, 2007, p. 38). 
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pluralism: that students can entertain and modify a diversity of fundamental commitments. The 
Weberian educator introduces and clarifies callings intellectually, but does not aim to preach an 
exclusive direction for addressing “problems of world shaking importance—the most exalted 
problems that can move the human heart” (Weber 1975, p. 418). Without supplying causes, but 
still hoping that students will have independent insights about them, the Weberian educator cares 
that students can respond to the following questions with concrete details: (1) To pursue this 
cause, or this moral task, what are the obstacles in the world I must work to overcome? (2) To 
pursue this cause, what are the limitations I must impose upon my life? (3) And to pursue this 
cause, what would it imply about the ultimate meaning of my obligations?   
4.7 Active Responsibility for a Calling   
  When a student’s active responsibility for heeding the demands of the ultimate meaning 
of his obligations is stressed as an aim of education, education and calling become intimately 
related. Daily obligations—experienced and worked as the demands of ideas—contribute to the 
student’s larger obligations. As it should be quite clear by now, the educator’s role in the 
student’s calling is not to match a student’s preferences and capacities with lucrative careers, nor 
to adjust them to the “common good” simpliciter. Instead, it means that an educator hopes that 
provoking an active responsibility for the ideas that arise in class will have a formative effect on 
students and help them to take an active responsibility for ideas about the meaning of their 
obligations. This means both recognizing the importance of these ideas and striving to work their 
demands with “clarity” and a “sense of responsibility” (Weber 2008, p. 48). The authentic 
response to a calling, however, does not occur during or after an academic lecture, and likely 
does not occur in the teacher’s presence; instead, the authentic response occurs through the 
student’s conduct of life (Lebensführung), as a calling is responsibly heeded and reflected upon 
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in action as a governing “demand of the day.”  
  Having examined Dewey’s conception of calling as occupation and Weber’s conception 
of calling as an ultimate obligation, I have thus far suggested that Dewey’s conception of calling 
insufficiently acknowledges modern society, while Weber’s conception of calling proceeds from 
an unblinking acknowledgement of the difficulty of heeding a calling in modern society. Here 
Weber’s pessimism is non-consoling, particularly towards those who have trouble thinking about 
educational aims apart from political aims regarding the common good. It suggests, put frankly, 
that having a calling in modern society is to move against the current and to appear “monstrous.” 
But why should the appearances given to calling by modern society determine its value, 
particularly when it is realized that modern society, marked the cosmos of capitalism, does little 
to sustain the intrinsic value of education? Assuredly, “for prudential reasons,” is an readily 
available answer. But educators who prioritize educational practice, as I have suggested, are 
aware of a tension between working for what the system demands and working for particular 
students. They understand their anticipations for their particular students run counter to the 
system’s demands. And thus, I think educator’s would greatly appreciate Weber’s conception, 
because it honestly acknowledges the realities modern society while stressing the ideal quality of 
the fundamental obligation to prioritize educational practice, an educated calling.  Nevertheless, 
prior to concluding, it is important to test the educational value of a Weberian calling with two 
objections that will serve to hedge these claims.  
4.8 Concern 1: Gap Between Theory and Practice  
  There exists a connection between Weber and Dewey that lies in the importance of 
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learning about one’s calling through action and reflection.73 The continuity between learning 
about occupations and acting upon them is readily apparent in Dewey’s work, yet its obscurity is 
a problem in Weber’s account.   
  Dewey affirms, “The only adequate training for occupations is training through 
occupations” (2004, p. 298). Dewey then proceeds to describe school as an embryonic society 
wherein students can test, discover, and appreciate a variety of occupations. Sounds progressive. 
But to recall my critique, outside of Dewey’s “healthy society,” calling and occupation are not 
one and the same. The former involves a commitment to deeply held values, and the latter need 
not. Furthermore, there is a fact that Dewey’s religiously inflected conception of calling does not 
help us to imagine: the cosmos of capitalism is a second-nature environment hostile to all 
callings. It “educates [erzieht] and selects the economic subjects which it needs through a 
process of economic survival of the fittest” (Weber 2003, p. 55). Thus any person—especially a 
person ardently pursuing Dewey’s religious vision—must resist the success ethic that modern 
society forcefully inculcates if they are to heed a calling. As demonstrated above, Weber’s work 
can be used to critique Dewey’s conception of calling for underestimating the social force of 
capitalism and overestimating the social progress that occurs through schooling. But does Weber 
offer a plausible educational alternative in modern society?    
  It is difficult to see how, because a Weberian education does not proceed through the 
actual conduct of life, but through disinterested and value-free lessons. These lessons prepare 
students to take an active responsibility for their callings by positing continuity between these 
callings and taking an active responsibility for insights that arise through concrete intellectual 
problem-solving. In short, thinking independently about intellectual problems—somehow—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 For instance, Dewey writes in A Common Faith: “ Interaction between ends and existent 
conditions improves and tests the ideal; and conditions are at the same time modified” (p. 50).  
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facilitates independent action in the face of practical problems. This should raise suspicions. For 
why do we assume that intellectual problems arise with the same force and urgency as practical 
problems? This suspicion will be clear to anyone who recognizes the great practical problems 
associated with resisting the irrational demands of modern society. For this reason, it might be 
claimed that a Weberian education neglects treating, and thereby discounts, the demands of 
practical problems in the world. And then it might be said that a Weberian education 
insufficiently provokes students to take an active responsibility for practical action.  
  Max Horkheimer, the pioneer of critical theory, lamented after attending one of Weber’s 
lectures, “It was all so precise, so scientifically exact, so value-free that we all went sadly home” 
(quoted Derman 2010, p. 484). I cannot speak to the quality of that particular lecture, but Weber 
lends support to Horkheimer’s reaction by claiming to have lectured “abstractly, purely 
conceptually—intentionally” (quoted in Weber, 1975, p. 664). How provoking an active 
responsibility for insights about abstract and conceptual material actually prepares students for 
their conduct of life remains unclear. A gap remains, which seems to undermine the continuity 
between working the demands of ideas in an academic setting and engaging a calling in modern 
society.  
  4.8.1 Response  
  But it would be far from accurate to say that Weber was numb to urgent practical 
problems, and it is doubtful that Weber’s lectures merely transmitted abstract content that could 
be replaced, for instance, by a programmed machine. There was a peculiar passion to Weber’s 
lectures. As Heinrich Rickert observed of Weber, “such dualism [between the practical and 
theoretical] was both a moral and theoretical necessity for him, and he carried it out in practice to 
such an astonishingly high degree … [the audience felt] as though they were listening to a man 
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forcibly suppressing something within himself” (quoted in Bruun, p. 38). I take these lines, 
particularly in light of the Weberian educator’s peculiar charisma mentioned in the introduction, 
as evidence of educational passion. Generalized, it might be said that the Weberian educator’s 
passion for her students’ independent thinking does not intend to entrench the gap between 
theory and practice, but intends for her students to discover the distinction between theoretical 
understanding (science) and practical action (politics), to internalize this distinction, and to use it 
as a guide in their conduct of life. The lesson here is not whether the demands of an insight 
pertain to theory or practice, but how to judge whether what Weber called  “sharply pointed and 
quite concrete problems” require reflective distance or practical urgency (quoted in Jaspers 1989, 
108-109).74 So, as I understand it, Weber’s peculiar passion for his students’ “independent 
thinking” about intellectual and practical problems required him to live this distinction as an 
educator and convey both reflective distance (directly) and practical urgency (indirectly). To 
recall Raymond Aaron’s (1957) explanation of Weber’s uniqueness:  
Weber’s originality and greatness consist first of all in the fact that he was, and aimed at 
being, a politician and a thinker at the same time, or more precisely that he both separated 
and united politics and science. He separated them, in the sense that science has to be 
independent of our preferences, and purged of all value judgments. But he also united 
them, for science is conceived in such a way as to make it indispensible for action. (67)  
I claim that the Weberian educator, who neither bends toward a rationalistic nihilism that only 
knows reflective distance nor towards a fanaticism that knows no reflective distance, merges 
what Aaron calls “science” and “politics.” The Weberian educator inculcates a distinction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 The full passage reads: “After very long experience and principled conviction, I have the 
viewpoint that only by putting to the test one’s supposed “ultimate” positional attitude on the 
approach to sharply pointed, quite concrete problems, does his own real intention become clear 
to the individual (quoted in Jaspers 1989, p. 108-109).     
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between distance and urgency because she never loses sight of the possibility that her 
provocation of active responsibility will echo as the student heeds and acts upon his calling. The 
Weberian educator does not envision a fictitious (as if) calling, because she does not aspire to 
echo the demands of her students’ merely fictive (as if) ideas. Neither does the Weberian 
educator envision an absence of calling, a fanatical calling, a calling that is merely a Romantic 
portrait of the self’s personality, or a calling that arises from the amplification of personal 
preference. For this is not what echoing the demands of her students’ ideas means in the present, 
and would not be how her students learn to heed a calling in the future.     
 Granting that an educated calling is not half-serious, nihilistic, fanatical, or simply 
preference-based, Dewey could still claim that it remains monstrous. For the educated calling 
envisioned by the Weberian educator ignores the “infinite variety of capacities” that might arise 
as a person interacts with others in a harmonious and shared social space.  
4.9 Concern 2: The Impoverishment of Social Experience     
  There is another objection to Weber’s conception of an educated calling that any 
familiarity with Dewey’s ideas will rightly invoke, namely that it impoverishes social 
experience.  To see this, imagine several young adults who have received a Weberian education. 
Having learned about the “the demands of their day,” we can imagine each one feels the pull of a 
distinct cause in the world, and given the Weberian educator’s assumption that distinct causes do 
not find unity, we can further imagine that all students might find themselves in a tense 
coexistence within the classroom. A variety of conflicting causes might draw students into 
conflict: some students might seek theoretical distance in order to avoid the practical urgency 
surrounding the conflict; others might decide to become who they are by engaging it, no-holds-
barred. How would the Weberian educator intervene? Dewey’s point here would be that the 
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Weberian educator’s fixation upon a student’s isolated soul and its cause in the world created a 
problem by overlooking abundant opportunities for communication and growth in the classroom.  
  There are good reasons for classmates to appreciate the values they share in common: an 
environment marked by hostility and isolation hinders clear and responsible thinking, whereas an 
environment where common values flourish—and dialogue occurs—supports deliberation, 
including deliberation about personal responsibilities. If educators have control over educational 
conditions, therefore, it seems far wiser to create a common educational experience free from 
unnecessary conflicts and blockages and barriers to communication. Weber—along with many 
academics today—overlooks this simple piece of classroom wisdom.  
  But the objection continues beyond the classroom because it is not just an objection to a 
Weberian education, but to Weber’s vision of the social world. Why must we assume that the 
condition of confusion (or value collision) as an existential fact? Contrary to a vision of the 
social world that fixates upon its non-ideal and pluralistic character, Dewey bids us to see that 
common values encouraged in the classroom can become values shared in the world. Although 
the world, like the classroom, is never a matter of certainty, human experience in either setting 
can be improved and controlled by patient intelligence and careful experimentation. As Dewey 
observed, “Whether or no we are, save in some metaphorical sense, all brothers, we are at least 
all in the same boat traversing the same turbulent ocean. The potential religious significance of 
this fact is infinite” (emphasis added, 1960, p. 84). Harboring an assumption that undermines this 
“fact,” the Weberian educator bids us to envision “monstrous” individuals who heed their calling 
by resisting the social world. As such, the Weberian educator not only overlooks the discovery 
and crystallization of good arising from common experience (within schools or societies). If we 
are—in fact—on the “same boat,” and we do—in fact—desire to improve the voyage with the 
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best methods available (ad infinitum), then encouraging students to heed a calling against 
common experience seems always to be an irresponsible way forward.   
  4.9.1    Response  
  A response to this objection utilizes terms already defined. In short, Dewey’s philosophy 
bids us to collapse instrumental rationality and value rationality, while affirming a condition of 
social harmony. Dewey renounces “final states,” but he does not renounce an ultimate direction: 
discovering intelligent methods and securing common values. Following this direction, problems 
arise and solutions are discovered and secured as facts that align with the order of things. So, just 
as we can and should discover cures for specific physical ailments, we can and should discover 
cures for specific social ailments. There are better and worse cures, of course, but the direction of 
discovering cures is not better or worse. It is, simply, the intelligent way forward.  
  To read Dewey charitably, we should dismiss the frightening image of public officials 
violating the liberty of consciousness by “vaccinating” society against recalcitrant beliefs that 
vex social harmony. This critique would be unfair to Dewey, who actively defended social 
deviants. Yet, after several charitable readings, it is still difficult to silence the concern that 
Dewey’s emphasis on discovering the common good obscures questions about decision-makers 
and their responsibilities. As Sheldon Wolin observes,  
  In the end Dewey’s most crucial concepts—experimentation, method, and    
  culture—were ways of evading questions about power. His society appears   
  fixated on the finding of methods, the conduct of experiments, and the    
  communication of results. Questions of how problems are identified, who    
  controls the communication of results, and who evaluates the consequences were   
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  all left indeterminate (2006, p. 517).75   
Wolin’s concern over power can be captured as a concern over who shoulders the responsibility 
for decisions that affect the community. That we are on the same boat, so to speak, does not 
mean we all have equal abilities to evaluate and enforce its direction, or that we will evaluate it 
in the same way, or that there is a single method for evaluating a particular problem. By directing 
attention towards discovery and away from decision, by setting discovery as a given, a Deweyan 
occupation risks avoiding the burden of responsibility, and missing the necessity of an education 
that prepares students to shoulder this burden in modern society. If a person wants to live into a 
vision of us being on the “same boat,” in modern society, this person must monstrously affirm it 
as a “Deweyan demand of the day” and take responsibility for the inconvenient truths their 
author neglected. 
  I do not intend this response as a dismissal of Dewey, but neither do I think Dewey’s 
objection provides sufficient cause for rejecting a Weberian education in modern society. 
Education should prepare students to recognize the tension between a world we discover 
(science) and a world we decide upon (politics). However, as Weber goes further in appreciating 
this tension—bringing it to life, as I suggested above, through the educator—I am led to 
privilege a Weberian account of an educated calling  as a ultimate obligation over a Deweyan 
account of an occupation serving the common good. A person who heeds his calling with active 
responsibility, amidst a society where false needs, distractions, and the pursuit of profit reign 
supreme ought to be classed as truly educated—not monstrous. The “demands of the day” only 
seem monstrous because heeding them requires resolutely moving against the current of modern 
society, where education only means a competition for successful adjustment, where aimlessness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Wolin’s remarks on Dewey have been recently critiqued by Roudy Hildreth (2009) and 
Melvin Rogers (2009).  
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is systematized, where callings are muted.  
4.10 Conclusion  
  The purpose of this chapter has been to defend calling as an educational aim in modern 
society. I have privileged the Weberian conception of calling over a Deweyan conception of 
calling, but I think that struggling with Weber’s and Dewey’s conceptions of calling can clarify 
and reaffirm the relationship between calling and education. But clarify and reaffirm to what 
end?  
  As I see it, calling can be used to reformulate the one basic question of philosophy of 
education in a manner that affirms the priority of educational practice. Again, this question runs: 
“To what extent can educating children for the common good be reconciled with educating them 
for their own good?” (Curren 2013, p. 233). As mentioned in the introduction, I do not think this 
question carries much weight in modern society, because what is common is capitalism and what 
is good is plural. Political visions of the common good become highly speculative and far 
removed from reality when they are imposed on educators and students. Stressing the highly 
speculative demand of a unified with society, as I see it, is a recipe for ignoring the educator’s 
concern for preparing particular students to think independently about their calling in modern 
society. So, how might this basic question be reformulated?  Political philosopher David Walsh 
provides an intriguing hint in the conclusion of his study The Modern Philosophical Revolution: 
The Luminosity of Existence (2008). Walsh writes, “Any serious account would, of course, have 
begun with the recognition that it is precisely fidelity to such principles that stands in more need 
of explanation than the principles themselves” (p. 463). Thinking through the question of an 
educator’s fidelity to their students’ callings strikes me as a promising direction for philosophers 
of education.  
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 Recasting the one basic question of philosophy of education in terms of calling 
emphasizes the need for the educator’s fidelity to the students’ conceptions of themselves and of 
the world as these conceptions are enacted in modern society. The new basic question might 
read: How do you faithfully prepare persons for a conduct of life that could clearly and 
responsibly be affirmed by them as the response to a calling? This question gains significance in 
the context of Weber’s work, wherein it becomes necessary to confront the question of how 
educational practice can provoke students to take an active responsibility for academic content in 
a manner that will equip them to take an active responsibility for their calling in modern society.  
Expressed in terms of the particular concerns of this dissertation, the question might read: 
How do you educate people, amidst contemporary educational institutions, to take an active 
responsibility for the ultimate meaning of their obligations in a non-ideal and pluralistic world? I 
think taking this question seriously bears promise. It can help philosophers of education consider 
how diverse educational practices and curriculums might hang together in a general way; how a 
variety of ideas (e.g., about algebra, English, art, or history) can inform a person’s fundamental 
insight about the ultimate meaning of his obligations in the world. It is thin enough to 
accommodate and respectfully inform a plurality of beliefs. It encourages encountering particular 
and concrete problems and highlights how ideas arising from them bear the potential to shape a 
student’s fidelity to the meaning of their obligations in the world. Finally, raising this question 
can provoke philosophers of education themselves to examine the purposes driving their work: 
whether these purposes envision “easy streets” or merely issue “blasts of defiance”—and, 
ultimately, whether the field itself possesses anything resembling a calling that would provide 
reason and motivation to continue to think philosophically about educational practice 
irrespective of the market’s demands. 
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Chapter 5 
Thinking Through Disenchantment:   
A Propaedeutic to Responsible Re-enchantment    
 
“Does that mean,” I said in some bewilderment, “that we must eat again of the tree of knowledge 
in order to return to the state of innocence?” 
—Heinrich von Kleist  
5.1 Introduction  
 In the previous chapter I argued that the Weberian educator aims to prepare students for 
an educated calling. I raised a Deweyan critique of Weber: namely, that the Weberian educator is 
content with her students’ isolation, or as Dewey might describe it, with her students “living in 
an indifferent and hostile world and issuing blasts of defiance” (1960, p. 53). It is not difficult to 
imagine the Weberian educator, like her students, alone and evincing an “ethos of engaged 
opposition” and “responsible struggle” against the system (Brubaker 1984, p. 111). Teaching in 
contemporary educational institutions can be a lonely and frusterating experience. But if 
prioritizing educational practice is to become motivational within contemporary educational 
institutions, the image of the teacher’s isolated struggle—“a small cog in a ceaselessly moving 
mechanism” (Weber 1978, p. 988)—seems sorely insufficient for the task. 
 I do not think teachers demoralized by contemporary educational reforms need to be 
reminded of their isolation and lack of professional autonomy. Instead, as I see it, they need 
encouragement and reminders about what grounds the dignity of their cause. Having so far 
expressed the educator’s cause only through the relationship between a student and teacher, in 
this chapter I consider the social aspect of the Weberian educator’s cause. I will argue that the 
educator who echoes the demands of particular insights that arise in the classroom and bestows 
the gift of independent thinking enacts a cause, which I will call responsible re-enchantment. 
This cause can be depicted as persons pursuing educated callings and enhancing the ethical status 
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of everyday life as they heed their “demands of the day” and thereby resist the cosmos of 
capitalism.   
Prior to depicting the Weberian educator’s cause, however, it is important to understand 
how the possibility of re-enchantment can responsibly arise amidst disenchanting social 
conditions. Thus, rather than simply making a re-enchantment proposal, I will use Weber’s work 
as a guide for thinking through (by which I mean “beyond”) disenchanting social conditions, for 
which educational institutions provide fitting examples.  
 In his recent book The Allure of Order (2013), sociologist Jal Mehta suggests that the 
major U.S. educational reform movements of the 20th century can be characterized using 
Weber’s term “rationalization.” “As Weber famously noted,” says Mehta, “rationalization 
creates order out of chaos, but it does so at the cost of creating an ‘iron cage’ that often 
emphasizes the measurable to the exclusion of the meaningful” (2013, p. 6). In the previous 
chapter, I argued that an education in active responsibility involves resisting the success ethic 
that dominates the cosmos of capitalism and renders talk of an education for “callings” naïve and 
superfluous. Yet Mehta’s observation about the history of educational reform points to a larger 
story. Indeed, capitalism is only one manifestation of a larger historical process of 
rationalization, where, as Weber famously described, the world becomes disenchanted. 
Assuming that Mehta is right and Weberian rationalization is a problematic tendency in 
educational reform, which philosophers of education have recently captured using related 
conceptions of “what works” (Beista 2007), “instrumentalization” (Higgins 2011), and externally 
motivated “standards, accountability, and outcome assessment schemes"(Curren 2013, p. 244), 
then perhaps resisting rationalization means advocating for the re-enchantment of education. But 
my primary claim in this chapter is that thinking about re-enchantment will not be useful to 
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contemporary educators if an effort is not first made to understand and think through 
disenchantment as a social condition.   
 To make this argument, I will begin by briefly mentioning three contemporary re-
enchantment proposals (John McDowell’s, Charles Taylor’s, and Akeel Bilgrami’s) and describe 
how their proposals—not written for educators—might be applied to current educational 
conditions. While these proposals are exciting and suggest creative possibilities, what they all 
share in common and what educators will likely find most familiar is their critique of 
disenchantment, which springs from Weber. I next turn to Weber to develop at greater length a 
distinction between Weber’s description of a disenchanted social condition and a Weberian 
method for teaching in this disenchanted social condition. Claiming that education provides a 
means for thinking through a disenchanted social condition, I will conclude by arriving at the 
Weberian educator’s cause, what I call responsible re-enchantment.  
5.2 Contemporary Re-enchantment Proposals   
 It is helpful to begin describing these contemporary re-enchantment proposals by 
pointing out that none of the philosophers mentioned above are proposing a naïve return to a pre-
scientific age (McDowell 1996, p. 72). Yet all of the philosophers mentioned note philosophical 
problems with the modern idea that nature is “brute and valueless” (Bilgrami 2014, p. 185), and 
that “the universe in which we find ourselves is totally devoid of human meaning” (Taylor 2011, 
p. 116). Another connection is that all of these philosophers subscribe to a version of moral 
realism, where meanings and values exist whether or not they are recognized by particular 
peoples at particular times. As McDowell writes, “The idea is that the dictates of reason are there 
anyway, whether or not one’s eyes are opened to them” (1996, p. 91). These contemporary re-
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enchantment proposals stand as responses to the philosophical problems with disenchanted 
conceptions of nature, subjects, and politics.   
5.2.1    Re-enchanting Nature   
 For McDowell, the philosophical problem of disenchantment arises when the whole of 
nature is conceived scientistically – that is, in terms of natural laws alone. When this occurs, 
meaning is problematically reduced to facts about nature, and our receptivity to the demands of 
reason, such as ethical demands, begin to provoke anxieties because they appear otherworldly or 
“spooky” (1996, p. 82). These anxieties can be dismissed, according to McDowell, by recalling 
Aristotle’s conception of second nature, which involves “initiation into conceptual capacities 
which include responsiveness to other rational demands besides those of ethics … having one’s 
eyes opened to reasons at large by acquiring a second nature” (1996, p. 84). For McDowell, a 
person’s initiation into language and culture as his formation (or Bildung) occurs, explains the 
fact that shared conceptual content exists in the world—and, by implication, that the world is not 
utterly disenchanted. A person’s receptivity to the demands of reason in the world, born through 
acquisition of a second nature, refutes a (disenchanted) scientistic naturalism. 
5.2.2    Re-enchanting Subjects    
 Charles Taylor’s re-enchantment proposal is inspired by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s 
critique of modern epistemology. This critique affirms that “Our grasp of the world is not simply 
a representation in us [but] resides rather in our dealing with reality” (Taylor 2011, p. 117). 
Taylor’s re-enchantment proposal responds to the problem of atomistic modern subjects, who 
relate to the world as if upon reflection. As Taylor sees it, the modern subject can be described as 
“buffered”—i.e. disengaged from meanings and values in the natural and social world (Taylor 
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2007, p. 42). Although not quite harkening back to a pre-modern “porous” self—which is 
haplessly susceptible to a world of spirits—Taylor’s re-enchantment proposal calls for the 
need to enlarge our palette of … points of contact with fullness [robust meanings in the 
world], because we are too prone in our age to think of this  contact in terms of 
“experience”; and to think of experience as something subjective, distinct from the object 
experienced; and as something to do with our feelings, distinct from changes in our 
being: dispositions, orientations, the bent of our lives, etc. (2007, p. 730) 
In contrast to McDowell, who diagnoses philosophical anxieties provoked by a disenchanted 
view of nature, Taylor’s work diagnoses the problem as stemming from the buffered subjects 
produced by a disenchanted (or secular) age. His re-enchantment proposal thus amounts to a 
historical diagnosis that makes a case for the possibility of a fuller experience in the world.   
5.2.3     Re-enchanting Politics    
 A third re-enchantment proposal, Akeel Bilgrami’s work aims to draw out the “humane 
and radical political possibilities” (2014, p. 201) in Romantic metaphysics as articulated by M.H. 
Abrahams in Natural Supernaturalism (1971). Bilgrami’s concern with disenchantment—which 
he traces back to William Blake—involves a political critique of the collective understanding 
that shapes and implements policies by evacuating values. Bilgrami finds the most important and 
creative resources for critiquing what we might call “disenchanted policy” lie in everyday 
perceptions of the world, which are “shot through with value properties, that is to say, enchanted 
in the low-profile sense” (2014, p. 205). An example of Bilgrami’s proposal, which he does not 
mention directly but would very likely affirm, can be found in Wordsworth’s poem “The Old 
Cumberland Beggar.” In the poem, Wordsworth describes the various everyday values disclosed 
by the beggar’s presence and contrasts them with the politician’s singular desire to “sweep” the 
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beggar from the street and rid the world of “nuisances.” But, in this case, these nuisances include 
the everyday values disclosed by the beggar’s presence. The politician and his policies thus 
perpetuate disenchantment. The political project motivated by Bilgrami’s re-enchantment 
proposal is one that removes the boundary separating the frame of policy from the frame of low-
profile, quotidian enchantment such that everyday values and responses to the world (like those 
disclosed by the beggar’s presence) are brought to bear on value-neutral policies that would 
perpetuate the disenchantment of politics.       
5.2.4    Applying Re-enchantment Proposals  
 Recalling Mehta’s line that the history of U.S. educational reform is marked by Weberian 
rationalization, which “emphasizes the measurable to the exclusion of the meaningful” (2013, p. 
6), there arises a healthy inclination to apply these re-enchantment proposals to contemporary 
educational institutions and put them to immediate work. For instance, if our upbringing enables 
us to become receptive to the demands of reason, as McDowell notes, and, as one commentator 
concludes, “education makes us who we are” (Bakhurst 2011, p. 162), then perhaps educators 
could use McDowell’s work to identify the misplaced confidence that drives educational 
reformers to seek curricular innovation through disenchanted and reductive conceptions of 
human nature. Or, turning to Taylor, if full and robust meanings are really available in the world, 
perhaps educators should consider how their educational practice may problematically buffer 
students by encouraging them to secure for themselves atomistic “points” or “marketable 
degrees” at the expense of contact with transformative texts or works of art. And finally, if the 
most creative political possibilities are inherent in everyday, quotidian values, maybe educators 
could deploy Bilgrami’s work to criticize the “experts” and “decision-makers” who govern 
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teachers using value-neutral language, and who create policy designed to help the disadvantaged 
but fail because of their atrophied receptivity to moral values.    
 Granting the possibility of using these re-enchantment proposals to inform educational 
practice, arguably the motivation to do so springs from their critique of a disenchanting social 
condition, which many teachers working in contemporary educational institutions understand 
pretty thoroughly. Interestingly enough, therefore, these re-enchantment proposals lead us back 
to Weber, because all of the above proposals spring (more or less) from a Weberian conception 
of a disenchanted social condition. Clarifying what Weber meant by this highlights a viable 
connection between educational practice and these contemporary re-enchantment proposals. 
However, establishing this connection is not my primary aim. My argument is that what Weber 
meant by a disenchanted social condition can be related to his pedagogy, and that this 
relationship will help educators to think through a disenchanting social condition, and thus 
supply a propaedeutic for my ultimate concern: associating the educator’s cause with responsible 
re-enchantment.  
5.3  A Disenchanted Orientation  
 The purpose of this section is to briefly define and note connections between Weber’s (1) 
descriptions of a disenchanted social condition, (2) intellectual positions, and (3) conception of 
pedagogy. These are necessary first steps in my argument that Weber provides a distinct 
pedagogy for thinking through disenchantment.   
5.3.1     A Disenchanted Social Condition  
 Weber provides two distinct but related definitions of disenchantment (Entzauberung) as 
a social condition. The first, more literal, definition is that magical or incalculable forces are no 
longer used to explain occurrences in the world. There is literally an entz (de-) zauberung 
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(magicization) of the world (cf. Green 2005, p. 52). This occurs, Weber explains, as rational 
methods and abstract rules begin to govern the conduct of man and nature; for every unknown 
occurrence, an expert (in principle) could give an explanation. Examples of this might be the 
mysterious death of hundreds of birds...or a gifted educator whose behaviors are boiled down by 
experts into core principles of successful teaching. Weber observes that a prevailing confidence 
in expert testimony does not necessarily imply a more enlightened or responsible population.  
Those of us who travel by streetcar—unless we are physicists—have no notion of how 
the streetcar works or what sets it in motion, and there is no need to know, either.  All we 
need to know is that we can “depend” on it to behave in a certain way and can act 
accordingly, but as to how the streetcar is built so that it will move, of that we know 
nothing. The savage knows incomparably more about his tools (Weber 2008, p. 35).    
The Rousseauian irony here is plain. The savage (presumably living in an enchanted world) 
knows incomparably more about how his world works (he makes his tools) than the modern 
urbanite, who is unfamiliar with the workings of his surrounding world (and sees the subway’s 
arrival as good fortune). Yet the crucial difference is that, unlike the savage, the modern urbanite 
can get to the bottom of every mystery—should he decide to make the effort. As Weber explains,  
the knowledge or belief that if we only wanted to we could learn at any time that there 
are, in principle, no mysterious unpredictable forces in play, but that all things—in 
principle—can be controlled through calculation…No longer, like  the savage, who 
believed that such forces existed, do we have to resort to magical means to gain control 
over or pray to the spirits. Technical means and calculation work for us instead (Weber 
2008, ibid).  
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So, according to this first definition of a disenchanted social condition, expert testimony and 
calculations define and fix our expectation of the world’s possibilities.76  
 The strong version of an enchanted education, on this definition, would be a magical 
education. The educator would be a sorcerer whose doings defy the causal nexus and natural 
laws; educational practice would involve feats like mind reading and teaching students through 
their dreams. A weaker version could simply teach students that just because a phenomenon can 
be successfully calculated does not mean it is appropriately captured or understood through 
calculation. For instance, the way a single student’s independent thinking about algebraic 
insights informs his independent thinking about the ultimate meaning of his action in the world, 
or his calling, could assuredly be calculated. However, the expense would be tremendous and the 
results would be so particular and so far removed from a controlled environment that it is not 
clear how they would be useful in educational practice. The expectation that there is a scientific 
explanation for a particular student’s formation may be true, but to seek general laws and pursue 
empirical proof would likely be fruitless.77 The teacher who is aware that her educational 
practice may form a student’s capacity to heed a future calling, on the other hand, does not 
proceed with the expectation that she will get to the bottom of exactly what her student should 
become. Instead, the educator hopes that the larger significance of her practice—her student’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Certainly, there are exceptions. Trust in experts’ testimony and their calculable explanations is 
not completely universal, even in our disenchanted society, for there is still a small space 
reserved for the incalculable. Modern hospitals, for instance, still employ religious chaplains to 
visit patients and pray for peace or healing. Granting such exceptions, Weber’s sociological 
observation is that disenchantment according to this first definition is mostly the case. For 
instance, although hospitals employ chaplains, we do not go to hospitals to pray, but to “get to 
the bottom” of our physical ailments as their “technical means and calculation work for us 
instead.”   	  
 
77 Cf. Weber’s essay “Roscher and Knies” (2014).	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independent thinking about the meaning of his action in the world—can be born through that 
very same practice.  
 Weber’s second definition of disenchantment pertains to the fragmentation of social 
values. In a disenchanted age, previously unified social values become fragmented into 
autonomous value spheres, which Weber identified as religious, economic, political, aesthetic, 
erotic, and intellectual. To illustrate this definition, imagine a member of the Canaanite cult who 
finds correspondence between activities such as worshiping the male sky god and female earth 
goddess, sexual intimacy and procreation, labor in the field and the public celebration of the 
harvest (cf. Ricour 1995, ch. 2). But according to this second sense of disenchantment, the 
organic unity of modern life is broken into distinct value spheres with autonomous logics. When 
these distinct value spheres appear to find a comfortable unity in everyday life, what I referred to 
as a condition of confusion arises (chapter 2). So while in the Canaanite cult, to quote Friedrich 
Schiller, “Everything to the initiate’s eye / showed a trace of a [g]od,” the modern urbanite living 
in a disenchanted social condition may unequivocally distinguish between non-overlapping 
spheres of life (his or her religious life, sex life, financial life, and so on). As one scholar 
summarizes it, “meaning no longer resides in axiomatically shared and publicly inscribed beliefs 
which constitute the epistemic and moral community” (Jenkins 2000, p. 15). The common good 
is fragmented.   
 A strong version of an enchanted education, according to this definition, might be neatly 
captured by examples culled from the previous chapter: Dewey’s vision of the school as an 
“embryonic community,” or his religious vision of a society where everyday occupations evince 
“…the unification of human desire and purpose” (1960, p. 86). A weaker version, however, 
might accept the fact of pluralism in modern society and promote the value of non-fragmented 
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persons pursuing a calling in modern society. For instance, a person who is committed to 
political action for his cause so resolutely that he has no time for playing the role of campaign 
fund raiser by pandering to rich donors, or to mix commerce and politics. This politician might 
recognize that his political opponent operates in the same way. Here there is a shared 
commitment to the political calling in spite of competing conceptions of political good, and thus 
a weak version of enchantment according to this second definition.   
 Though these definitions of disenchantment are distinct, Weber took them both to spring 
from the same historical process. Weber explains both calculated realties and social 
fragmentation as the results of rationalization. Rationalization, as Weber understands it, is a 
phenomenon perpetuated by intellectuals—importantly, not educators—who sought to 
encompass all aspects of life (particularly its irrational aspects) with rational explanation. The 
origin of rationalization, according to Weber, is located in theodicies used to legitimate or 
compensate for the distribution of fortune in society—for instance, accounts distinguishing 
between the blessed and the cursed, the saved and the damned. The purpose of these religious 
accounts, says Weber, was to explain the irrational aspects of life with logical consistency. This 
involved dismissing recourse to magical explanations. As these religious accounts moved away 
from magical means, they became progressively rationalized through highly developed 
intellectual articulations (e.g., sophisticated theologies) and the systematization of institutions 
(e.g., sophisticated church bureaucracies). Then, through juridical labors, notions of legitimate 
and illegitimate fortune became formalized and codified in the political domain. So, if the first 
form of rationalization was increasingly sophisticated religious distinctions between categories 
like the blessed and the cursed, the second form of rationalization is increasingly sophisticated 
distinctions between actions the state deems lawful and unlawful. According to Weber’s thesis, 
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in the modern West, all aspects of life became increasingly rationalized – i.e. increasingly 
calculated and fragmented, standardized and disconnected – leading to an age of disenchantment. 
Attempts to heed the incalculable or return to a past social unity may therefore be cast as 
attempts to partially recover something lost, or as proposals that favor a weaker version of re-
enchantment.   
 Incidentally, I suspect that the field of philosophy of education is overflowing with 
attempts at re-enchantment. For instance, relating to the first definition of disenchantment, 
consider Gert Beista’s recent claim that we should start to think about teaching in terms of 
“transcendence” and “[take] the idea and possibility of revelation seriously, as both a religious 
and secular concept” (2014, p. 56). Thinking about the teacher as a transcendent agent—one 
whose lessons are revelatory events—makes it literally impossible to operationalize teaching and 
measure teacher success. Thus if we think about improving teacher quality, according to Beista’s 
implications, technical means and calculation cannot work for us because the lessons of a 
transcendent teacher must be utterly incalculable: purely an affair of grace. In a disenchanted 
age, the educational expert may naturally rejoin: “Are you serious?”   
 For a less conspicuous example, which elicits a solution for the second meaning of 
disenchantment, consider Randall Curren’s recent claim that the insights of neo-Aristotelian 
philosophy, the demands of justice, and facts about “universal psychological needs,” bid us to 
use education in a manner that promotes human flourishing. For Curren, this means introducing 
students to values from a variety of social spheres “by expanding and deepening students’ 
understanding of what is valuable and enabling them to relate to things of value in ways that give 
their life meaning” (2013, p. 242). But how does this proposal take shape in practice? The 
attempt to envision the modern school in this manner, as a well of deeply meaningful social 
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values, is not aided by the fact that Curren provides no pedagogical illustrations. Curren’s 
account of education can thus be read as playing something of an alchemic role, like Dewey, 
because he suggests that a fragmented social reality can be unified through educational 
institutions. Deeply meaningful values (e.g., religious, economic, political, aesthetic, erotic, and 
intellectual) cohere in a curriculum that aims at student flourishing. But the possibility of a 
harmony of diverse meaningful values in school is questionable. For instance, a sociologist or 
multicultural theorist might ask: “ Can you not see that this school is rampant with antagonistic 
purposes?” These experts could also ask: “Are you serious?”   
 My suggestion that Beista and Curren are engaged in re-enchantment projects is meant to 
provoke doubt. I agree with them, and probably all philosophers of education, that the meaning 
of education and the conflict of values animating educational institutions should receive greater 
philosophical attention than these matters do today. At the same time, I do not think raising “Are 
you serious?” type questions to these proposals is at all unreasonable. For these various, indirect 
appeals to re-enchantment in philosophy of education tend to evoke ideas that ignore or evade 
the realities educators face while working in the bureaucratically organized schools described in 
chapter one. Against the tendency to animate the importance of education by recourse to either 
wholly incalculable events or wholly unified social spaces, Weber helps readers appreciate that 
disenchantment as a social condition is a deep-versus-superficial state of affairs. Shortcuts past a 
disenchanted social condition, particularly in an educational environment subjected to 
rationalization, are suspect as they evade or mystify the everyday realities of educators. How 
does one offer a solution that is not a shortcut?  Curiously enough, I suggest, Weber’s intellectual 
positions can provide a way forward.  
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 5.3.2     Intellectual positions  
 Weber’s understanding of the social world is premised upon two intellectual positions: 
the fact/value distinction and value collision. The fact/value distinction, as described in chapter 
two, relates to the first definition of disenchantment. Put simply, this distinction claims that there 
is a strict separation between descriptions, and empirical justification, and prescription, and 
normative justification. Phillip Gorski, a critic of Weber mentioned in chapter 2, describes the 
fact/value distinction in stark and categorical terms. Gorski explains that facts exist in an 
“intransitive realm that is clearly bounded from the influence of value” which means “values 
[are] subjective and relative” (2013, p. 546). Now if there were not an “intransitive realm” 
(which I take Gorski to mean something like a firewall) separating and distinguishing facts from 
values, then adopting a factual vs. an evaluative stance would be hard to distinguish. And yet, the 
importance of the fact/value distinction is affirmed throughout Weber’s work. Therein the 
assumption reigns that humans in general (and students in particular) are more inclined towards 
affirming their own values than confronting inconvenient facts. But is Weber really advancing 
what Gorski calls an “instransitive realm?” Weber’s description of “the (often hair-thin) line that 
separates science from belief” (Weber 2014, p. 137) does not seem to mesh with Gorski’s 
conception of the fact/value distinction, but that is jumping ahead of my argument. 
 Value collision, as referenced throughout this dissertation, relates to the second definition 
of disenchantment and rests on the notion that if we want to understand the world as it is we 
must not look for unity or harmony of values but aim to understand how value spheres conflict. 
Values spheres—or religious, economic, political, aesthetic, erotic, and intellectual values—do 
not harmoniously coalesce, but rather collide. Weber uses the metaphor of polytheism to explain 
value collision in “Science as a Vocation,”  
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as long as life remains immanent as is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only of an 
unceasing struggle of these gods with one another. Or speaking directly, the ultimately 
possible attitudes towards life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be 
brought to a final conclusion (1958, p. 152).   
Now, once again, employing a metaphor of polytheism seems like an enchanting way to describe 
this methodological position, but again I am getting ahead of my argument.   
 For the time being, note that the fact/value distinction and value collision are both 
intellectual positions that appear to assume, if not entrench, a disenchanted social condition. 
Indeed, if these are the only ways of realistically understanding the social world, Weber appears 
to be denouncing any attempt to understand it otherwise. And if we join the philosophers 
mentioned above and are troubled by the features of a disenchanted social world (e.g., scientism, 
buffered selves, value-free policy), we should also be troubled by Weber’s apparent defense of it. 
Furthermore, if we feel dismayed by initiatives resembling Weberian rationalization in 
educational reform, we should also be dismayed that Weber’s pedagogical principles are 
premised on fact/value distinction and value collision.  
5.3.3     Pedagogy  
  In his lecture “The Meaning of ‘Value Freedom’” (first presented in 1914), we find an 
explicit statement of Weber’s pedagogical principles. Weber remarks,  
what the student should learn above all from [his] professor in the lecture hall  
 is (1) the ability to content himself with simply carrying out a given task; (2) to 
 face facts—including (indeed: above all) those that are uncomfortable for him 
 personally—and to distinguish between stating [such facts] and taking an 
 evaluative stand with regard to them; (3) to rate his own person less highly than 
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 the task [before him]; and, consequently, to suppress the desire to parade, 
 unbidden, his personal tastes or other feelings (2014, p. 307). 
The presence of the fact/value distinction is explicit in item (2). Its purpose is to encourage 
students, through the professor’s example, to prioritize the demands of a given academic task 
(and eventually, a moral task, or cause) above their personal preferences.  
 The espousal of value collision also undergirds Weber’s pedagogical principles. Indeed, 
Weber’s endorsement of teaching value collision—and assumptions about the condition of 
confusion—rests upon the strong claim that the social world will not be understood and self-
knowledge (about one’s daemon) will not be achieved if value collision is ignored. To recall a 
passage mentioned in chapter 2, endorsing value collision, says Weber, is tantamount to eating 
from the “fruit of the tree of knowledge;” it is necessary for a self-determined life, i.e. one that is 
“lived in full awareness” and one that “chooses its own fate—the meaning, that is, of its activity 
and being” (2014, p. 315). Even whilst pointing to “hair-thin” lines between science and belief, 
referencing battling gods, and evoking Plato’s myth of Er, we might still have reason to believe 
that Weber does not simply endorse a disenchanted methodology, but, by inculcating these 
methodological positions, endorses forming disenchanted people, and espouses a “moral un-
education” too (Gorski 2012, p. 99).  
 Indeed, given the link between Weber’s methodological positions and pedagogy, there 
are good reasons to worry about the latter. Why, after all, must students learn to think through 
the disenchantment described by Weber when this social condition is so obviously problematic 
and liable to become inhumane by emphasizing the measureable to the exclusion of the 
meaningful? Moreover, even if Weber’s description of a disenchanted social condition does 
capture the conditions of schooling today, we might still affirm that the meaning of education 
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should not be reduced to what is conveniently measurable and education should do something to 
mend the fragmentation of values in society—i.e. do something to approximate the common 
good and discover or create the criteria by which to assess it. Weber’s pedagogy, at the end of 
the day, may only raise up students whose calling is to entrench the disaster of a disenchanted 
social condition and the educational institutions reproducing it. Prominent critiques of Weber can 
be read along these lines (cf. Strauss 1965, Habermas 1984). Nevertheless, I think that Weber, 
who could recognize that “the hopeless threat of disaster would not have made pedagogical 
sense” (Weber 1952, p. 324), has more pedagogical sense than even his astute critics care to 
acknowledge. This becomes clear when Weber’s remarks on disenchantment are read to bear 
meaning beyond descriptions of a disenchanted social condition.   
5.4  Thinking Through Disenchantment  
 Towards the end of “Science as a Vocation,” there is a brilliant passage that belies the 
claim that Weber was intent on entrenching a disenchanted social condition. The passage begins 
with Weber reiterating the methodological positions that inform his conception of pedagogy. 
First speaking of value collision, Weber says,    
The assumption that I am presenting to you is based on the fundamental fact that life, as 
long as it exists in itself and is understood for what it is, knows only the eternal struggle 
of those gods with one another, or, in non-figurative language, it is about the 
irreconcilability of the possible ultimate attitudes to life and the impossibility of any 
resolution of the conflicts among them. (Weber 2008, p. 48)  
Then Weber evokes the fact/value distinction,  
Whether or not under such [disenchanted] circumstances science is worthy to become a 
“vocation,” and whether or not it has an objectively worthwhile “calling” itself, is again a 
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value judgment about which nothing can be said in the lecture hall, as an affirmative 
answer is presupposed if any teaching is to take place there. I answer the question in the 
affirmative through my own work (Weber 2008, p. 48).   
So far the teacher does not provide guidance, neither helping students to reconcile the constant 
struggle between values nor helping students to distinguish between salient facts and higher 
values. But the lines that follow suggest that something more is at stake. Weber writes,  
 And I do it precisely from the standpoint that hates intellectualism and   
 regards it as the worst devil, just as today’s young people do, or—more   
 often—imagine they do. There is a saying that applies to such    
 people: “Reflect: the devil is old; grow old to understand him!” This   
 has nothing to do with a date on a birth certificate. Rather, the sense is   
 that we must not flee from the devil if we want to get the better of him,   
 as so many do today, but must first become thoroughly acquainted  with   
 his ways, in order to see what his power and his limitations are  
(2008, p. 48). 
This line does not seem to be void of direction. Quite the contrary: it evokes realism – “we must 
not flee from the devil” – but it also evokes something more “if we want to get the better of 
him.” What is this “something more”? Recent scholarship provides hints.  
 Political philosopher, Jeffrey Green, argues that Weber is not simply referring to 
disenchantment as a social condition in his lecture “Science as a Vocation,” but also testifying to 
disenchantment as a philosophical act. Like Nietzsche’s madman proclaiming that “God is dead” 
to a crowd of unbelievers, Green claims that Weber’s philosophical testimony “generates a moral 
direction out of the very insistence that moral direction is lacking” (2005, p. 55). According to 
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Green’s interpretation, “Disenchantment, as a philosophical pronouncement, is thus engaged in 
two struggles: against those who think they possess what is in fact missing and against those who 
have no sense what is missing” (2005, p. 66). Depending upon the audience, in other words, 
Weber’s testimony might bring about sober realism for those who “think they possess” what is 
missing, or might discomfit the romantics with “no sense” of what is missing. Thinking past the 
event of a momentous lecture, though, I am focused on what it would mean to engage in a 
Weberian practice of education amidst disenchanted educational institutions.  
 I think Green’s insight can be extended to the intellectual positions that inform Weber’s 
conception of pedagogy. To be sure, if these intellectual positions also testify to the 
philosophical meaning of disenchantment, then the claim that Weber’s pedagogy helps us to 
think through disenchantment becomes less absurd and more akin to the contemporary re-
enchantment proposals mentioned above.   
 Basit Bilal Koshul’s work in The Postmodern Significance of Max Weber’s Legacy 
(2005) supports this move. Koshul claims that Weber should not be read merely as a child of the 
Enlightenment, because Weber’s work “contains valuable resources if one is committed to the 
idea that disenchantment needs to be disenchanted” (p. 120). For the task of teaching 
disenchantment, Koshul’s phrase “disenchanting disenchantment” suggests that Weber is not 
leading students into either a state of nihilism/emotivism  (chapter 2) or fanaticism (chapter 3), 
nor merely providing a philosophical oration on disenchantment as Green suggests. The phrase 
“disenchanting disenchantment” suggests instead that Weber is encouraging students to see that 
there is something deeply senseless about reducing the world around them to a disenchanted 
social condition, for a disenchanted social condition undergirds the “cosmos” of capitalism 
(Weber 2003, p. 181) that mutes callings. Noting this tendency of Weber’s to get beyond 
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disenchantment leads Donald Macrae to jest that he is really a closeted magician—“a Prospero 
who must bury his staff under the gray sky of everyday rationality”—whose true lesson echoes 
the Satyr in Stephan George’s poem: “it is only through magic that life stays awake” (Macrae 
1974, pgs. 97-99).78 Macrae is not wrong, but a less playful, more accurate way to describe what 
Weber is doing is to take the term lesson more seriously. Understanding disenchantment, as 
Weber teaches it, begs thinking through it.  
 The intended direction of thought can be discerned by comparing disenchantment and 
rationalization with Weber’s conception of bureaucracy. To recall a line quoted in chapter 2, the 
historian Wolfgang J. Mommsen observes,  
Weber deliberately accentuated the hierarchal as well as the impersonal features of 
bureaucratic institutions, because he believed that through them the social as well as 
psychological conditions of modern man would be significantly altered. Seen from this 
vantage point, Weber’s theory of bureaucracy was an exercise in defending humanity. 
(emphasis added, 1992, p. 115)     
I do not think it a stretch to claim that Weber’s accentuated descriptions of disenchantment and 
rationalization accomplish the very same purpose. Furthermore, I think they can also be read 
pedagogically, as exercises in educating humanity. There is a tacit demand in Weber’s 
conception of pedagogy that students learn to get the better of a disenchanted social condition. 
This tacit demand does not evoke Satyrs, or strong versions of enchantment, but a fuller 
conception of humanity. It evokes people who have learned to affirm the “meaning … of [their] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  The poem is called “Goat and Man.” The context of this line is a debate between a Satyr and a 
man. As Macrae describes, “George has the goat-man sneer, “You are but man … our wisdom 
begins where your wisdom ends.” The man replies that the day of myth is over and the Satyr’s 
time is done. Yet, says the Satyr, “it is only through magic that life stays awake (Nur duch den 
Zauber bleibt das Leben wach)” (p. 99). 
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activity and being” in the world, people who heed the beckoning of the task calling them, and 
people who have learned to meet demands of the day despite the cosmos of capitalism.  
5.5  Teaching Re-enchantment  
 These rhapsodic lines may seem to run contrary to the appeal to realism that I used to 
philosophers of education like Beista and Curren.  If Weber’s teaching of disenchantment is 
directed towards a fuller conception of humanity, as I have just claimed, then it is a good time to 
inquire whether Weber’s teaching of disenchantment is one sobered by social realities or 
intoxicated by a cause. Oddly enough, the answer is both. The Weberian educator must ever toe 
that “(often hair-thin) line that separates science from belief,” and in doing so must balance a 
disenchanting political realism with a re-enchanting romanticism, attending to both the crushing 
realities and the lofty aspirations. As far as I have read, there is nothing resembling Weber’s 
position in the field of philosophy of education today. However, rather than pasting together two 
general terms, such as realism and romanticism, a surer explication of Weber’s pedagogy can be 
achieved by considering what occurs when Weber’s intellectual positions, described above, 
supplement each other.  
 We must now recall that the intellectual position of value collision—according to 
Weber—is premised upon the importance of a person’s self-examination and profound 
deliberation about the meaning of their life. If people’s lives are not to be carried out in a shallow 
manner, says Weber, then they must not “evade the choice between ‘God’ and the ‘Devil,’ and 
the fundamental personal decision as to which of the conflicting values belongs to the realm of 
one, and which to the other” (2014, p. 315). According to critics (cf. Habermas 1984) this 
valorization of personal decision may result in fanaticism: the reduction of the world, and the 
rational resistance it affords, to a person’s cause. But the Weberian educator does not simply let a 
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person’s cause be, but encourages him to consider it carefully, at a distance and with respect to 
inconvenient truths (cf. chapter 3). 
How exactly does an educator provide students with distance from an urgent cause? For 
Weber, careful guidance occurs by teaching students the history of value conflicts that are 
occurring in the present. This is how the fact/value distinction bears upon value collision or the 
condition of confusion. Instead of leaving students in the fray to make sense of the various value 
conflicts in their lives without support, and instead of playing the role of a modern sophist who 
advises students on the quickest path to any desired life, the Weberian educator guides students 
by teaching them the history of contemporary value conflicts. The educator instructs students 
about the course of human interests (material and ideal) and also about the demands of ideas that 
have “like switchmen … determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the 
dynamic of interest” (Weber 1958, p. 208). A student may arbitrarily choose to ignore these 
ideas and their course. However, the Weberian educator challenges such a student with the 
possibility that the cause he is compelled by has fueled human interests long before this 
particular “desire to parade, unbidden, his personal tastes or other feelings” (2014, p. 307). 
Recalling a point made in Chapter 3, the Weberian educator would remind students that they 
have been habituated by the tracks, images, interest, values, and ideas that have preceded them. 
In short, if they are to proceed meaningfully, they must realize that they are partially determined 
by meanings enacted in a condition of confusion. Should a student seriously desire to play the 
role of a “switchman,” or lay down entirely new tracks for his cause, this student should 
understand the magnitude of the task, says Weber, and learn “to rate his own person less highly 
than the task” (Weber 2014, p. 307).  
 The fact/value distinction thus provides substantive and realistic guidance for students 
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living amidst a world with a meaningful history. Yet the intellectual distinction between facts 
and values does not remain purely intellectual when it is substantiated and given life by a 
particular student’s prior habituation, knowledge, and desires. The “hair-thin” line between facts 
and values does not remain fixed in the same way, but must be adjusted on a case-by-case basis 
when teaching particular students. This way, particular students learn to internalize this 
distinction—described in chapter 4 as a distinction between science and politics—so that they 
can decide whether a practical problem arising in life demands distance or urgency.  
 It is also important to note, recalling an argument made in chapter 2, that the Weberian 
educator who challenges students to see their desires and values impartially is not encouraging 
nihilism, which would reduce all commitments to preferences and render all causes equally 
desirable. This cannot be the case. For, if it were, Weber would endorse the notion that 
committing to a particular cause is the same as committing to no cause at all. But the Weberian 
educator clearly privileges engaged commitment with particular ideas and larger insights about 
the meaning of one’s action in the world, and therefore seeks to clarify students’ understanding 
of what commitment to x cause demands. As a distinguished Weber scholar Fritz Ringer 
observes: “...[Weber] clearly dreamt of individuals who are moved by conscious principle and by 
a commitment to a ‘cause’ rather than by the all-too-human tendency to ‘adjust’” (emphasis 
added 2010, p. 255).   
 So described, the fact/value distinction is used to strengthen and mature the student’s 
resolve, not to mold them into nihilists or relativists or consumers. Italian sociologist Franco 
Ferrarotti helpfully observes,  
[Weber’s understanding of] objectivity … is produced for man in reference to his  need to 
enter into meaningful relations with the world and other men. It is  objectivity for man 
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himself, not concretized in a relativistic drift but, on the contrary, in taking positions in 
full awareness and rationally (scientifically)  testing his own potentialities in a given 
situation. (1982, p. 23-24)  
Objectivity, on this view, becomes a personal aspiration versus a given outcome, a solid 
subjectivity versus a “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986). But what stops this sober aspiration for 
objectivity from inoculating the problem of value collision and evading action that must be 
undertaken by the “striving person” in a world where diverse values conflict (Weber 2014, p. 
102)? 
 The Weberian educator who supplements the fact/value distinction with value collision, 
what I have called the condition of confusion, does not simply rest content with disseminating 
value-free facts. An indirect pedagogy on the limits of intellectual explanation is at play, too. 
When presenting facts about a particular cause, the educator must indirectly acknowledge that 
there is something more than what can be captured by scientific explanations. Scientific 
explanations are only one response to the world, and while they have manifest power, they also 
have limitations—particularly when the world assumes an expert’s testimony is the final word, 
and the value of independent thinking is pushed aside, and the striving person is consigned to 
gambling for higher stakes in the cosmos of capitalism.      
 Recalling Green’s observation that Weber taught disenchantment as a philosophical 
pronouncement indicates that the Weberian educator must not shy away from value collision 
when providing students with scientific (academic) explanations of causes in the world. Any 
presentation of facts is undergirded by intellectual values (e.g., trends, precision, rigor), and 
these values—even the value of rational consistency itself—need not monopolize reality. The 
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achievement here is not to ignore reason or evade the history of rationalism, but to be 
consciously aware of its limitations.  
 Pascal enigmatically writes, “Reason’s last step is the recognition that there are an 
infinite number of things which are beyond it. It is merely feeble if it does not go as far as to 
realize that” (Pascal 1984, p. 85). I think supplementing the fact/value distinction with value 
collision provides an analogous reminder for students encouraged to think through 
disenchantment as the fruit of rationalization, because diverse values will be part of and arise 
from a world that is not utterly disenchanted. The persuasive pull of these values as causes 
cannot be exhausted by third-person explanations or expert testimony. Whether a person decides 
to affirm a cause premised upon a social vision of the world as a mixture of religious blessings 
and curses, economic efficiencies and inefficiencies, political responsibilities and convictions, 
erotic climaxes and seductions, or aesthetic forms and materials is not a decision made by 
embracing the cause of scientific vocation alone. Weber might say the assessments of an expert 
in our disenchanted universities are “merely feeble if [he or she] does not go as far as to realize 
that” (Pascal 1984, p. 85) But, more to the point, Weber would say that an educator who, taking 
after a positivist like Auguste Comte, presents scientific explanations as the means to integrating 
all values is an educator who botches the task of guiding students (as particular persons) to think 
through a disenchanted social condition.79 Totalizing scientific explanations fails because they do 
not encompass all values and are liable to neglect particular causes. The Weberian educator 
knows this. She acknowledges a pantheon of values in the world but does not presume to govern 
it in the classroom. Instead, she envisions her cause, a fuller conception of humanity: students 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Though far from the course of this project, this failure is brilliantly depicted in Leopoldo Zea’s 
Positivism in Mexico. The title repays attention given Comte’s immodest claim to be an 
“educator of humanity.” 
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learning to understand the “meaning … of [their] activity and being;” students learning to 
actively respond to the beckoning of the task before them; and students heeding the demands of 
the day in modern educational institutions. This is a long, and perhaps rhapsodic, way of saying 
that the Weberian educator, who beholds her students working particular ideas, recognizes the 
demands of the day and foresees their educated callings, and is thereby enchanted by the 
momentous significance of her work.  
5.6  The Enchanted Educator  
 To recall the puzzle that launched this dissertation, I find it highly suggestive that in 
“Science as a Vocation”—a testimony to the disenchantment of the world—Weber opts to leave 
the educator enchanted. He claims “diese Kunst ist eine persönliche Gabe” (“This art is a 
personal gift”)—a phrase he uses elsewhere to denote charisma, divinity, or grace—“and by no 
means necessarily coincides with the scientific abilities of a scholar” (Weber 1958 p. 79). There 
is a big difference between the expert’s explanation and the educator’s art. Inside the classroom, 
the Weberian educator is not serving the ideas of specialized scholarship; she is echoing the 
immediate demands and future callings of her particular students. Her cause, we might say, is to 
echo the demands of a fuller conception of humanity through her particular students, re-
enchanting the world on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, the Weberian educator heeds her 
cause by educating her students’ capacity for a calling: for taking an active responsibility for a 
cause in the world and simultaneously remaining faithful to themselves. To work at this cause, 
the educator must provoke her students’ active responsibility for particular content in manner 
that contributes to and anticipates the formation of the ultimate meaning of their obligations in 
the world, experienced and lived out as their “demands of the day.”    
	  
	   159 
 “So any end goes?” Familiar deflationary objections can be raised here, once again, such 
as whether the Weberian educator would be content to educate a young Hitler to recognize and 
affirm his calling. These objections distract from appreciating the passionate commitment of a 
teacher who serves particular students according to their reception of causes in the world. Put 
another way, these quick objections focus on the product (good, evil, marketable, mediocre) and 
not on how much a teacher would need to care for her students to (1) content herself with 
“simply carrying out a given task”; (2) face facts “including (indeed: above all) those that are 
uncomfortable for [her] personally” and distinguish “between stating [such facts] and taking an 
evaluative stand with regard to them”; (3) rate her “own person less highly than the task [before 
her]; and, consequently … suppress the desire to parade, unbidden, [her] personal tastes or other 
feelings” (Weber 2014, p. 307). In short, those who would raise deflationary objections skip over 
the educational practice of teaching particular students and try to get straight to the student-as-
product. The objection misfires because a Weberian philosophy of education does not presume to 
foresee the student-as-product. Jumping back and forth between educational practice and 
educational outcomes, as the objection bids us to do, is really a strategy for neglecting 
educational practice and its slow labor. The deflationary objection, foreseeing the student-as-
product, misses the unobtrusive enchantment of educational practice: the personal gift of 
recognizing, awakening, testing, and guarding the independent thinking of others. This is the 
educator’s cause.      
 Expressed in terms of the contemporary re-enchantment proposals mentioned earlier, 
hopefully in a manner that makes their insights relevant to educators, the personal gifts the 
Weberian educator bestows might be: (1) less anxiety about meaninglessness of the modern 
world, as people critically affirm the “meaning … of [their] activity and being;” (2) points of 
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contact with fullness, through people who heed the beckoning of the tasks calling them; and (3) 
creative social and political possibilities raised by people who know how to recognize the power 
and limitations of expert testimony and value-neutral policies, and work for sorely neglected 
causes. These are people who elevate the ethical status of everyday life by meeting their 
“demands of the day.”   
5.7  Towards Responsible Re-Enchantment   
 The purpose of this chapter has been to argue that Weber’s work provides a propaedeutic 
for responsible re-enchantment. This involves first understanding the social realities of 
disenchantment, but also teaching about and amidst disenchanting social conditions in a way that 
provokes students to think through them. Weber’s teaching of disenchantment moves 
simultaneously towards greater political realism and a greater romanticism. To recall Green’s 
description, “Disenchantment, as a philosophical pronouncement, is thus engaged in two 
struggles: against those who think they possess what is in fact missing and against those who 
have no sense what is missing” (2006, p. 66). Weber’s pedagogy for thinking through 
disenchantment helps students to realistically acknowledge our disenchanted social condition 
(i.e. to realize what is missing and the institutions, experts, and expectations that insure its 
absence), but also to romantically overcome this condition by responding to causes amidst such a 
condition.  
 It is tempting to imagine that this synthesis amounts to a lonely teacher railing against 
educational institutions, engaging in actions that Karl Löwith described as “the contradiction, 
always conquered anew, between the recognition of a rationalized world and the counter-
tendency towards freedom for self-responsibility” (Löwith 1993, p. 77), or perhaps what Rogers 
Brubaker called an “ethos of engaged opposition” and “responsible struggle” (Brubaker 1984, p. 
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111). But portraying the educator as merely coping in an ‘iron cage’ is to miss the significant 
cause afforded to her by a Weberian philosophy of education. The educator who compels 
students to take an active responsibility for ideas that arise in the classroom, the educator who 
hopes her work is continuous and will contribute to her students’ educated callings, works for a 
weighty purpose. Through educational practice, through the slow labor of education, she 
responsibly re-enchants the world, “from person to person and pianissimo” (Weber 2008, p. 51).   
 Touching. But this image, perhaps like all appeals to educational practice that do not pay 
homage to the norm of institutional realism (mentioned in chapter 1), appears too slight to 
leverage against an educational climate animated by a frenzy of economic and political aims, 
which, over the course of time, have managed to push it towards increasing Weberian 
rationalization (cf. Mehta 2013). In such a climate, an appeal to the notion of re-enchantment 
springing from an educator who is deeply concerned with the formation of her students’ lives can 
quickly sound sentimental. To become more persuasive, at least today, it would demand the 
support of educational experts and must be corroborated with evidence (business quotas, brain 
scans, and big data), for whatever the educator’s good intentions may be, it remains true that 
“technical means and calculation work for us instead” (Weber 2008, p. 31). The demand for 
evidence to ground and improve educational practice becomes particularly persuasive in the 
cosmos of capitalism, which “educates [erzieht] and selects the economic subjects which it needs 
through a process of economic survival of the fittest.” There seems to be an elective affinity, in 
other words, between the voices of experts subjecting the educator’s cause and the immense 
economic forces clearly shaping her student’s aspirations. Thus to talk of the educator and re-
enchantment, it might be said, is merely to make a groundless, sentimental appeal. Indeed, it is a 
telling sign of a disenchanted age when appeals to inappropriately calculable ideas about 
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education are taken to be appeals to subjective experience or an unreasonable, personal sentiment 
alone.  
 Yet the decision-makers determining the grounds and urgency of educational reform have 
wholly neglected the quality of action springing from internal commitments. Whether a student 
heeds the demands of an idea springing from an intellectual problem or simply learns to master a 
rote task assigned by educational institutions is an inconsequential distinction from their 
perspective. Yet, if the argument of this dissertation holds, their perspective entails a meager 
conception of humanity. For just as it does not matter whether the student heeds the demands of 
ideas or merely demonstrates mastery, from this perspective it does not matter if people think 
independently about the demands of the day so long as they adjust to the given political and 
economic demands of the “cosmos” of capitalism (Weber 2003, p. 181). In short, there is 
continuity between their conception of education and the low value they ascribe to independent 
thinking about the demands of the day. They thus promote a slight and impoverished conception 
of humanity. An educator who works for her particular students and prioritizes educational 
practice inevitably resists this stunted conception of education. She does this, simply, by 
prioritizing education and acknowledging the formative trajectory of particular ideas as her 
particular students take them up. Her resistance is not simply motivated by a lone “responsible 
struggle” (Brubaker 1984, p. 111) against the inhumanity of educational institutions, but is also 
motivated by the fuller conception of humanity that is harbored by her cause.  
But how can the vision of the Weberian educator gain traction in today’s outcome-
focused, educational climate when she is forced to work with unpredictable human material? 
One place to start would be to simply observe classrooms in anticipation, as if persons were 
coming to be and as if their agency were developing in the classroom. David T. Hansen has 
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admirably learned to watch and wonder in this manner. He asks: “Where are the moral 
dimensions of teaching? Are they in the eye of the beholder? Or are they there in the classroom 
‘spread around’ and over and in the actions of teachers and students? If they are there to be seen 
how does one learn to see them?” (Hansen 2007, p. 50). Hansen’s questions are poignantly raised 
in a disenchanted school system—where moments of enchantment are not pronounced and little 
resembles the “stirring of the prophetic spirit that once spread through the great communities like 
a raging fire and welded them together” (Weber 2008, p. 51).   
 However, it is important to ask what witnessing and reflecting upon quiet re-enchantment 
in the classroom serves to accomplish beyond capturing moral or aesthetic moments for the 
enjoyment of spectators. A cynic might remark: “You have a preference for seeing education this 
way rather than that. What you say is nice, but why should we listen to it?” Hansen (et. al.) 
remark that classroom observation focused on moments of the students’ formation as persons 
supplies working knowledge, which constitutes “[an] invitation, an opportunity, and what feels 
like a calling” (2014, p. 169). While it is exceptional and admirable for an educational scholar to 
heed a calling to attend to educational practice, and work like Hansen’s certainly does not bid 
educators to become what I called in my first chapter “institutional adjusters” or “institutional 
resisters”, a lingering worry is that documenting moments of re-enchantment in contemporary 
educational institutions leaves the educator in her present state, beset by chance obstructions and 
magical moments, struggling to prioritize educational practice but without any authority. For 
what good reason should the educator’s cause gain authority against perspectives that proceed by 
distrusting its reality and scoffing at its efficacy?    
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Conclusion 
6.1  Rehearsing the Argument  
  The general claim I have sought to defend in this dissertation is that philosophers of 
education can best reflect upon the fundamental obligation to prioritize educational practice by 
reflecting upon its ideal qualities realistically, that is, despite and given contemporary 
educational institutions and their situation in a (non-ideal and pluralistic) modern society. 
Although educational institutions are shaped by a host of colliding social interests and values—
whether these be parental, political, religious, economic, or intellectual—the motivation for 
prioritizing educational practice involves the lives of particular students, i.e. the persons an 
education should work for. And it is the ideal quality of the fundamental obligation of education 
that best expresses the demand that none of the interests or values animating educational 
institutions (or society at large) should shape students, unless they can be understood and 
affirmed by particular students as their “demands of the day,” that is, unless these interests and 
values can support a student’s educated calling. I have sought to demonstrate that Max Weber’s 
conception of education provides the resources for forming a philosophy of education. By 
resources I have not simply meant Weber’s explicit remarks about education, but also the way in 
which his work sheds light on the relevant concerns, arguments, and questions that philosophers 
of education should address today. My argument has been that a Weberian philosophy of 
education provides a timely means for reflecting upon the ideal quality of the fundamental 
obligation to prioritize educational practice—an educated calling—and that it does so in a 
realistic manner, acknowledging the confusions, conflicts, and external demands animating 
educational institutions in modern society. 
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 Although much of this dissertation has been driven forward by posing objections, such as 
the objection that Weber is a relativist (chapter 2), ignores habituation (chapter 3), or 
impoverishes social experience (chapter 4), the positive account of a Weberian philosophy of 
education springs from Weber’s conception of ideas as mysterious, non-specialized, and 
obligating, and the claim that the Weberian educator who teaches students to think independently 
about particular ideas does so with the anticipation of their educated calling. The central tenet of 
a Weberian philosophy of education is an educated calling. I analyzed this tenet as active 
responsibility bearing upon the ideas arising from a student’s self-examination or daemon 
(chapter 2), which involves a student’s relationship to the world (habituation) and the demands 
arising from it, or causes (chapter 3). In chapter 4, I defended the worth of an educated calling in 
modern society. Expressed as a formula, a skeletal sketch of my positive account of a Weberian 
philosophy of education runs as follows:  
educated callings = active responsibility (daemon & cause) 
In chapter 5, then I considered the Weberian educator’s social vision. I added the term 
“responsible re-enchantment,” and augmented the formula as follows:  
educated callings = active responsibility (daemons & causes) à responsible re-enchantment 
I think this formula readily communicates the structure of the dissertation, but the 
structure can also be captured through a deductive argument. I offer it to readers at this stage of 
the dissertation as a means of assessing its argument. The argument, a hypothetical syllogism, 
runs as follows:   
(1) If the Weberian educator prioritizes educational practice and attends to her particular 
students’ independent thinking, then she is conceiving of students as persons whose 
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responses to the “demands of the day” shape their ideas about their lives, or (expressed 
by analogy) their daemons.  
(2) If the educator conceives of students as imminent and everyday daemon-like persons, 
then she cannot neglect her students’ worlds: both their habituation and their ethical 
“demands” for changing it, or causes.  
(3) If the educator attends to her students’ habituation in modern society and the demands of 
acting for a cause (or ethical task), then she hopes that her daily work echoing the 
demands of particular ideas will someday re-echo as the demands of her students’ 
callings despite our modern society’s prioritization of a success ethic and its spurning of 
callings.   
Therefore, the Weberian educator who prioritizes the practice of educational and attends to 
her students’ independent thinking, hopes her work will one day echo the demands of her 
students educated calling in modern society. The Weberian educator’s cause envisions a 
fuller conception of humanity. I have called this vision of educated callings: responsible re-
enchantment. Thus, from the Weberian educator, who prioritizes educational practice and 
attends to her particular students, springs a particular gift:  
the source of responsible re-enchantment.   
This is the positive argument of my dissertation. I submit its soundness and cogency to the 
reader’s judgment.    
 The subheading of this dissertation reads “Towards a Weberian Philosophy of 
Education,” because I do not think it offers a definitive Weberian philosophy of education. 
Besides the obvious need to better understand Weber and his legions of commentators, there is a 
greater need for me, namely, to better articulate why I am drawn to Weber’s work. Weber bids us 
	  
	   167 
to think about education in a more limited, more realistic, and more pessimistic way, but does so, 
as I see it, in order to for us to better reflect upon, not avoid, educational practice and its ideal 
qualities. The prospect of better understanding this tension between realism and romanticism, for 
lack of better terms, is why I continue to be motivated by my study of Weber. My highest 
ambition as a philosopher of education, however, is not to write the definitive Weberian 
philosophy of education, but rather to articulate a philosophy of education that both grounds and 
quickens the responsibility to educate. Moving towards a Weberian philosophy of education is 
not an end-in-itself, but a labor that compels self-clarification and a sense of responsibility. 
Weber has thus been the educator of—and not purveyor of—this ambition.  
6.2  Next Steps 
I would like to conclude this dissertation by briefly mentioning how the perspective of 
the Weberian educator might govern the reform of educational institutions and the public’s 
conception of educational practice. At present, as I suggested in the introduction, employees of 
educational institutions have difficulty taking responsibility for the priority of educational 
practice. I explained that employees of educational institutions have trouble prioritizing 
educational practice because they are either (a) employed as educational experts, decision-
makers, or administrators to design and enforce impersonal, institutional guidelines, or (b) they 
must work with the tension of living off of educational institutions while working for particular 
students.80  
So, what power does the educator’s perspective have to change this state of affairs? The 
answer is, at present, very little. But to inquire how the educator’s vision might govern the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 I fully realize that educational administrators also feel the tension between living off 
educational institutions and working for particular students (and teachers). I would not object to 
the claim that they, at times, feel it in more pronounced ways. But this amounts to an idle debate 
given the argument of this dissertation.   
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reform of educational institutions is to raise a question about her normative authority to do so:81 
that is, the good reasons supporting the assertion that the Weberian educator’s vision should have 
authority over the domains of educational reform and the public’s education about education. I 
do hope the good reasons amount to more than this negative claim: because educational policy-
makers and the testing regime is awful, that’s why. 
But a caveat is in order. To be very clear, the argument of this dissertation will be 
undermined if the power of the educator’s vision moves beyond the purview of the classroom or 
lecture hall and proceeds to renege upon the fundamental obligation to prioritize educational 
practice. The aim of philosophy of education, as I see it, is not covert political philosophy. The 
aim of this field is to understand how and why an educator goes about prioritizing educational 
practice. The educator who does so catches sight of particular persons in formation as they heed 
the demands of ideas. Presenting ideas to “untrained and receptive mind[s]” (Weber 2008, p. 30) 
and echoing the demands of these ideas is the source of the Weberian educator’s authority. 
Political actors, on the other hand – at least in a mass democracy – hope to capture and move 
crowds. They aim to secure the power to define what is mass and public. Political authority, as 
Sheldon Wolin observes, “…is distinguished from other forms of authority in that it speaks in the 
name of a society considered in its common quality…that the order that political authority 
presides over is one that should extend throughout the length and breadth of society as a whole” 
(2004, p. 11). The claim that the educator’s authority is a form of covert political authority, i.e. 
an ability to define political “goods” or secure evidence of broad social progress, is one I take to 
be a categorical mistake. The educator only begins to appear like a political authority when the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
81	  I am not referencing Weber’s descriptive definition of authority, which is used synonymously 
with domination: “…the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be 
obeyed by a given group of persons” (Weber 1978, p. 212).  
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grace of any particular student’s independent thinking is forgotten and the priority of educational 
practice is ignored. Although magnifying the political implications of education might be a 
viable strategy for investing philosophy of education with significance, the practice of education, 
as I have sought to demonstrate, need not be associated with momentous political possibilities to 
justify its significance.  
A Weberian philosophy of education claims that momentous moral and existential 
significance resides in particular persons working ideas. The Weberian educator gains authority 
by echoing the demands of particular ideas and, because of the incalculable, non-specialized, and 
obligating aspects of ideas, by pointing to a moral and existential reality that makes demands of 
particular persons. Put otherwise, the authority of the Weberian educator deals with a person’s 
“immediate responsibility,” not a person’s association with common images, slogans or brands – 
that is, not with a person’s “reduced sense of responsibility,” the psychological state that seems 
to be a prerequisite for political action in a mass democracy (Schumpeter 2008, p. 261-262). So I 
ask again, how might the Weberian educator’s specific form of authority bear upon the reform of 
educational institutions and the formation of the public?   
 6.2.1    Governing Educational Institutions  
 I concluded chapter 5 by mentioning the quiet charisma of the Weberian educator as she 
prioritizes educational practice. I raised the question about how philosophers of education who 
recognize this charisma might better persuade decision-makers, experts, and administrators, i.e. 
those who are not directly involved with educational practice, to prioritize it? I take this to run 
parallel to the question of the educator’s normative authority and the good reasons supporting the 
transformation of educational institutions according to the Weberian educator’s perspective.  
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 Recall how I mentioned in chapter 1 that education would be a profession without dignity 
if it did not involve a relationship with particular students. This dissertation has spent a 
considerable amount of time developing the motivation to educate particular students by 
analyzing the meaning of an educated calling. Nevertheless, it has said very little about the 
dignity of the Weberian educator. By dignity I mean the esteem the Weberian educator should 
receive from others based upon her educational practice. A correlate of the Weberian educator’s 
dignity would be her contempt for administrators or other educators who treat education as 
though it lacked a cause.82 I think the Weberian educator’s evaluative attitudes hold the key to 
extending the sway of her authority. More specifically, I contend that educational institutions 
should be transformed by the evaluative attitudes of the Weberian educator, insofar as they 
spring from her obligation to prioritize educational practice. Why is this the case?  
 The Weberian educator’s evaluative attitudes should transform educational institutions 
because they are nearest to the practice of education. Yet they are not synonymous with the 
practice of education. As Robert Paul Wolff observes in his brilliant chapter “A Discourse on 
Grading,” evaluation and ranking do not serve an educational function; according to Wolff, only 
criticism does as “the analysis of a product or performance for the purpose of identifying and 
correcting its faults or reinforcing its excellences” (1969, p. 59). The Weberian educator, who 
echoes the demands of ideas, is engaged in what Wolff calls criticism. However, the Weberian 
educator’s dignity and contempt for wayward administrators and educators clearly involves 
evaluation and ranking (a comparative or positional aspect). Again, evaluation and ranking are 
not synonymous with the practice of education. Granting this, my claim is still that the Weberian 
educator’s evaluative attitudes are most reliable for transforming educational institutions because 
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  For more on contempt, see especially Bell (2013) but also Darwall (2013).  
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they are nearest to the practice of education. An administrator or politician who seeks sweeping 
reform may be motivated by a compelling image of schools as a whole or the state of education 
writ large, but his evaluative attitudes – even if supported by numbers and sanctions – are far 
removed from the practice of education. An example will help demonstrate what I intend to say 
about this difference between the educator’s and the administrator’s evaluative attitudes.  
Imagine a major urban school district has elected a new superintendent. The 
superintendent promises to make radical gains, and proceeds by whipping school principals into 
shape. Let us say a particular school delivers on the superintendent’s promises and makes 
unprecedented gains in test performance. The superintendent lavishes praise upon the principal 
and teachers, and all parties receive awards and bonuses. Unfortunately, it then becomes clear 
that the principal and teachers cheated on the test results and the superintendent was complicit in 
the scam. Now public disapprobation is cast on all parties.83 One response is that this bunch are 
simply bad apples—the exception, not the rule. Another response, however, is that the very 
occurrence of this scam betrays a disconcerting gap between an educational decision-maker’s 
evaluative attitudes and means of justifying them, and the practice of education as it occurs on 
the ground. The Weberian educator’s contempt, in this case, would not be aimed at cheating on 
the tests per se, but at the deference paid to a practice that has scant educational value and no 
capacity to echo the demands of particular students’ ideas and thereby participate in their 
formation as persons. The Weberian educator’s evaluative attitude is not synonymous with the 
practice of education, but it is closest to it because the Weberian educator feels an “immediate 
responsibility” for her students’ thinking.   
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  Specifically, I have in mind the testing scandals in Atlanta Georgia ca. 2009. But a similar 
scandal occurred in D.C. (ca. 2010).    
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  An argument for another day is that heeding the educator’s evaluative attitudes provides 
a better form of accountability than top-down bureaucratic management or economic incentives 
and sanctions based upon performance. If the purpose of educational institutions is to house 
educational practice, than the educator’s evaluative attitudes form the best way to hold them 
accountable. This does not mean educators are free from criticism; it means they evaluate each 
other, and participate in a network of evaluations.   
Were I to flesh this idea out, I would likely connect my argument to the recent work of 
Philip Pettit and Geoffry Brennan called The Economy of Esteem (2005). Quite relevantly for the 
purposes of my project, Pettit and Brennan’s work was motivated by the treatment of educators 
in Australia. They write: “Like many countries, Australia has begun to submit teachers and 
academics to a pattern of relentless scrutiny and continuous accounting that consumes an 
extraordinary amount of time, demoralizes and destabilizes those in the business of education, 
and makes the education profession less and less attractive to young talent (2005, p. 6). Pettit and 
Brennan respond by recalling the economy of esteem: namely, how the formation of evaluative 
attitudes can discipline people and hold them accountable, and, at least in the case of education, 
can do so more effectively than the “iron fist” of a bureaucratic command structure or the 
“invisible hand” of a market. My argument would be that the Weberian educator’s dignity, 
secured by working for particular students, also grounds her normative authority to hold an 
institution and its employees accountable. As I foresee the conclusion of this argument, 
educational institutions have zero need for the managerial class of educational administrators 
who currently govern them. Their positions could be effectively eliminated without any real loss 
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if technology were effectively utilized,84 if the evaluative attitude of the Weberian educator 
exerted its due power, and if the public came to understand that granting such power to educators 
is not arbitrary, but springs from the fundamental obligation to prioritize educational practice.  
6.2.2    Educating the Public  
 There is reason to believe that the public is not well positioned to take responsibility for 
the priority of educational practice. Public reflection on “education” is largely conveyed through 
newsworthy events, or sensational occurrences demanding immediate action or decision. Violent 
crimes in schools present an obvious example, yet significant media attention is also given to 
strife surrounding educational policy: issues such as Universal Pre-K, common core standards, 
and the cost of higher education. It is important for the media to report on educational policies; 
the direction of these policies will determine the shape of educational institutions. And yet, 
educational policies are not settled by educational practice, by what decent educators aspire to do 
on a daily basis, but rather by the organization and amplification of educational interests, legal 
procedures, and, ultimately, by elites with the power to make political or economic decisions. 
The fundamental obligation under consideration, the priority of educational practice, does not 
feel like a public concern. Understandably, it is difficult for the public to reflect upon educational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 What I mean here certainly requires further explanation. Roughly, I think machines could 
effectively enforce the impersonal rule of law in educational institutions. For instance, the 
teacher who shows up late to work one day need not be caught and chastised by an administrator, 
but the event should be documented. If the pattern continues, other teachers will perceive its 
negative effect the institution’s commitment to educational practice. However, if this is a one-
time occurrence, and the teacher generally is giving her best effort, then the administrator’s 
lecture serves no purpose. Moreover, if a group of teachers evaluate this teacher as neglectful (or 
incompetent) in her practice of education, then she could use data to make a case for her 
position. “Look, I leave work three hours late everyday (etc.); I am doing my best. Give me 
another shot.” As opposed to mass accountability schemes, these sorts of discussions (which 
utilize data collected by machines) could occur as “community maintenance.” The real 
discipline, however, would come from a collective effort to uphold educators’ dignity.     
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practice in a state of affairs where education only becomes subject to reflection through the lens 
of newsworthy events—in short, through spectacles of what it should not be.  
 The final question I will take up is: how can the public be led to reflect upon educational 
practice in a manner that motivates them to prioritize it? Perhaps through continuous academic 
inquiry about educational practice, the results of which are artistically presented by the media. 
This is John Dewey’s response in The Public and Its Problems (1988). Dewey writes that “…a 
genuine social science would manifest its reality in the daily press” (p. 180), and that an 
organized, articulate public can come into being when “…free social inquiry is indissolubly 
wedded to the art of full and moving communication” (1988 p. 184). Applied to the subject at 
hand, this means that social scientists would conduct inquiries about educational practice, then 
artists would dramatize and illustrate the results, and the media would communicate them. I see 
no reason why Weber would disagree with this approach. However, at least based upon this 
dissertation, I am not sure it sufficiently captures what Weber meant by the social scientist being 
a “national educator” (Scaff 1977, p. 131). More specifically, while it might capture what it 
means to present ideas to “…untrained but receptive minds” (Weber 2008, p. 30), it does not 
seem likely to capture the Weberian educator’s role in provoking students to take an active 
responsibility for their lives by echoing the demands of particular ideas. It is also unclear to me, 
based on reasons supplied in chapter 4, that Dewey’s approach would sufficiently provoke the 
public to take an active responsibility for education in modern society. Of course, Weber was not 
so naïve as to think that actions are governed by the demands of ideas alone.  
 As Weber famously claims in “The Social Psychology of World Religions,” “…material 
and ideal interests, directly govern the conduct of men...” That is, according to the subject at 
hand, the de facto motivation to educate tends to operate as a means for satisfying these interests. 
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However, as Weber continues, “….very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by 
‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the 
dynamic of interest” (Weber 1958, p. 280). So ideas about educational practice do have the 
power to determine the “tracks” of education and thus are not inconsequential or eliminable. 
Whether these ideas are understood or not matters. For instance, the American Dream as a 
motivator might truly be driven by selfish ambition to secure more material goods than others. 
However, the dynamic of interest is set along the tracks of certain ideas, which can be clearly 
understood: for instance, the ideas of “equality of opportunity,” “upward mobility” (cf. Duncan 
and Murnane 2014), and how educational practice should realize these ends. These ideas are not 
inconsequential or eliminable because they express demands to educate citizens according to the 
vision cast by the American Dream. The Weberian educator would echo the demands of the 
ideas determining the American Dream without ignoring the presence of conflicting ideas.  
 The Weberian educator’s authority should be used to transform the public’s conception of 
educational practice, to provoke the public to clarify and take responsibility for ideas about 
education that will determine its future. Here the Weberian educator aspires to promote 
independent thinking about educational practice and warns the public about rushing along 
particular educational “tracks” based upon the force of a “momentary impression” (Weber 1975, 
p. 154). In this case, to extend the Weberian educator’s authority is to extend the hope that ideas 
about education can become more significant and more consequential in determining the public’s 
oversight of educational institutions. Here the philosopher of education assuredly finds an 
important component of his or her calling: to present the understanding sought and conveyed by 
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